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“I don’t feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. 
The main interest in life and work is to become someone else  
that you were not in the beginning.”
– Michel Foucault
Preface: The yin and yang of social justice 
These four years seem to have lasted no longer than four months. From intense teamwork 
throughout 2017 focused on developing methodological and conceptual frameworks, 
to conducting the first phase of fieldwork in Russia in 2018, to participating in fascinating 
conference trips and research visits in 2019 and 2020, to hours of enlightening interviews 
held everywhere in between–this was an incredible research experience. As I began 
progressing with the project, the great puzzle of digital vigilantism and its manifestation 
in Russia began to unveil. I do not claim to have completed the full mosaic, but hope 
that my research has helped in identifying contexts, concepts, structures, approaches 
and experiences in digital vigilantism, which can improve the scientific understanding 
of the phenomenon and be of greater societal value.
In this preface, my task is to set the mood for the dissertation, to offer a condensed 
flavour of the phenomenon of digital vigilantism. Amateur justice provision, often 
informed by subjective morality and perceptions of right and wrong, inevitably leads 
to controversies and arguments for and against. Throughout this research journey, in 
conversations with friends, family, colleagues and acquaintances, I was often asked 
a question along the lines of “is this practice of vigilantism fundamentally good or 
fundamentally bad?” When confronted with such a question, the social scientist 
in me demands that I deliver a lecture of a few hours and let people draw their own 
conclusions; at the same time, the urge to maintain healthy relationships with people 
around me demands a more concise response. As a compromise, allow me to share two 
stories that can hopefully illustrate somewhat of an answer to this central question. 
The only inmates inside the panopticon
On the night of 13 March 2020, having completed my Erasmus+ Teaching Exchange in St. 
Petersburg, Russia, I flew to my hometown of Namangan, Uzbekistan. I was going to be 
joined by my wife, Natasha, who was conducting fieldwork in neighbouring Kazakhstan 
and together we would fly back to Rotterdam shortly afterwards. So we thought.  
On 15 March, Uzbekistan recorded its first COVID-19 case and announced the closure 
of its borders as of the next morning. This meant that no citizens of Uzbekistan (me) would 
be able to leave the country for an undetermined period of time. Foreigners (Natasha) 
would no longer be able to enter the country. Our small family was being separated 
by the pandemic. In a panic, I considered rushing to the nearest border town before 
borders closed at midnight and reuniting with Natasha in another country. Suddenly, 
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the phone rang. A neighbourhood clinic representative on the other end invited me for 
a checkup given that I had just returned from abroad, or in their words, “from Dubai”, 
where I, in fact, have never been. The checkup was mandatory in compliance with orders 
given by the country’s National Guard. I walked to the clinic where my temperature was 
recorded at 36.5°C, and I was put on house quarantine for 14 days with daily checkups 
by the nurses and the National Guard. The escape plan crumbled in one instance. The 
new normal was about to begin. 
In the days that followed, a sign was glued to the front door of my parents’ house 
reading: “This household is on quarantine due to COVID-19”. At this point, information 
about the virus was still limited, and such a sticker on the front door in the best traditions 
of World War II-era ‘chalk marks’ was interpreted by the neighbours as “This is the 
‘beehive’ of the virus”. They could as well have written CORONAVIRUS on our foreheads. 
In the meantime, rules and regulations were tightening by the hour. Movement 
between and within cities in Uzbekistan became restricted. An officer from the National 
Guard was then posted outside of our door. The man literally stood outside and stared 
at the front door from nine to five to make sure no one entered or left. As a surveillance 
scholar, I felt like we were inside of the panoptic prison and we were its only inmates. 
After 14 days and no symptoms, I was told not to leave the house for an additional 14 
days “just in case”. Such strict measures were accompanied by messages in the national 
media which framed COVID-19 as an “import” brought by those travelling around the 
world. Some reports even made a distinction between “imported” cases and local 
contamination by referring to the latter as “civilian cases”–thus framing compatriots 
who came from abroad as some sort of combatants. The sign, the officer, and the media 
quickly produced results, with strangers throwing rocks into my parents’ backyard at 
night. People saw us as a danger and retaliated. I felt flattened. I do not see any better 
word I could use here.  
At that point of my life, I had been researching vigilantism for over three years and 
had read hundreds of stories of people who experienced citizen-led justice, public 
humiliation, shaming, unsolicited exposure, and other forms of collective retaliation 
and punishment. I was afraid of one day finding myself in the same position as the 
targets of vigilantism I studied. My case, however, was relatively tame compared to 
what other people experienced in terms of public shaming and online harassment. 
The so-called “patient zero”–the first person to have been diagnosed with COVID-19 
in Uzbekistan–experienced bullying and death threats online. After diagnosed cases 
increased, measures were finally taken to protect the identity of those who tested 
positive.  However, when ambulances would arrive at someone’s house to take them 
to the hospital, the neighbours would film the process on their phones and share the 
footage across social media channels revealing personal information such as the names 
and addresses of the “virus carriers”. Again, patients were not only haunted by the 
dangerous virus but also by a wave of accusations: “Because of you, we are all going to 
die”. 
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This experience at the end of my PhD trajectory underscored the significance and 
relevance of studying citizen-led justice. Public exposure and shaming are becoming 
widespread, gaining new approaches and modes with increasing access to mobile 
devices and social media. COVID-19 illuminated some of the existing and deeply 
ingrained practices. Targets accused of numerous delinquencies are exposed and 
publicly shamed. What is particularly alarming is that those that are vulnerable offline 
become even more vulnerable online, be they women, migrants, sexual minorities, 
ethnic minorities, political activists, or COVID-19 patients, etc. Seeking justice through 
legal channels after falling target to mob law is challenging, especially in the context of 
selective application of the law.
When we all thought 2020 could not get any crazier 
Time Magazine proclaimed 2020 as “the worst year ever”, but for many places around 
the world the pandemic was not the only challenge. In October 2020, my second home, 
Kyrgyzstan, fell into turmoil. After a series of journalistic investigations into the criminal 
schemes of corruption and money laundering by the country’s politicians and power 
brokers, disenchantment in state leadership led to demands for change. Parliamentary 
elections that took place on 4 October 2020 confirmed fears that the status quo would 
prevail and the old establishment and its allies would maintain power. In spite of the use 
of biometric data aimed at preventing the usual practices of registering “dead souls” 
(voting on behalf of the deceased) or carousel voting (one person voting several times 
in different locations), the impoverished electorate was bribed by direct cash payments 
in exchange for votes.
On 5 October, protests against the election results erupted and on the night of 
the 6th led to the storming of the country’s “White House”–the state building shared 
by the parliament and the president. After the initial use of force which harmed over 
1,000 people and took the life of 19-year-old Umutbek Altynbek uulu, law enforcement 
disappeared as everyone held their breath in the anticipation of Kyrgyzstan’s third 
revolution.     
Previous coups in the country (2005 and 2010) resulted in mass looting and 
destruction of businesses and infrastructure. To prevent such events this time 
around, citizens gathered in key locations such as the city hall, markets, mass media 
headquarters, and telecommunication offices and formed live shields in front of these 
sites. During peak days of unrest, a channel on Telegram messenger devoted to resource 
sharing was overloaded with directions to safe houses for those needing protection, 
ride offers, people signing up to be the ‘city guards’, financial support offers, donations 
of tea, food, and clothes... The capital city, Bishkek, withstood the pressure of looting 
and lawlessness. In this case, vigilante actions demonstrated the most positive side of 
solidarity as civilians engaged in property protection. 
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To revisit the question of whether vigilantism is fundamentally good or bad, these 
two examples can perhaps demonstrate that, like most other forces and actions, 
vigilante formations constitute a yin- and yang-like dualism. On the one hand, mob law 
can be destructive, harming individuals and groups, leading to social degradation; on 
the other hand, in the absence of legal forces, vigilantes can serve the greater social 
good. Another important question to pose here is whether the positive forces are the 
exception rather than the rule.  
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This chapter establishes research premises and presents the components of the current 
dissertation. Serving as a general introduction, the chapter identifies key conceptual 
frameworks surrounding digital vigilantism by elaborating on the existing studies and 
identifying the literature gaps that it aims to fill. In doing so, it highlights the scholarly 
contributions and societal significance of the dissertation. The chapter presents the 
main and supporting research questions. It introduces and justifies methodological 
approaches, case selection and ethical considerations. Furthermore, a roadmap for the 





“A problem well stated is a problem half solved.”
– John Dewey
1.1. Setting the problem
Imagine living in a society with no police. All matters of legal and moral boundary 
breaching are handled by fellow citizens acting as judge, jury and executioner. There 
are no fines to issue, nor are there any prisons. There is no due process, no presumption 
of innocence. Punitive measures are carried out by citizens and imply exposure and 
public shaming of fellow citizens for their mischief, be it the breaching of legal or moral 
boundaries. Sometimes, punishment is purely virtual, involving online shaming, memes, 
vitriolic comments and direct messages of death threats. Other times, it involves offline 
physical harm including acts of humiliation and sexual violence. This punitive process is 
often filmed, edited and made permanently available to the wide online audience. This 
dystopian approach to justice resembling a wild fantasy or a scenario from a TV series 
á la “Black Mirror” or “Love, Death and Robots” is, in fact, anything but fiction. Practices 
of citizen-led justice manifest globally and across various legal, political, socioeconomic 
and cultural contexts. 
Amid the process of ubiquitous visibility that Haggerty and Ericson describe as the 
“disappearance of disappearance” (2000, p. 619), events, acts and speech can potentially 
be exposed on a mass scale and for prolonged periods of time when shared across 
social media platforms and picked up by news media. Alleged wrongdoings that 
spark collective citizen-led retaliation can range from a “stupid tweet” with a racist 
connotation (Ronson, 2015) to a university graduation speech deemed unpatriotic (BBC, 
2017a) to paedophilia (DutchNews.nl, 2020). 
These collective reactions to perceived wrongdoing can be spontaneous and 
reactionary, with no prior planning or institutional organising. In this case, taking 
offence is the uniting factor for people who otherwise do not necessarily know each 
other on- or offline and may be located in different parts of the world. On the other 
hand, citizens can form thematic collectives and proactively address specific offences, 
as is the case in Russia. Parking on a sidewalk in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other major 
cities, for instance, may not only lead to a police ticket, but can also result in public 
shaming by social media users, should concerned citizens film and expose the “road 
boor”, causing long-lasting reputation damage and potential job loss. 
What could be the term to define this phenomenon of digitally mediated citizen-
led justice provision informed by legal, moral and ideological motives; incorporating 
elements of (online) bullying/assault/harassment; and involving a plethora of retaliation 
approaches and ambiguous relations with the violence monopolist–the state? Can 
citizen-led justice be justified in some instances, while qualifying as an act of crime 
in others? To address the diverse cases and nuances in digitally mediated citizen-led 
justice, the current dissertation employs the notion of digital vigilantism in its conceptual 
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framework. What follows will address scholarly takes on both conventional vigilantism 
and its digital manifestation. 
1.1.1. Vigilantism: In Search of a Definition 
Etymologically originating from the Spanish vigilante [watchful], vigilantism has been 
addressed in scholarship with a degree of lengthy voids between moments of attention. 
Political scientists Jon Rosenbaum and Peter Sederberg were among the first to tackle 
the phenomenon and defined vigilantism as “simply establishment violence”, where 
the established sociopolitical order may be violated by participants in order to protect 
this very order from any subversion (1974, p. 542). Rosenbaum and Sederberg offer a 
typology of vigilantism with three varieties–crime control, social group control and 
regime control (p. 548). Crime control vigilantism concerns private person use of violence 
in response to law-breaking in contexts where the state is absent due to “inefficiency, 
corruption, or the leniency of the system of due process” (p. 548). Social group control 
vigilantism is described as establishment violence targeting “those who appear to 
advocate [for] significant change in the distribution of values” (p. 551). According to the 
authors, an example of such change advocacy can be the civil rights movement in the 
United States, where the Ku Klux Klan would exemplify a vigilante force. Finally, and 
rather intriguingly, the authors propose regime control vigilantism as a category where 
“the regime itself” may be targeted by vigilantes (p. 556).
In spite of the pioneering nature of their work, Rosenbaum and Sederberg raised 
fundamental questions that continue to be relevant in the digital age. These include the 
nature of the relationship between the state and vigilantes, as well as the consequences 
of order breaching for the sake of order protection accompanied by disproportional 
punishment and the potential for wrongful accusations (pp. 557; 660). Several cases 
presented in the current dissertation address the complex relationship between 
vigilantes and the state. Examples include citizens volunteering their help, police forces 
turning to private citizens for assistance, and vigilante acts being encouraged through 
public discourse and law-enforcement structures (see Chapter II). The dissertation also 
considers cases where forces critical of the state take on the task of exposing the ruling 
elites accused of corruption, illustrating the scenario of Rosenbaum and Sederberg’s 
regime control vigilantism (see Chapter VI).
Nearly two decades passed since this initial attempt to offer a definition and a 
typology of vigilantism before the phenomenon received further scholarly attention. 
In 1996, criminologist Les Johnston continued the quest for the conceptualisation of 
vigilantism. Critical of Rosenbaum and Sederberg’s conceptual “reductionism,” Johnston 
proposes six necessary features of vigilantism: (1) planning and premeditation; (2) 
voluntary involvement of private citizens; (3) a social movement of autonomous citizens; 
(4) (the threat of) the use of force; (5) a transgression threat to the established order; 
and (6) crime control through security guarantees (pp. 220-221). Johnston stresses the 




for participants to act as an extension of the state. Furthermore, for Johnston, vigilantism 
is not necessarily legal or illegal, nor does it need to involve the actual punitive act since 
participants can prevent crime or threaten to use force without actually resorting to it 
(pp. 232-233).  
Johnston’s conceptualisation can be challenged on several levels, especially amid 
the prevalence of digital media affordances for vigilante practices. Vigilante acts can 
emerge spontaneously in response to a perceived offence when participants join in 
on ‘the cause’ and form a collective. The autonomous character of participants is also 
challenged amid state-citizen relations in vigilantism, illustrated throughout the current 
dissertation. The argument that the threat of using force is not a punitive measure in 
itself is rather unconvincing, as psychological impacts of such threats can be severe. 
Finally, security provision is a broad and subjective term given that vigilantism can be 
morally-motivated on the one hand, and hate-based on the other. 
Another two decades passed and vigilantism once again regained scholarly interest 
(see conceptual contributions of Favarel-Garrigues & Shukan, 2019; Loveluck, 2019; 
Moncada, 2017; Trottier, 2017; 2019). Some scholars have focused on the digital incarnation 
of vigilantism and responded to digital media affordances for retaliation. Trottier, for 
instance, responds to Johnston’s six necessary features by positioning vigilantism in 
the “broader media culture”, where social media platforms allow for “amplification of 
peer-to-peer communication” granting previously impossible opportunities in access 
to- and circulation of people’s personal information (2017, pp. 59-60). Trottier defines 
digital vigilantism as a “process where citizens take offence in other citizens’ action 
and respond in coordinated retaliation on digital media, including social platforms and 
mobile devices” (Trottier, 2017, p. 56). In digital vigilantism, the urge to expose, judge 
and direct the virtual audience to observed and perceived wrongdoings often defies 
any critical analysis of the situation at hand. As the act of exposure goes viral, crowd 
reactions and responses become infused with a sport-like drive in which individuals 
offer their time, skills and creativity in target punishing. 
1.1.2. Simply ‘Vigilantism Performed Online’ or a Distinct Category? 
Several unique features that are informed by digital media affordances differentiate 
digital vigilantism from its conventional counterpart. Among these features is longevity 
of punitive measures, given that online exposure is near-permanent in nature (Trottier, 
2017), as well as the extent of exposure to massive online audiences. If a given case 
goes viral, the target(s) of vigilantes can be shamed on a previously unimaginable scale. 
Contrary to Johnston’s argument, the act of punishment is not only necessary but weaved 
into digital vigilantism since exposure is both the means and the end of retaliation. Akin 
to medieval public torture and execution practices, the punitive measures of digital 
vigilantism resemble a “public spectacle” that Foucault deemed obsolete (1995, p. 11). 
Unlike its conventional counterpart, digital vigilantism requires the presence and, in 
some cases, participation of audiences. The current dissertation responds to the role 
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of audiences in public punishment by first looking into conventional practices of 
comrades’ courts and the power of peer-to-peer judgement (see Chapter II). The role 
of audiences is further assessed through the perspective of vigilante products aimed 
at attracting viewers to YouTube videos (see Chapter III), as well as the perspective of 
traditional broadcasters that frame the phenomenon and bring further visibility to 
cases (see Chapter IV).  
Loveluck proposes the following four ideal types of digital vigilantism: flagging, 
investigating, hounding and organised leaking (2019). In flagging, retaliation can 
take place as an act of sharing an image or a video featuring the target, potentially 
revealing their identity and personal information such as address, phone number, 
place of employment, etc. Such exposure is usually accompanied by a description of 
the perceived wrongdoing. Retaliation can range from public statements resembling 
consumer reviews such as ‘this person is a bad professional, do not hire them’, to 
accusations of severe crimes such as ‘this is a paedophile, lookout’, or ‘this person is a 
terrorist’. These practices can be directed and shaped to purposefully discredit select 
individuals and groups via accusations of committing serious crimes. In Russia, for 
instance, when it comes to regime critics, accusation of paedophilia has been used as a 
sentiment that triggers immediate resentment and public outrage (Coalson, 2019). 
In the context of technological advances that increase visibility (be it CCTV cameras 
that flood modern cities, or digital traces that people knowingly or unknowingly leave 
behind), citizens have been encouraged by the state to exercise vigilance (Abrahams, 
1998; Andrejevic, 2002; Marx, 2013; Reeves, 2012). They have effectively turned into an 
extension of the state’s watchful gaze as a result. Police reliance on citizens is not a novel 
phenomenon, and it has been present across historical periods, geopolitical settings 
and in various crises to a greater or lesser extent (Reeves, 2012). In their operation, 
vigilantes can collaborate with the state or challenge its agencies and orders (Kirsch & 
Grätz, 2010, p. 29).
Loveluck (2019) suggests investigating as a term applicable to cases where online 
crowds are involved in identifying suspects. Thus, when taking on policing duties, 
citizen involvement can be solicited by state agents, or vigilantes can work in parallel 
to authorised forces based on their own initiative and without a direct invitation (Marx, 
2013, p. 60; Reeves, 2012, p. 246). The existing social frustrations and biases tend to come 
into play in circumstances where citizens turn into sleuths. A tragic example of such 
involvement is the case of crowdsourced investigation and information consolidation 
on Reddit platform in the aftermath of the 2013 Boston marathon bombings, which 
led to widespread accusations based on racially biased perceptions (Nhan et al., 
2017). Traditional media involvement assisted in the spread of misinformation and 
suspect misidentification. The case culminated in the fundamental questioning of the 
effectiveness crowd-sourced justice and Reddit issuing a public apology. A similar case 
took place in Russia following explosions in the St. Petersburg metro in 2017. Based on 




misidentified as a suspect and his image was widely shared across social and traditional 
media. In spite of the consequent proclamation of such reports as inaccurate, the man 
faced difficulty continuing with ‘normal’ life as he became recognisable in public. Even 
flying became impossible for him when terrified passengers refused to be on board 
with ‘the terrorist’ they had seen in the media (The Moscow Times, 2017a).
In case of hounding, which Loveluck describes as “perhaps the epitomy of digital 
vigilantism” (2010, p. 227), a more proactive online approach can take place in 
combination with exposure since the target’s personal data can be made public with 
the aim of intensifying punitive measures. Personal data, in this case, can come from 
open sources such as the history of a target’s tweets; photos shared on other social 
networks; or information ‘volunteered’ by ex-partners, which may include intimate 
photos and videos (McGlynn, Rackley, & Houghton, 2017). Information can also be doxed 
or hacked in cases where technologically savvy users join ‘the cause’ and use their skills 
to access the target’s personal information “often with the intent to humiliate, threaten, 
intimidate, or punish the identified individual” (Douglas, 2016, p. 199).
Online exposure and public shaming may accompany physical retaliation 
where degrading acts performed on the target’s body are recorded for subsequent 
dissemination. Examples include the case of female labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan 
who fall target to male vigilantes in Russia (see Chapter V). Kyrgyz men find it offensive 
when ethnic Kyrgyz women date non-Kyrgyz men in Russia. Calling themselves “patriots”, 
these men kidnap the women and perform degrading and criminal acts such as beatings 
and rape. The retaliation is filmed and shared on social media. In the videos, women 
are forced to reveal their identity and home towns or villages. This is done to ensure 
longevity and intensity of retaliation, given the context of collectivism and regionalism 
of the Kyrgyz Republic. A female who has been exposed in the nude is believed to have 
brought shame to her family and greater community, be it neighbourhood, village, 
town or country. Such exposure can make it impossible for the target to ever return 
home. Other examples of hounding in Russia are committed by groups such as Hrushi 
Protiv and StopXam, addressed in great detail in Chapters III and IV, respectively. 
The fourth type of digital vigilantism proposed by Loveluck is organised leaking 
aimed at targeting institutions and organisations (2019, p. 234). In the Russian context, 
the abovementioned FBK serves as an example of an organised collective whose goal is 
gathering and disclosing information that could potentially incriminate the ruling elites. 
In this case, participants reveal cases of corruption and power abuse via investigative 
reports that sometimes come in the form of entertaining YouTube videos. Some of the 
most controversial investigations of the Foundation include the 2017 “Don’t call him 
Dimon” video exposing the riches of Russia’s ex-president Dmitry Medvedev, with 43 
million total views (as of May 2021); as well as the “Putin’s palace. History of world’s 
largest bribe” investigation released on YouTube in January 2021, gaining over 100 
million views in the first 10 days (Alexei Navalny, 2017; 2021). 
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Activities of FBK can serve as an example of what Rosenbaum and Sederberg 
categorised as regime control vigilantism. In the absence of official control mechanisms 
that could be applied to the ruling elites, citizens take these duties into their own 
hands. While visibility can bring a certain amount of power and capital to vigilantes 
(Gabdulhakov, 2018), being openly critical of the state can be potentially dangerous 
(Gabdulhakov, 2020). This forces participants to carefully negotiate their visibility and 
safety (for a detailed account of this negotiation see Lokot, 2018). In reaction to the vast 
popularity of FBK’s investigative videos and the political ambitions of Alexei Navalny and 
his supporters, Russia’s state Duma (the Parliament’s lower house) adopted legislation 
banning members and supporters of extremist organisations from participating in 
elections at all levels. A; while court hearing scheduled for 9 June 2021 will likely deem 
FBK extremist (Meduza, 2021). Russia’s digital media governance, social media user 
arrests and various counter-forces in the struggle for online freedom of speech and 
control thereof are addressed in Chapter VI. 
1.1.3. Participation Motivations and the Role of the State 
Motives for participation in vigilante acts are diverse and range from moral and 
ideological beliefs to hate-based drives. Furthermore, digital media brought about 
additional affordances for participants, such as monetisation of YouTube channels, 
advertisement and the sale of merchandise–a phenomenon Favarel-Garrigues refers 
to as “moral entrepreneurship” (2021). Sometimes, income can be generated through 
collaboration with the state. Contrary to Johnston’s idea of vigilante autonomy, the state 
may have its interest in recruiting, encouraging and creating vigilante formations. Prior 
to moving further with the discussion of the role of the state, it is necessary to establish 
what is meant when the term “the state” is operationalised in the current dissertation. 
Within the power hierarchy in Russia where the orders are handed in a top-down 
manner, “the state” as a compendium of official structures, actors and regulations is 
shaped by those at the top of the so-called “power vertical”, namely, President Putin 
and his inner circle (for further discussion of this power structure see Chaisty, 2012; 
Monaghan, 2012). The term “power vertical” was introduced by Putin in the beginning 
of his presidential career and is still used in his official speeches emphasizing the 
importance of stability that can only be guaranteed by strong executive power (see 
quotes in Interfax, 2020; Izvestia, 2020). When it comes to the implementation of the 
laws and regulations that radiate from Moscow, there are certain dysfunctions reflected 
in the desire of regional actors to serve the political centre on the one hand, and 
corruption motivated by the pursuit of individual interests on the other. Thus, when 
referring to “the state”, this dissertation implies a set of actors holding various amounts 
of official power and a structure where President Putin is the most powerful individual 
at the time of writing. 
A unique state-vigilante relationship is observed in Russia, where select groups have 




and informal endorsement. These complex relations are addressed throughout all five 
empirical chapters that make up the dissertation. Namely, the study addresses the 
role of the state in the creation, support, and instrumentalisation of vigilante groups. 
In this case, instrumentalisation can be understood as acts aimed at discrediting the 
opposition; attacking state critics; organising events in support of the political status 
quo; and creating a façade for active civil society in the context of its continuous 
suppression. Furthermore, the dissertation elaborates on vulnerabilities and immunities 
in public exposure. While already being in a precarious position offline, women, 
migrants, ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, political activists, rights defenders and 
other vulnerable groups and individuals experience additional risks online. Sometimes 
these vulnerabilities intersect, since a single person can simultaneously be an ethnic 
minority, woman, migrant, political activist, etc. This individual can be the target to 
several vigilante formations at once. Beyond this, targets may be deprived of the right 
to seek legal justice after experiencing retaliation due to their vulnerable position in 
the host state, social stigma, police indifference/dysfunction/abuse, and lack of legal 
frameworks to qualify vigilante retaliation acts as criminal offences as opposed to mere 
hooliganism (see Chapter V for further discussion). 
After shaming for a perceived mischief goes public online and gets picked up by 
traditional media, undoing the damage is a challenging task for the target, even in cases 
where innocence is proven in court. Having been exposed, a person can be identified as 
a wrongdoer over a long period of time. The accused targets can face hostility in their 
respective communities, leading to the inaccessibility of basic services such as getting 
a haircut, eating at a restaurant, attending public events, or using public transport. 
Interviews that inform this dissertation revealed that the situation is especially alarming 
in small towns, where disappearance from the public eye is impossible and public 
exposure on social media or television can lead to physical retaliation by village/town 
mates. 
At the same time, there are individuals powerful enough to rebuff online exposure 
and endure the consequences. Political elites pressure mainstream platforms to remove 
the compromising content, as was the case when Russia’s former Deputy Prime Minister 
Sergei Prikhodko was exposed by the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK)1 (BBC, 2018). 
As such, this dissertation views social media platforms from the perspective of their 
functional affordances for participants, at the same time considering their complex roles 
in autocratic governance contexts where freedom of self-expression and suppression of 
critical voices are negotiated between users, censors, as well as global and domestic 
social media platforms (see Chapter VI). 
1 Established by activist and opposition leader Alexei Navalny in 2011, designated as “extremist 
organisation” in Russia in 2021.
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1.1.4. Responding to the Literature Gaps 
This dissertation aims to make both theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
literature. In conceptual terms, in response to the need of further theorisation of 
digital vigilantism, the current work presents the unique features that differentiate 
the phenomenon from its conventional counterpart. It does so by comparing and 
contrasting Soviet comrades’ courts with current incarnations of vigilante practices 
mediated by platforms such as YouTube. Furthermore, the role of audiences in punitive 
measures is addressed, given the character of punishment where exposure is the means 
and the end of retaliation. While literature on digital vigilantism tends to focus on the 
role of digital media (Cheong & Gong 2010; Kasra 2017; Smallridge, et al., 2016; Stratton, 
et al., 2017), this dissertation offers a unique insight on the powers of traditional media 
in this online phenomenon, also considering audience reach, target exposure and 
participant empowerment. 
The available literature is still largely missing empirical cross-disciplinary studies 
on digitally mediated citizen-led justice. Studies addressing diverse sociocultural, 
economic, legal, media and political environments in which these practices take place 
are in demand. This dissertation aims to respond to these gaps by investigating the 
case of Russia, where digital vigilantism manifests in the environment of state support 
of select participants and simultaneous suppression of other forms of online self-
expression. 
The studies that make up this dissertation investigate the process of emergence and 
decay of vigilante formations and, in doing so, addresses the methods of and motives 
for participation. Experiences of targets and greater societal impacts of digitally 
mediated citizen-led justice are addressed. The dissertation elaborates on nuances of 
internet governance in Russia while exploring the role of platforms in the negotiation 
of what social media practices are allowed and condemned by the ruling elites and 
law enforcement. Social frustrations and biases are addressed along with various 
motives and modes for participation in digital vigilantism. Moreover, the phenomenon 
of increased influence of vigilante culture creation and business-like franchising of 
institutionalised vigilantism across and beyond Russia is presented. 
1.2. Research questions
Social justice matters are complex negotiations of legality, morality, norms, cultures 
and perceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. These negotiations, in turn, are influenced by 
social biases and frustrations, while social media can illuminate these societal features 
and make them more visible. Moreover, political, economic, legal and media contexts 
are significant in the manifestation of digital vigilantism. Johnston’s (1996) logic of not 
qualifying vigilantism as necessarily illegal or extra-legal can be applied to social media 




place therein be framed as fundamentally good or bad? Such categorical conclusions 
risk being a narrowly essentialist exercise. 
Instead, it is necessary to consider motives for participation; the relationship 
between vigilantes and the state; the impact of vigilantism on its targets; as well as the 
legal, political, economic and cultural milieux where vigilantism is manifest. These and 
other nuances surrounding the phenomenon of digital vigilantism are addressed in the 
current dissertation through the following main research question: How are practices of 
digital vigilantism in Russia manifested through state-citizen and citizen-to-citizen relations?
To address a diverse set of nuances that inform digital vigilantism manifestation in 
Russia, the following supporting research questions are addressed:
SQ1:  How is digital vigilantism in Russia informed by (1) historically situated practices 
of outsourced, crowdsourced, and volunteer-based citizen-led justice, and (2) the 
denouncing, shaming, and moralising of citizens by fellow citizens? (Chapter 2)
SQ2:  How is visibility (including mediated shaming, moralising, harassment, and physical 
acts of retaliation) weaponised by participants? (Chapters 3; 4; 5)
SQ3:  What motivates citizen participation in and state support of digital vigilantism? 
(Chapters 3; 6)
SQ4:  How is digital vigilantism framed and rendered meaningful by state-owned and 
independent Russian media? (Chapter 4)
SQ5:  How is digital vigilantism experienced by targets in relation to social inequalities, 
digital divides, social frustrations and biases? (Chapter 5)
SQ6:  What are the legal and digital media landscapes in which vigilante practices take 
place in Russia? (Chapter 6)
1.3. Methods, case selection and chapter overview
Relying on the inductive principles of grounded theory where theoretical frameworks 
and conclusions are derived from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 2017), a multi-method 
research design was utilised to address the interdisciplinary objectives of this 
dissertation. Namely, a literature review, field interviews, qualitative content analysis 
(Altheide & Schneider, 2013), online and in-person observations of vigilantes in action 
were employed. 
Throughout the project, the author travelled to Russia on four occasions conducting 
interviews and field observations. While a significant amount of research artefacts 
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came from online sources, seeing vigilantes in action was crucial for understanding the 
setting and the dynamics of interaction in citizen-to-citizen retaliation. In the spring of 
2020, the author made field observations of a bad-parking combating group (StopXam) 
during its raids on one of the neighbourhoods of St. Petersburg. Offline observations 
allowed for an understanding of activities in their ‘raw’ state, prior to being edited for 
YouTube episodes.  
Since cases that take place in Russia are beginning to have greater cross-border 
impact, the project’s fieldwork was performed in and outside the country. This implied 
conversations with former and current participants from Moldova (in-person interview 
in Rotterdam) and Peru (online interview), as well as with a political target in exile in 
Latvia (online interview). A case involving labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan required 
that fieldwork be done in that country, which was combined with academic exchange. 
In total, fieldwork consisted of 36 semi-structured in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders, including participants (9), a target (1), media professionals (3), civil rights 
defenders (4), NGO representatives (6), academics (7), lawyers (2), and law enforcement 
authorities (4). Some of the approached actors refused to be interviewed. Among these 
are the Moscow-based StopXam group; the Moscow-based Hrushi Protiv group; the 
St. Petersburg-based Hrushi Protiv groups; the Google office in Moscow; and an anti-
vigilante activist in Moscow. Some participants preferred the online mode of interview 
and this preference was accommodated. All conducted interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and, where necessary, translated from Russian into English by the author. 
See Annexe III for the full list of interviewees and Annexe IV for interview topics and 
questions. Interview data is used to support the argument and provide vivid examples, 
perceptions and insider perspectives throughout the work. Not all the interview 
material made it into the final dissertation, and the remaining data will be used further 
academic publications. 
In addition to performing observations and conducting interviews, the author 
analysed 990 legal cases against social media users in Russia. This analysis helped in 
understanding the types of activities that can get people in trouble with the law as 
well as the nuances of pressing charges against social media users (see Chapter VI). 
Furthermore, the author collected and analysed 1,500 news pieces covering vigilante 
activities in Russia’s state-loyal and independent media. Content analysis of 307 such 
news pieces covering StopXam vigilante formation is discussed in Chapter IV. Between 
2017 and 2021, the author watched several hundred YouTube videos produced by 
vigilantes in Russia. Content analysis of top 20 YouTube videos (by number of views) of 
Hrushi Protiv vigilante group is presented in Chapter III. See Annexes I and II for further 
details on content analysis procedure.  
Relying on these methods, the current dissertation responds to several conceptual 
elements of digital vigilantism. While chapters do not exclusively focus on a single 
theoretical element and are instead divided into themes. Namely, Chapter II addresses 




provision matters to ‘private’ citizens. In this case, privacy is put in quotation marks, 
since according to Soviet ideology, all citizens were a default extension of the state. 
Chapter III considers motivations for participation and social media affordances. Chapter 
IV illuminates the role of the audience and the significance of traditional media in target 
exposure, discourse formation and rendering digital vigilantism meaningful. Chapter V 
exposes the complexity of the layers of target vulnerabilities and difficulties in seeking 
post-exposure justice. Chapter VI addresses the legal environment and media realities in 
which digital vigilantism is manifest. Furthermore, it considers various counter-forces in 
justice provision. Below, each chapter content is introduced in greater detail.  
1.3.1. Citizen-led Justice: Past and Present
This research project began with the investigation of sociocultural factors and historical 
practices related to outsourcing legal matters to citizens in Russia and its impact on the 
current manifestation of digitally mediated citizen-led justice. It should be noted that 
the state has compelled citizens to exercise justice over other citizens since the early 
formation of the Soviet Union (Sieglebaum, 1992). Amid various public shaming practices 
was a phenomenon “known as ‘prorabotka’ (literally ‘working over’),” a type of character 
judgment meeting that disciplined representatives of various segments of society, 
from university students to mature Communist Party members (Stephenson, 2021, p. 
114). Chapter II “Citizen-led justice then and now: From comrades’ courts to dotcomrade 
vigilantism” addresses Soviet-era delegation of certain legal matters to citizens. Such 
delegation of small judiciary duties to the masses required watchfulness of comrades 
over fellow comrades, while demonstrating the dangers of the “democratisation of 
justice” (Stephenson, 2021, p.130). 
The involvement of citizenry in vigilante and judicial duties was institutionalised by 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, in the 1950s with a 
formal introduction of comrades’ courts (Gorlizki, 1998, p. 403). The courts aimed to 
“explore matters of everyday morality and address instances of improper behavior by 
those who depart from the norms of socialist community life” (materials from the XXI 
Communist Party Congress cited in Gorlizki, 1998, p. 424). The courts addressed minor 
mischief, poor performance at work, hooliganism, alcoholism, asocial behaviour and 
the like. As well, they were granted the power to assign and execute punishment or 
transfer the case to other state organs, should the severity of a given offence be outside 
of the scope of amateur judges, i.e., fellow comrades (Supreme Council of RSFSR, 1961). 
Public shaming was practiced in the form of the so-called “black boards of shame” 
where photographs of deviant community members were displayed for the public eye. 
In fact, these boards of shame had an antipode in the form of “red boards of honor”, 
displaying hardworking communists (Bondarev, 2012). Such methods of public display 
and shaming resemble modern practices of exposure, where social media platforms 
serve as spaces for “flagging” other citizens (Loveluck, 2019). These systems in the 
context of the Russian social organisation provide a historical socio-cultural foundation 
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for organised vigilante groups to take collective action against a perceived offence and 
exercise moralisation and public shaming. 
The role of the state (Russia’s ruling elite and other structures in the hierarchy of the 
so-called vertical of power) is addressed as a traditional power and violence monopolist, 
as well as, in the case of Russia, a media superpower (Lipman, 2017; Orttung & Walker, 
2013). Contrary to the perceived autonomy of vigilantes (Johnston, 1996), in Russia, 
successful vigilante movements are approved and supported by the state. The chapter 
investigates the nuances and complexities of this relationship, inquiring into the 
characteristics and practices that can grant state approval or spark counter-measures. 
Some aspects of Soviet-era collective justice indeed appear to have been reincarnated 
in the digital domain, such as shaming and moralisation. Other nuances, however, have 
either evolved or are unique due to social media affordances. For instance, in the Soviet 
era, seasoned members of society were granted participatory powers; in contemporary 
Russia, however, these actors had been replaced with digitally-savvy youth. Moreover, 
exposure in the Soviet times was limited to one’s neighborhood or workplace, while in 
digital retaliation audiences are global. 
The following questions are addressed in the chapter: What are the similarities and 
differences between conventional communist and digitally mediated post-communist 
vigilantism in Russia? What role does the state play in manifestations of mediated 
citizen-led justice in post-communist Russia?
1.3.2. Vigilantes, Their Media Products and Motives for Participation
Having addressed historical premises, the dissertation hones in on contemporary 
state-supported groups. The new era of organised and institutionalised vigilantism in 
Russia begins in 2005 with the formation of a pro-Kremlin youth group, ‘Nashi’ [Ours], 
which “played an important role in political socialization of young people” (Krivonos & 
Fedorova, 2014). After its dissolution in 2012, Nashi left behind federal-level movements 
with franchise branches across the country such as ‘StopXam’ [Stop a Douchebag], 
combating bad parking and traffic violations and ‘Hrushi Protiv’ [Piggy Against], 
specialising in detection of expired produce in grocery stores and markets. Both groups 
were founded in 2010 by former commissars and members of the Nashi movement. 
These groups have benefited from state grants under the Presidential Program for NGO 
Support (Rubin & Rustamova, 2014; Rustamova, 2015). 
Both StopXam and Hrushi Protiv operate in similar modes: a group of participants 
approaches its target and confronts offensive behaviour while filming the process. 
Confrontation often leads to use of obscene language and violence, sometimes 
escalating into group fights. Videos are edited, uploaded on YouTube, and shared across 
various other social platforms. Chapter 3: “YouTube as a stage for vigilantism and politicised 
citizen-led justice in Russia”, features media analysis addressing how participants frame 
actors such as targets and law enforcement. Videos were analysed with regards to 




(often ethnic minorities and labour migrants); and portrayal of police forces (sometimes 
invited to the scene by both participants and targets) among other formal and informal 
actors (state officials and popular artists). For a detailed methodological approach see 
Annexe II.
The analysis revealed a bias towards merchants of non-Slavic descent, as the group 
frames people from the Caucasus and labour migrants from the former-Soviet Central 
Asian republics as those responsible for expired produce on the shelves of Russia’s 
stores. In 2013, Hrushi Protiv called on its audience to sign petitions to prevent migrants 
from working in retail—an act suggestive of nationalist biases in state-encouraged 
vigilante practices. In this case, digital vigilantism is practiced and perceived as a form of 
entertainment akin to reality TV, with a reflection of on-the-ground societal frustrations 
and tensions. The more verbal and physical violence was featured in the videos or 
promised in the titles, the more viewers such videos attracted. 
This chapter aims to enrich the current literature on digital vigilantism by addressing 
the motivations of participants, their relationship with the state, as well as platform 
affordances for vigilante practices. By focusing on the media products of Hrushi Protiv, 
the chapter investigates participants’ framing of their targets and other actors, and in 
doing so, further contributes to literature by demonstrating the value and relevance 
of communication approaches and methods in studying modern digitally mediated 
vigilantism. The following questions are addressed in the Chapter: 1) How do Hrushi 
Protiv portray themselves, their targets, police, and other actors in retaliation videos? 2) 
What motivates participation in and state support of digital vigilantism in Russia? 
1.3.3. Heroes or Hooligans? 
After looking at the digital media products, the dissertation considers the role of 
traditional media in framing participants, targets, law enforcement and other actors. 
Media discourses surrounding the phenomenon of digital vigilantism more broadly are 
addressed in Chapter 4: “Heroes or hooligans? The role of traditional media in rendering 
digital vigilantism meaningful”. This chapter aims to expand theoretical frames of 
definitional dimensions of vigilantism by addressing the role of audience and traditional 
media in the digitally mediated manifestation of this phenomenon. It aims to do so by 
addressing the following questions: How are StopXam participants, their targets, and 
police forces portrayed in Russia’s traditional media? What is the role of traditional media 
in rendering digital vigilantism meaningful? Motives for participation by groups and 
individuals as well as harm experienced by targets are evaluated in the context of social 
biases and frustrations that penetrate the digital domain and, consequently, re-enter 
offline discourses. This chapter focuses on StopXam and considers the portrayal of the 
group, its targets and police forces in Russia’s pro-state and independent media outlets, 
investigating the role of traditional media in the manifestation of digital vigilantism.
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The chapter draws its sample from Russia’s top broadcasters: Channel One, NTV, Ren 
TV and Rossiia-24. State controlled media in Russia is a norm-setter that represents the 
position of the ruling regime on both domestic and international issues. Qualitative 
content analysis of reports on StopXam is used to shed light on the media perception 
of the role and meaning of digital vigilantism in the society. By looking at the eight-year 
coverage period between 2010 and 2018, the chapter illustrates the evolution in the 
coverage of StopXam and links narrative fluctuations to greater socio-political processes 
in the country. In addition to these state-loyal broadcasters, the study features TV Rain–
an alternative voice that had to move all of its broadcasting online due to state pressure 
and inability to deliver content via cable. 
All selected channels maintain websites with archived news blocks in the form of 
videos and transcribed text which were relied upon in the current study. News reports 
were sought by using variations of the group’s name spelling in the Cyrillic alphabet: 
СтопХам, Стоп Хам, Стопхам. Select results that featured unrelated topics were 
removed. A total of 307 news pieces were analysed in this research: 4 from Channel 
One; 48 from NTV; 149 from Rent TV; 98 from Russia-24; and 8 from TV Rain (for details 
on methodological approaches see Annexe II). Content analysis demonstrates the 
important role of traditional media in framing social justice and giving voice to its 
various actors. Whether StopXam members are heroes or hooligans is a contested view, 
and media analysis reveals that perceptions have changed over time.
1.3.4. Layers of Target Vulnerabilities 
Hate-based movements in Russia target ethnic minorities, labour migrants and alleged 
paedophiles. Targets are identified through social networks and eventually fall victim 
to embodied confrontation and humiliation filmed on camera and shared online. Some 
groups exclusively target Muslim women and expose them to collective shaming and 
moralising. In the country’s conservative regions such as Chechnya, this exposure can 
lead to physical abuse and even ‘honour execution’. 
Chapter 5: “Layers of target vulnerabilities in digital vigilantism” addresses the case of 
the so-called patriot groups composed of male Kyrgyz migrants who punish Kyrgyz 
women through ‘honour beating’ for interaction with representatives of other ethnic 
groups while in Russia. 
By addressing the selected case, this chapter aims to further inform the scientific 
discussion, debate, and exchange on the role, benefits, and harms that digital media 
can bring into the lives of vulnerable groups such as labour migrants. The chapter 
considers the following question: How are the established social, political, and 
economic inequalities, as well as racial, ethnic, and other biases impacting social justice 
manifested in the digital domain? Capable of reinforcing “existing social relationships” 
(van Dijk, 2012, p. 243), these biases can re-enter the offline sphere and further influence 
the discourse where they “culminate in a coordinated mass persecution of a targeted 




The male ‘patriots’ undress women, beat them, shave their eyebrows off, and sexually 
assault them. The entire process is filmed and shared online. While filming, they force 
women to reveal their identity and home address and to say that they are sorry for 
interacting with non-Kyrgyz men in order to “send a message” to others (Beishenbek 
Kyzy & Bigg, 2012). The case of ‘Kyrgyz patriots’ illustrates hierarchies of vulnerability 
among targets as labour migrants are targeted by far-right anti-immigrant groups in 
Russia, while female migrants also fall victim to abuse by fellow male compatriots.
1.3.5. (Con)Trolling the Web: Internet Governance in Russia
After addressing the historical premises, contemporary cases, the roles of digital and 
traditional media and target experiences, it is important to take a few steps back and 
consider the legal and digital environment in which these practices are taking place. The 
aim of Chapter 6: “(Con)Trolling the web: Internet governance in Russia” is to inquire into 
the logic of social media user arrests in Russia. The chapter responds to the following 
questions: What is the logic behind social media user arrests in Russia? What specific 
online activities can lead to litigation? It concludes that ambiguity and monomania of 
social-media control structures in Russia make everyone potentially vulnerable. In such 
circumstances, social media users simply do not and cannot know whether or not they 
will face the law for their online engagements–a condition capable of stimulating self-
censorship. 
The research begins with the analysis of legal frameworks, as several criminal code 
articles have been amended and applied to online speech, leading to accusations 
of extremism and terrorism not only for expressed opinions, but even for ‘likes’. 
Furthermore, 990 cases of litigation against social media users were investigated to 
illustrate who is being targeted and over what type of online self-expression.
The chapter identifies state-loyal vigilante forces recruited to ‘snitch’ on fellow 
citizens and monitor the web for undesired content. It also presents citizen counter-
forces to repressive state mechanisms and their operation tactics. Four types of charges 
against social media users can be identified based on the study: 1) authentic–real cases 
instigated over real hate-speech; 2) tactical–made-up cases targeting state critics; 
3) practical–targeting people with limited financial and social capital for police to fill 
case quotas; 4) random– random persons facing the law due to vague definitions and 
broad interpretations. All four categories can be described as invasive, as in some cases 
citizens face the law for content shared in private photo albums on VKontakte. This level 
of invasiveness is an indication of a collaboration between law enforcement and the 
platform. 
There are certain themes in social media posts that can greatly increase risk of 
litigation. Among these are posts challenging the ruling elites, calls for protests, 
posts concerning the Orthodox Church, World War II, xenophobic posts, and posts 
related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The spectrum of topics is broadened with every 
new accusation and new legislation governing online speech. Sometimes there are 
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contradicting combinations, since both misogynist and feminist, religious and atheist 
posts can lead to litigation. Most of the analysed cases concerned posts shared or 
‘liked’ on the VKontakte social network. Although nearly all other mainstream social 
media platforms are represented, VKontakte is the leader when it comes to legal cases 
concerning online content. 
The applicability of the law is selective in Russia. This selectivity exemplifies a 
scenario where critics of the state can be punished for their off- and online activities. 
When a person is challenging the ruling elites offline, their online trace will also fall 
under scrutiny. Due to technical and financial inability to replicate a Chinese-style 
firewall, Russia’s ruling elite opted for trolling the web through the spread of fear via 
repressive legislation, selective arrests, and regime-loyal citizens acting out in the 
manner that echoes the country’s totalitarian past. Citizens can report on other citizens 
for personal reasons. Furthermore, equipped with quotas, police officers can use 
vague legal frameworks to arrest random users and fill their case-solving statistics. 
Citizen counter-forces are present but are weaker than the united forces of elites, law 
enforcement, recruited citizens and state-loyal/state-compliant social media platforms. 
Counter-forces are in a weaker position due to limited capacity, disproportionality of 
resources, and lack of unity.
1.3.6. General Conclusion
In conclusion, the dissertation revisits the primary and supportive research questions 
and elaborates on how the research project addressed them. Each of the six supportive 
questions is presented with a commentary based on the findings from various 
chapters of the dissertation. These commentaries are followed by the discussion of the 
overarching question of state-citizen and citizen-to-citizen control, surveillance, and 
retaliation in Russia. Recommendations for further research follow. 
1.4. Ethical considerations
The methodology of this dissertation was evaluated and approved by the Ethics Board 
of the Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication. A data management 
plan was carefully designed in consultation with supervisors, data protection and legal 
specialists at Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
While conducting the fieldwork, as individual researchers and members of a greater 
team, we took conscious measures to limit potential harm to both informants and 
investigator(s). As such, we intentionally avoided meeting with some of the more radical 
groups and participants. Coming from Uzbekistan myself and meeting with Russia’s 





Similarly, I did not seek contact with the vulnerable targets so as not to bring further 
harm into their lives. For example, when handling the case of female honour beating, I 
avoided meeting with female Kyrgyz migrants who fall target to male Kyrgyz migrants. 
As a non-Kyrgyz male, I could endanger the lives of female informants if I were to 
interview them. Instead, we opted for interviewing journalists who reported on the 
cases and who already met with the targets and possessed insider information. 
Some of the interviews were intentionally held online, as the informants felt more 
comfortable meeting this way. All interview participants were introduced to the 
informed consent form, outlining the purpose of the research and its approaches in 
regards to handling their data and responses. Written or verbal consent was granted by 
each participant prior to the interview. 
Other potential safety threats concerned political and legal environments in the field. 
Political confrontation between Russia and ‘the West’ sometimes resulted in labelling 
foreign researchers coming from European academic institutions as ‘foreign agents’ in 
Russia, leading to deportation at best and arrests at worst. During the three field visits, 
I sought affiliation with local academic institutions to avoid any legal misinterpretation 
of my scientific visits. 
Other ethical concerns and measures implied cautious data handling. With 
consultations and training from Erasmus University’s data protection officer, measures 
were taken to minimise risk when gathering, storing and handling data. All the data 
such as screenshots, videos, field notes and interview recordings were stored in the 
password-protected digital vault with restricted access for anyone aside from the author 
of this dissertation. All data will be destroyed in accordance with the data management 
plan.
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This chapter aims to provide a theoretical conceptualisation of digital vigilantism in its 
manifestation in the Russian Federation where cases do not emerge spontaneously but 
are institutionalised, highly organised, and systematic. Given the significant historical 
context of collective justice under communism, the chapter reviews historical practices 
of citizen-led justice in the Soviet state and compares these practices with digital 
vigilantism that takes place in contemporary Russia. The central argument of the author 
is that despite new affordances that digital media brought about in the sphere of citizen-
led justice, the role of the state in manifesting this justice in the Russian Federation 
remains substantial. At the same time, technological advances have caused certain key 
features of these practices such as participants, their motives, capacity, targets, and 
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Dwell on the past and you will lose an eye. Forget the past and you will lose both eyes.
– Russian Proverb
2.1. Introduction
The spread of smart mobile devices and social networking has transformed 
communication. Content can be generated and shared with the world by anyone in 
possession of these technologies. As social media users, we tend to share our human 
experience with others in the virtual domain, be it the food we eat, witnessed artwork, 
destinations visited, degrees obtained, relationship updates, or birth and death news. 
Virtual connectivity and practices of sharing with friends or with complete strangers 
defy the boundaries of conventional (offline) socialisation, as such modes of interaction 
are characterised by visibility, accessibility and unpredictability. Visibility is granted 
by the virtual non-existence of private interactions on social media, since anything 
one posts or shares in ‘private’ messages has the potential of becoming visible to the 
global audience. Accessibility can be described in dual terms: 1) access to the personal 
information of billions of other users, and 2) access to persons who otherwise seemed 
‘outside of human reach’–celebrities, politicians, royalty. Unpredictability is, perhaps, the 
broadest of the three and implies a wide spectrum of virtual socialisation characteristics. 
Among these is the idea of some events/photos/videos going viral and others remaining 
buried in the quicksand of the fragmented, chaotic and short-lived attention span of 
virtual audiences. Furthermore, there is a certain unpredictability in terms of what 
delinquency (alleged and genuine) of other users will be revealed to the thrill and 
consternation of the audience. Besides, one can never be certain that their own actions 
would not become subject to resentment, shaming and denunciation online.   
From exposing a neighbour for leaving their trash bags by the front door for days to 
inviting the online audience to direct its fury towards alleged paedophiles or terrorists, 
virtual socialization is dominated by the pursuit of citizen-led justice equipped with the 
codes of perceived threats and violation of social norms and morality. Such practices 
of visibility instrumentalisation for the purpose of punishment can be referred to as 
digital vigilantism. In digital vigilantism, citizens take on the duties of police, jury and 
executioners and direct their collective punitive efforts towards fellow citizens. 
While this is a global phenomenon taking place across political, cultural, social, 
economic and technological contexts, this dissertation focuses on the case of Russia, 
where social media users instrumentalise the digitally mediated pursuit of justice to 
reach a variety of objectives, from moral calls and ideological motives to entrepreneurial 
and political aspirations. The phenomenon of public naming-and-shaming and the 
moralisation of citizens by other citizens is not a novelty for modern Russia. The state 
has historically compelled citizens to vigilantism, denunciation, and collectivist justice 
during the Soviet period. Given the significant historical context of social justice that 
took place under communism, the current manifestation of digital vigilantism in Russia 
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raises questions about re-packaged history amid the spread of vigilante practices to 
social media. While the Soviet state was renowned for its surveillance practices, it is 
important to consider how these practices compare to modern-day approaches in 
Russia. Indeed, Soviet manifestation of citizen-led surveillance and justice pursuit 
were diverse in their form and extent depending on their positioning on the historical 
timeline. However, comrades’ courts are applicable to the study due to several nuances 
in their modus operandi. Comrades’ courts used naming-and-shaming and moralisation 
in reaction to offences, much like digital vigilantes do when they expose their targets 
online. Comrades’ courts resembled a disciplinary show, as the audience intensified 
shaming and moralisation while witnessing the consequences of deviation from the 
socialist order. Digitally mediated citizen-led justice too thrives on the presence of the 
audience since the audience is fundamental to the effectiveness of retaliation.
While digital media brought about new affordances for participation in citizen-led 
justice, the Russian state maintains control over traditional media through censorship, 
repression, and other means of muting alternative narratives. The state attempts to 
spread this control over social media through website blocking and putting pressure 
on telecommunication providers to collect, store, and share user-generated data upon 
request (Meduza, 2018a). It also does so through demonstrative arrests and lawsuits 
where users are convicted for “shares” and “likes” on social media (Litvinova, 2016). 
Manifested in multifaceted hierarchical layers, the relationship between the state and 
vigilantes in Russia is complex and requires a nuanced analysis. On one hand, support 
and coordination of vigilante groups can grant the ruling regime control over their 
activities and can be instrumentalised in its interest; on the other hand, the state is 
essentially endorsing a force that can become criminal or turn against the ‘feeding 
hand’.
As a phenomenon of collective online retaliation to perceived offences committed 
by individuals and groups, digital vigilantism can be both spontaneous and 
unpredictable in terms of how viral and long-lasting the case could become. Aside from 
challenging the notion of spontaneity, digital vigilantism in Russia is also challenging 
Johnston’s (1996) idea of vigilante autonomy from the state. In this regard, Russia’s 
digital vigilantes constitute a unique research case where organisational structures, 
systematic approaches, thematic focus and respective relationships with the state 
play a firm operational role. There is an intricate dynamic between vigilantes and the 
authorities as, on one hand, participants respond to dysfunctionalities of state actors 
by taking justice into their own hands, thus stressing the impotence of state bodies. 
On the other hand, some vigilante formations in Russia receive Presidential grants in 
support of their activities and enjoy formal and informal endorsements from the highest 
authorities. All the while, the state attempts to impose tight control over social media 
and online self-expression through censorship, blocking, user-arrests, and obliging 
telecommunication corporations to store and share user-generated data with security 
authorities upon demand (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019; Gabdulhakov, 2020). As such, 
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the use of concerned citizens by a controlling state to monitor other citizens largely 
resembles the Soviet totalitarian collectivist approaches to surveillance.
Russia’s digital vigilantes address a wide set of offences and tend to be thematically 
focused. There are groups that can be generally described as those collaborating with 
the state, those working in spite of the state and those targeting the state itself. 
Collaborators tend to focus on topics of everyday frustration–shaming of road traffic 
and parking violators, exposure of expired produce sellers, confrontation with drinkers 
and smokers in otherwise alcohol and smoke-free public spaces, etc. Namely, it focuses 
on two prominent pro-Kremlin groups: StopXam [Stop a Douchebag] and Hrushi Protiv 
[Piggy Against]3 which specialise in monitoring traffic violations and exposing allegedly 
unscrupulous merchants, respectively. These groups resemble the “many watching the 
many on behalf of the few” model set forth by Larsen and Piché where the public is 
engaged in “participatory surveillance”, extending the “effective gaze of the state” and 
doing so “beyond the boundaries otherwise posted by technology, resources, and law” 
(2009, p. 196). Some pro-state formations engage in snitching on fellow citizens and 
report on content critical of the political status quo, protest activities and other content 
challenging the ruling elite. 
Other cases of vigilante-state collaboration can be described as strategic partnership 
between corrupt law enforcement and football hooligans, criminal formations and hate 
groups. Such forces engage in attacks on alleged drug dealers, migrants, and ethnic and 
sexual minorities. Among these groups are the ultra-right fascist formation “Restruct”, 
which also incorporates other thematic groups such as “Occupy paedophilia” and 
“Occupy narcophilia”.
Groups that operate in spite of the state can also be described as those violating 
the law for moral pursuit. Among these groups are various ultra-right nationalist 
and patriarchal formations, such as Karfagen, The Male State and Kyrgyz Patriots. All 
three groups engaged in practices of slut-shaming, virtual exposure and shaming of 
women and embodied harms such as beating, rape and other criminal, degrading and 
humiliating acts made visible online. 
There are technologically-savvy groups that utilise social media to expose the 
ruling elites and their corruption schemes, police brutality, the dysfunctionality of 
state bodies and other wrong-doings conducted by authorities. Such groups include 
the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and Dissernet, among others. FBK specialises 
in investigative reports shared across social media in which secret bank accounts, 
luxurious houses, apartments, private jets and other ruling elite-focused content is 
shared. Dissernet is a collective of academic enthusiasts who reveal plagiarism in 
doctoral dissertations. The collective’s frequent targets are Russia’s state officials. 
Activities of the FBK and Dissernet where the state itself is being watched are brought in 
3 English translations of group titles are taken from groups’ official websites and social media 
accounts. Thus, orthographic nuances are preserved.
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to conceptualise the “many watching the few” scheme (Mathiesen, 1997) of monitoring 
and exposing the state. However, issues of power and immunity to exposure afforded 
by certain privileges of political power come into play.
This chapter aims to contribute to the theoretical conceptualisation of digital 
vigilantism by analysing the case of Russia with its Soviet-era pretext for citizens’ 
involvement in justice matters and the institutionalised, digitally mediated post-Soviet 
manifestation of this justice. It does so by addressing the following questions: What 
are the similarities and differences between conventional communist and digitally 
mediated post-communist vigilantism in Russia? What role does the state play in 
manifestations of mediated citizen-led justice in post-communist Russia?
First, the chapter conceptualises citizen-led justice and its conventional as well as 
digital forms. It then focuses on the Soviet comrades’ courts as examples of historical 
vigilante practices and elaborates on their structure, modus operandi, relations with 
the state and its agents, as well as the motives of the state for involving citizens in 
surveillance and justice matters. The chapter also introduces prominent cases of digitally 
mediated citizen-led justice in contemporary Russia and compares them with Soviet-
era citizen-led justice. The two are compared in terms of participants and their motives 
for engagement; the role of state authorities and collaboration between police and 
vigilantes; the nature of retaliation; targets; venues for retaliation; use of media; as well 
as the audience and its role. In doing so, the chapter contributes to the existing literature 
by spotlighting cases where the state has played and continues to play a significant 
role in the manifestation of citizen-led justice. These cases demonstrate that retaliation 
is systematic rather than spontaneous, where a complex mechanism of inter-relations 
between the ruling regime, law enforcement, media and communication corporations, 
as well as active citizens establish a powerful surveillance and control system.
2.2. Theoretical background
This section provides theoretical grounds for further elaboration on citizen-led justice 
in the Soviet Union and its reincarnation in contemporary post-communist Russia. 
Theoretical frameworks address modern technological realities and capacities where 
visibility is ubiquitous and, therefore, new mediated forms and means of vigilantism are 
afforded.
2.2.1. Entrusted, Crowdsourced, and Lateral Surveillance
Social media and smart mobile devices with an internet connection have made visibility 
global and widespread. Through social networks, but also by default of using digitised 
services, users generate and make personal information public—a phenomenon of 
which intelligence services of the past could only dream (Morozov, 2011). In light of global 
visibility and “the internet of things” (Ashton, 2009), surveillance has transformed from 
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a process into a lifestyle with “constant clustering and sorting of groups of individuals” 
(Lyon, 2007, p. 183). Hand in hand with the demanded vigilance coming from the state 
“see something, say something” (Marx, 2013; Reeves, 2012), technological advances 
allow citizens to take “policing” and “spying” duties into their own hands (Andrejevic, 
2002), thus turning them into sleuths acting out of their own interests or as an extension 
of the “effective gaze of the state” (Larsen & Piché, 2009, p. 196).
The very word “surveillance” consisting of “‘sur’ (from above), and ‘veillance’ (to 
watch)” (Galič et al, 2017) implies the presence of a supervisor watching over subjects 
within some hierarchical system. Governments justify the ongoing data mining, storage 
of information, and clustering of individuals as a security measure (Posner, 2008), while 
corporations define it as a business measure fundamental for providing customised 
experiences in advertising (Facebook, 2016). “Ubiquitous computing” (Lyon, 2007) at 
the backbone of modern existence resembles a new form of exploitation where “smart 
devices” must be regarded as “exploitable devices” (Hypponen, 2014). Being a power 
monopolist, the state may warrant, demand, and/or hack access to big data gathered 
by corporations (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). While the capacity of different actors 
ranges vastly between the users, the providers and the sovereign, there is a subject-
object dynamic between them where a citizen is both “an agent of and a subject 
for surveillance” (Marx, 2013, p. 58), given that “legal biases render citizens far more 
vulnerable under police surveillance” (Reeves, 2012, p. 246). However, theoretically, so 
are state agents and corporations as their visibility can be weaponised too. 
Lateral acts of social justice have existed historically. Witch-hunting, lynching, and 
comrades’ courts serve are common examples. In the modern context, such acts are 
afforded by the weaponisation of visibility of other citizens (Trottier, 2017). Convenience 
in generating and accessing information granted by the internet offers scenarios where 
“sharing may supersede reflecting” (Trottier, 2017, p. 58). This urge to share information 
quickly and the idea that anyone can be a sleuth (Nhan et al., 2017) can lead to waves 
of intense hatred in citizen-to-citizen relations, sometimes directed at the wrong 
suspects (Volpp, 2014). In digital vigilantism, there is a system of presumption of guilt as 
opposed to the presumption of innocence as targets are deprived of a due process and 
legal trial. Furthermore, the state and its agents can themselves fall target to vigilante 
citizens. Footage of police brutality shared on social media, candidly recorded political 
conversations, citizen-led corruption investigations, and other acts of the “many 
watching the few” (Mathiesen, 1997) illustrate this dynamic. However, asymmetries of 
power (Monahan, 2006) must be carefully considered in the instances where the state is 
“sousveilled”, or watched from the bottom-up (Mann et al., 2002).
Despite making the sovereign more visible,4 social media empowers the regimes 
themselves to exercise harassment over political opponents and investigative 




journalists (Pearce, 2015). Even dictators join social networks, as opposed to censoring 
them, in order to be in tune with the discourses and in control of online conversations 
(Morozov, 2011, p. 116); although censorship, blocking, and other forms of control over 
social media are certainly extant across political and media systems. State advantages 
can be exemplified by Russia’s “anti-terrorism” telecommunication legislation, requiring 
telecommunications companies to “record and store all communications and activities 
of all users, and make stored records available to authorized government bodies at 
their request” (ICNL, 2016). Therefore, ubiquitous visibility may, on one hand, denote 
vulnerability of the state when it comes to “sousveillance” (Mann et al., 2002), while 
at the same time providing new opportunities for surveillance and control. Citizens 
watch each other while they are also watched by the state through telecommunication 
corporations. At the same time, citizens can expose the state on these very platforms. 
The state, on the other hand, has legal and other resources to impose further control 
over information. Therefore, depending on the circumstances and capacity of each 
actor in a given case, respective advantages and limitations will vary.
2.2.2. Visibility as a Novel “Spectacle of Punishment” 
Foucault (1995, pp. 11-12) argued that the role of the “spectacle of punishment” had 
withered away with the development of the “discipline society”, which transferred 
corrective and disciplinary measures behind curtains for the sake of punishing the soul 
as opposed to punishing the body. In digital vigilantism, the spectacle of offensive 
conduct and retaliation to perceived offences is both the means and the end of a punitive 
practice. Thus, in digital vigilantism “punishment of the soul” takes place through 
online harassment and damaged reputation; while “punishment of the body” takes 
place through embodied actions made visible online. The “spectacle of punishment” 
lives on in online retaliation, insofar as the weaponisation of visibility a priori requires an 
audience (Trottier, 2017).    
Debord (2002, p. 12) defines spectacle as “a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by image”. There is, of course, a relationship between participants and targets 
as the former takes offence at the actions of the latter, but there is also a relationship 
with the audience. The audience is a significant element that has a relationship both 
with participants and targets of digital vigilantism. This dynamic raises questions over 
the definition of participation in digital vigilantism, as even the act of watching certain 
media products can be harmful to the exposed targets. It also raises questions over the 
motives, authority, and power of participants in response to perceived offences, as well 
as the proportionality and nature of this retaliation, which can manifest in such acts as 
naming and shaming, moralising, hacking, doxing, and broadcasting physical attacks.  
Widespread connectivity granted by the internet brought about new modes of 
operation for citizen-led justice. Citizens can monitor and expose each other via social 
networks, while other users can participate through (dis)likes, shares, and comments. 
Information shared on social networks such as Facebook and YouTube (and on their 
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Russian equivalents such as VKontakte [In Contact], Odnoklassniki [Classmates] and 
Rutube (a domestic YouTube equivalent)) “provide both a platform and a set of practices 
that render DV (digital vigilantism) meaningful and practical” (Trottier, 2017, p. 61). 
Visibility is exploited by participants who access or produce and spread content related 
to their target. In this sense, digital vigilantism “can be framed in the context of online 
communication” (Trottier, 2017, p. 60), the “culmination” of which is “a coordinated mass 
persecution of a targeted citizen” (Trottier, 2017, p. 61).
Retaliation on digital media grants a wider set of affordances that distinguish it from 
conventional vigilantism. The audience observes retaliation and participates in it while 
enjoying anonymity that was not possible in comrades’ courts. If comrades’ courts used 
to culminate in a target’s repentance, digital vigilantism grants the audience capacities 
to intensify and (indefinitely) prolong retaliation. Disciplinary elements are present in 
this digitally mediated spectacle as the audience is shown the consequences of the 
offence. A large audience is a marker of popularity and relevance of activities of a given 
digital vigilante group. Thus, the audience is entertained by retaliation, the audience 
participates in retaliation, and the audience is disciplined through the “spectacle” of 
digitally mediated retaliation, with or without solidarity for the target that crowds 
expressed during public executions of the past (Foucault, 1995, p. 64).
Much like executioners described in Foucault’s examples, digital vigilantes 
themselves fall target to vigilantism and retaliation from targets and audiences, 
illustrating a dynamic where the complexity of agendas and interests clash in counter-
narratives. However, questions concerning proportionality of offence and response, 
audience reach capacity, as well as the role of state endorsement come into play when 
counter-narratives are addressed. In digital vigilantism, participants’ visibility can be a 
desired condition because it can be instrumentalised. Visibility can lead to vulnerability 
for some and grant popularity and immunity to others. 
Visibility granted by social media is the means, the end, and the structure in which 
digital vigilantism takes place. Digital media (i.e., social networks, websites, blogs) 
are both tools and platforms for participants to produce and share information that 
is intended to punish, shame, moralise, or otherwise expose and harm targets. Most 
importantly, mediated visibility resembles a Foucauldian “spectacle of punishment” 
(1995, p. 16)—a show that attracts an audience and serves as a warning for potential 
targets, thus becoming a disciplinary act.
2.3. Back in the USSR
In the Soviet Union, the state incessantly compelled its citizens to be watchful of each 
other. The intensity and severity of “many watching the many on the behalf of the few” 
(Larsen & Piché, 2009, p. 196) varied throughout the history of the Soviet state. Small 
collective comrades’ courts were present since the early days of the Soviet empire 
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(Barnett, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 1994; Gorlizki, 1998; Kucherov, 1970; Sieglebaum, 1992). With 
the support of comrades’ courts, the “father” of the Bolshevik Revolution, Vladimir 
Lenin, envisioned the eventual dismissal of legal coercion in “socialist democracy”, as 
people were expected to “act righteously not from fear of punishment but directed 
by rules of communist morality” (Kucherov, 1970, p. 197). Mediated tools of citizen-
led justice and Soviet disciplinary measures included the so-called “boards of shame” 
and “boards of honour” (Bondarev, 2012), displaying photographs of the deviant and 
admirable community members, respectively.
Comrades’ courts were initially designed to enforce worker discipline by virtue of 
peer-to-peer monitoring and collective shaming of those who were not contributing 
their share to the common purpose of building communism. These courts experienced 
a downfall under Stalin’s industrialisation programme which required strict labour 
discipline and consequently much harsher measures by the state and its agents 
(Kucherov, 1970, p. 167). This manifested in mass repressions across the Soviet Union. 
Millions of Soviets were subjected to Stalin’s repressions as vragi naroda [enemies of 
the people] on accusations of treason, espionage, theft of state property, and other 
wrongdoings (Barnett, 2006). This came to be known as The Great Purge—comparable 
to “the Nazi destruction of European Jewry in the Holocaust” (Shatz, 1984, p. 1). 
Lenin’s idea of socialist democracy had transformed into mass-spread fear, suspicion, 
denunciation, and snitching.
Under Stalin’s repressions amid the industrialisation campaign, it was important to 
show the power of the state as opposed to the power of fellow comrades over each other. 
Still, the identification of ‘enemies’ was often carried out through anonymous accusations 
and reporting. A mere phone call or anonymous note, commonly known in the Russian 
language as donos [snitching],5 could lead to a person’s imprisonment and execution 
(Fitzpatrick, 1994). Thus, the boundaries between secret police and citizens blurred.
With the death of Stalin, public participation in the administration of justice 
experienced a revival (Kucherov, 1970, p.168). Involvement of citizenry in state judicial 
duties was formally institutionalised by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s with formal re-
introduction of Lenin’s comrades’ courts (Gorlizki, 1998, p. 403). The comrades’ courts 
aimed to “explore matters of everyday morality and address instances of improper 
behaviour by those who depart from the norms of socialist community life” (from the 
XXI Communist Party Congress cited in Gorlizki [1998, p. 424]). The courts addressed 
minor mischief, poor performance at work, hooliganism, alcoholism, asocial behaviour, 
and the like. They were granted the power to assign and execute punishment or transfer 
the case to higher state authority, should the severity of a given offence supersede their 
scope (Supreme Council of RSFSR, 1961).
5 Anonymous reports by citizens on fellow citizens were submitted to higher authorities such as 
NKVD (The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) later transformed to KGB (Committee for 
State Security).
47
Citizen-led justice then and now: From comrades’ courts to dotcomrade vigilantism
2
Once formally institutionalised, comrades’ courts quickly spread across the Soviet 
Union. “From a few hundred mostly dormant agencies in the mid-1950s, the number of 
comrades’ courts across the USSR swelled to 197,000 by the beginning of 1964, of which 
approximately 90,000 were in the Russian Republic” (Kazin, cited in Gorlizki, 1998, p. 
403).
Image 1 illustrates a hearing during the comrades’ court session in one of the typical 
Soviet apartment block courtyards. As is seen in the image, a local police officer is 
present at the hearing, signifying full collaboration between “citizen prosecutors” and 
the state. The “judges” are seated at an improvised judge’s bench and are dressed in 
ties, white shirts, and suits. The “defendant”—or rather the accused—is also dressed in 
a formal suit as one would when appearing in the legal court of justice. The audience, 
mostly the elderly and children, occupied front rows for the spectacle of comrade 
justice.
Image 1. Comrades’ Court. Photo by A. Nazarov (2012).
2.3.1. The Role of the State in Pre-digital Citizen-led Justice
The main proponents of the comrades’ courts in Soviet Russia were professional jurists, 
who “saw in these lay agencies a constitutionally viable mechanism for diverting a 
large volume of troublesome business away from state courts” (Gorlizki 1998, p. 404). 
Despite the fact that the Communist Party was “omnipotent” in the Soviet Union and 
permeated “every aspect of Soviet life,” there is “no evidence” that comrades’ courts 
were established to “strengthen Party influence” (Kucherov, 1970, p.192). Public opinion 
was, of course, influenced by the Communist Party and political cases were highly 
subjected to this influence. However, in instances where the Party “did not care to 
interfere,” the “pressure of [a] biased public” had the power to be exercised in comrades’ 
courts (Kucherov, 1970, p.193). The main idea behind Lenin’s statutes on comrades’ 
courts, and their consequent reinforcement by Khrushchev, was that “all persons will 
learn to rule and will nearly independently control all the affairs of society” so that “the 
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state” itself “may wither away” (Kucherov, 1970, p.170). While this indeed could have 
been the genuine desire of the proponents of citizen-led justice in the Soviet Union, 
the practical implication of this form of justice was accompanied by various problems, 
including but not limited to the “lack of knowledge of legal matters” by court members 
(Kucherov, 1970, p.196).
Comrades’ courts were at times more frightening to the citizens than state judicial 
bodies. As cited in Kucherov (1970, pp.196–97), Gorshenin offers an example of a case 
where a slightly inebriated man was caught by a people’s brigade and begged for any 
punishment, except for the transfer of his case to his own workers’ collective. Being judged 
by co-workers was more terrifying than the legal court of justice. Comrades’ courts, in this 
regard, fulfilled their core task of serving as an educational and prophylactic tool of worker 
discipline. They could be seen as a stage for the Foucauldian “spectacle of punishment”, 
amplified not by atrocities of physical torture but by the shaming from fellow comrades.
Some Soviet citizens took on individual roles of sleuths, revealing their darkest side 
through donos on fellow comrades, neighbours, co-workers, and relatives. These people 
subsequently fell prey to the agents of the state: NKVD, KGB, and other secret police 
units. Citizens reported on other citizens, judged, and convicted their comrades. All the 
while, the state was in a way immune to challenges and criticism beyond the whispered 
conversations in the kitchens of Soviet workers (Levina, 2017). This atmosphere persisted 
until state-initiated reforms of perestroika [restructuring] and glasnost’ [openness] came 
about in the 1980s.
2.3.2. Participants
In the country of the workers, society was in principle not permitted to remain indifferent 
toward its members. It had the obligation to care for and interfere in “how a person 
behaves on the street, in a club or at home, or to how he relates to his loved ones and to 
his comrades” (Gorlizki, 1998, p. 406). Comrades’ courts were theatrical in their nature, 
with an interactive setting where all members of the audience could verbalise their 
opinion on the case. As Gorlizki describes, comrades’ court members and chairs were 
usually prominent and high-ranking members of workers’ collectives with remarkable 
experiences and achievements. World War II veterans, veterans of industrialisation, 
and the elderly who “adhered to a harsher prewar puritanical morality” were invited 
to moralise to the younger generation and while doing so, they could both shame the 
less experienced generation and “let off steam” concerning the vector of Soviet society 
(Gorlizki, 1998, p. 423).
In this regard, the older generation and outstanding workers were agents of the 
Soviet state in their respective communities. This affiliation and hierarchy worked both 
ways. On the one hand, the state was able to penetrate into the deepest folds of the 
social fabric and guarantee its continuous presence. On the other hand, this form of 
social justice gave regular workers a sense of participation in their otherwise limited say 
in state affairs.
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2.4. Digital vigilantism in post-communist Russia
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation itself underwent a 
political, economic, and social transformation. Hand in hand with this transformation 
came new affordances for citizen-led justice granted by the internet and digital media. 
What has changed and what echoes the Soviet practices in mediated citizen-led justice 
in contemporary Russia? What role does the state play in the manifestation of mediated 
citizen-led justice in post-communist Russia?
2.4.1. Nashi [Ours]: Pro-state Digital Vigilantes in Russia
With the demolition of the Soviet Union came political and ideological struggle. Under 
the system change and democratisation of politics and market economy, known as 
“shock therapy,” the oligarchs emerged as a class (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005). At the same 
time, most of the former comrades were left with a broken state, a collapsed economy, 
and abandoned ideals. Citizen-led participation in state life took on a form of patronage 
and racketeering, while comrades’ courts as they were known in the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist (Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huérou, 2004, p.17). Economic stagnation and 
public disenchantment with the state created a vacuum in legal and social organisation 
of independent Russia. This vacuum lasted until the mid-2000s and was filled with 
state initiatives made by Russia’s second president, Vladimir Putin. Society members, 
especially the youth, were once again politically organised and mobilised.
The history of organised and institutionalised digital vigilantism in Russia was seeded 
in 2005 with the formation of Nashi [Ours] pro-Kremlin youth group which “played 
an important role in political socialisation of young people” (Krivonos & Fedorova, 
2014). With Putin’s efforts for youth mobilisation came the popular sentiment that the 
Motherland needed to be lifted “off its knees” (Kudors, 2010, p. 8). Young people played 
a dual role in this process. They were used to support the legitimacy of the regime, 
and while doing so, were prevented from becoming a revolutionary force that could 
challenge or even tackle this very regime.
As the backdrop to the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine, the 
instrumentalisation of youth in anti-revolutionary movements was a practical step 
for the Kremlin. Nashi were created to resist the “unpatriotic coalition of oligarchs, 
anti-Semites, Nazis, and liberals” (Heller, 2008, p. 3) and became agents of the state 
in response to behaviour and actions that went against it or were suspected of going 
against it. Certainly, there were movements that questioned the ruling regime, however, 
pro-Kremlin groups received financial and administrative support from the state, thus 
becoming “stalwarts” of the regime (Heller, 2008, pp. 3–4) with larger capacities.
As time went on, however, the ruling elite’s interest in youth mobilisation began to 
fade and Nashi experienced a downfall. Heller (2008) explains the decline of Nashi as a 
change of priorities in the Kremlin when Dmitry Medvedev came to power, attempting 
to improve relations with the West. The “yobbish hooligans of Nashi” fulfilled their task 
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in preventing a colour revolution in Russia but did not suit the new image of Russia, 
which positioned itself as a “civilized” “partner of the West” (Heller, 2008). Nashi’s 
failure to counter anti-regime protests and demonstrations in 2011 advanced the loss 
of interest in youth mobilisation from the side of the ruling elite, and the movement 
ceased to exist in 2013 (Baunov, 2017). The role of civilized partner became less 
relevant in the confrontation with the West amid the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and 
consequent sanctions imposed on Russia by Western democracies, paving the road for 
possible future resurrection of Nashi-like youth movements. However, the mobilisation 
of Cossacks (semi-military communities in Russia) to assist the state in cracking 
down on protesters (Goble, 2018) demonstrates that the Kremlin is leaning toward 
hard conventional forces in countering opposition, although hybridity of digital and 
conventional forces is possible. Nonetheless, starting from 2010 Nashi activists began 
re-branding the dissolving movement and under the Kremlin’s approval launched 
several vigilante groups with a specific offence focus and the use of social media in 
retaliation.
2.4.2. Stop a Douchebag and Piggy Against
Some of the prominent projects of former Nashi activists are the StopXam and Hrushi 
Protiv vigilante formations, specialising in monitoring traffic violations and exposing 
“unscrupulous” merchants who sell expired produce, respectively. The groups operate 
in a similar manner—approaching a target and engaging in often violent confrontation, 
shaming, and moralisation. The process is filmed, edited, and uploaded to the YouTube 
channels of these groups with subsequent dissemination across other social media.
Russia’s StopXam branch has two channels on YouTube, a Russian language channel 
and an English language channel where the episodes are systematically uploaded. The 
group is also present on Facebook, Google+, Odnoklassniki, Twitter, VKontakte, and 
other social media. StopXam’s signature trademark are stickers reading “I don’t care 
about anyone, I park where I want”, which they place on the windshields of noncompliant 
drivers.
Offence can be rooted in a wrongly parked vehicle, unauthorised stop or driving 
on sidewalks. Confrontations with targets often escalate into conflicts and even mass 
fights (Stop a Douchebag, 2015), attracting a wider audience. StopXam in Russia is 
essentially a brand, with numerous franchise branches across the country and in the 
neighbouring post-Soviet states. Furthermore, some members of Russia’s StopXam 
founded their own movements such as Lev Protiv [Lion Versus] in 2015 and Stop Haram6 
in 2017, battling smoking and drinking in public spaces and behaviour that goes against 
Islamic principles, respectively.
6 “Haram” describes anything forbidden by Islamic canon. In this case, vigilantes target fellow 
Muslims and confront “non-Muslim” behaviour.
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Hrushi Protiv operate in a similar manner to StopXam and engage in activities related 
to exposure and denunciation of allegedly unscrupulous merchants who sell expired 
products. Under their own initiative or upon receiving complaints from other citizens, 
group members wearing full-body pig suits enter grocery stores to survey product 
shelves. The entire process is filmed, and videos are edited and uploaded on YouTube with 
further dissemination across social media platforms. Much like StopXam, videos often 
feature violent content, cruel language, and physical confrontation. Hrushi Protiv has a 
website, an online store, and accounts on Facebook, Google+, Instagram, LiveJournal, 
Odnoklassniki, Periscope, Twitter, VKontakte, and YouTube. In 2016, Hrushi Protiv opened 
a branch in Belarus and became an international project (Hrushi Protiv, n.d.).
In the videos, Hrushi Protiv often features merchants of non-Russian origin as 
unscrupulous. Among frequent targets are people from the Caucasus and Central Asia.7 
Several videos produced by Hrushi Protiv called on the viewers to “sign a petition to 
legally ban migrants from working in retail” (Hrushi Protiv, 2014a). This controversial 
7 Some of these people can also be Russian citizens.
Image 2. StopXam sticker (Stop a Douchebag, n.d.a.). 
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call was made following Vladimir Putin’s proposition to reserve construction and some 
other employment spheres for migrants and leave retail for the Russian citizens (The 
Kremlin, 2013). This is an intricate situation where a citizen-led justice group can assist 
the state with a policy agenda. Furthermore, this situation raises questions concerning 
the framing of targets in digital vigilantism. Participants possess editorial powers 
and maintain framing capacity, which can be further supported on traditional media 
platforms. Framing of targets and other actors, such as police, can be instrumentalised 
in several ways including justification of and relevance to one’s own activism. 
Image 3. Hrushi Protiv in action (Hrushi Protiv, 2014b). 
Pro-Kremlin digital vigilantes receive state grants under the Presidential Program for 
NGO Support (Rubin and Rustamova, 2014; Rustamova, 2015), thus constituting a curious 
force supported and endorsed by the state. Meetings and selfies with Vladimir Putin 
and Dmitry Medvedev serve as additional legitimising tools for pro-Kremlin activists, 
and they often emphasise these ties in their videos.
2.4.3. Ne Nashi [Not Ours]: Digital Vigilantism Despite and Against the State
Kremlin-supported vigilantes aside, there are groups acting in spite of the state, 
although the nature of relations between, for instance, nationalist groups and the ruling 
regime remains unclear. Nationalists operating under the umbrella movement Restruct 
illustrate a scenario where the state closed its eyes on openly criminal acts of mediated 
and embodied retaliation but eventually responded in crackdowns on such activity. 
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Starting with an allegedly anti-paedophile movement “Format 18”,8 ultra-right 
nationalists formed issue-specific sub-groups and engaged in targeting migrant 
workers, foreigners, alleged drug dealers, ethnic and sexual minorities, and paedophiles 
(often using this façade to actually target sexual minorities). “Occupy Paedophilia” and 
“Occupy Narcophilia” are branches of Restruct, specialising in busting paedophiles 
and drug dealers, respectively. Such criminal and openly fascist groups humiliate and 
physically abuse their targets while filming and exposing them online (Balmforth, 2013). 
Retaliation conducted by Restruct members is characterised by brutality, humiliating 
and degrading acts, such as forcing the target to drink urine on camera (Wong, 2016).
Ultra-right nationalist vigilantes intentionally avoided collaboration with police 
and openly declared their motives to propagate nationalism and spread fear to 
prevent migrants from coming to Russia (Current TV, 2007). The voluntary visibility and 
outspokenness of Restruct leader Maxim Martsinkevich (better known as Tesak [Axe]) 
initially afforded him publicity and even air time in talk shows on Russia’s mainstream 
mass media, despite his radical nationalist views. Martsinkevich eventually faced 
charges for extremism, assault, and hooliganism, which led to his arrest and consequent 
extension of the sentence to ten years (Vesti, 2017a). Despite criminal charges, videos 
produced by Martsinkevich and his supporters were widely available across social 
networks at the time of gathering data for this publication in 2018.9 It is important 
to investigate nuances behind the initial indifference of the state to the activities of 
Martsinkevich and his supporters and eventual retribution.
Other cases include religiously motivated digital vigilantism where targets are 
confronted for their alleged deviation from religious obligations (Belsat TV, 2017). 
Some groups target Muslim women exclusively and expose them online for collective 
shaming and moralising. In the country’s conservative regions and republics such as 
Chechnya, this exposure can lead to physical abuse and even “honour execution” of 
targeted women (Mavromatis, 2017). Women fall victim to digital vigilantism in other 
instances. The so-called “patriot groups” composed of male ethnic Kyrgyz migrants 
punish Kyrgyz women through “honour beating” for interaction with representatives 
of other ethnic groups while in Russia (Recknagel, 2013). The case of Kyrgyz migrant 
workers illustrates subjection to layers of vulnerability. For instance, a Muslim Kyrgyz 
woman with a migration background is a target for several vigilante groups at once, 
including those in her own diaspora.
Anti-Kremlin groups use digital media affordances to get their message to the 
masses and expose the state itself. Among these is the Anti-Corruption Foundation 
(FBK) led by a public activist in opposition—Alexei Navalny. FBK describes itself as 
8 According to some online forums, the number “18” here evidently stands for Adolf Hitler, reflecting 
the alphabetic positioning of his initials: “A” being the first letter and “H”–the eighth.
9 On 16 September 2020, Martsinkevich was found dead in his detention cell. The official cause of 
death is suicide, which is contested by his lawyer and family.
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“the only Russia-based NGO that investigates, exposes and fights corruption among 
high-ranking Russian government officials” (Anti-Corruption Foundation, n.d.). FBK is 
an example of mediated activism that works against the state. In this regard, the state 
represented by the ruling regime is likely to have interest in limiting and controlling 
digital media through censorship and legislation limiting free speech on social media. 
Amid FBK’s exposure of Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Prikhodko accusing him 
of corruption for informal contacts with oligarch Oleg Deripaska on a yacht in Norway 
(Troianovski, 2018), the country’s Federal Service for Supervision of Communication 
[Roskomnadzor] ordered media corporations to remove certain content under the 
pretext of privacy violation. Facebook complied with the orders and removed content 
on its daughter company, Instagram (Troianovski, 2018). This case illustrates the power 
that the state enjoys and instrumentalises amid ubiquitous visibility in which citizens 
are theoretically capable of watching and exposing the state and its agents but are 
practically sanctioned for doing so.10 Privacy matters and other legal concerns come 
into play when high-ranking state officials fall target to exposure. This challenges 
sousveillance (Mann et al., 2002) as an option for “the many” to watch “the few”, given 
that “the few” enjoy a greater set of tools for self-protection.
Digital vigilantes are themselves watched by others engaging in revealing 
unscrupulousness, power abuse, and financial and political motives behind the operation 
of these groups, creating a clash of counter-narratives. Here, it is important to consider 
the role of social media platforms and pressure coming from the regulatory bodies of the 
state, as some bloggers voice concerns over counter-narrative videos denouncing that 
pro-Kremlin vigilante groups are being blocked, rated 18+, and otherwise restricted and 
deterred. The ruling regime has the capacity to provide favourable operating conditions 
and endorsement for some digital vigilante groups while censoring, legally charging, 
and otherwise controlling other groups. In doing so, the regime enjoys advantages in 
the capacity to protect itself and its agents from vulnerability to visibility.
2.4.4. Citizens as an Extension of the State in Digital Vigilantism
The state is a complex entity with respective layers of hierarchies and manifestation in 
society. It is important to be mindful of the fact that while being endorsed by some state 
representatives, digital vigilantes can be denounced by others. As seen above, citizens 
can be perceived as an extension of the state. Nevertheless, the state here is represented 
by the ruling regime in its legislative, judicial, and executive capacities, making it an 
important ground-setting actor adept at imposing particular rules of engagement.
10 FBK was declared “foreign agent” by Russia’s Ministry of Justice in 2019 and designated as 
“extremist organisation” by Moscow City Court in 2021.
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In his meeting with the Interior Ministry Board on 9 March 2017, Putin emphasised 
the importance of collaboration between law enforcement and civil society activists in 
crime prevention efforts:
The force of the law alone is not enough to prevent aggressive behaviour on the 
roads and situations that endanger lives. This requires a principled stand by the 
whole of society. I, therefore, ask you [The Ministry of Internal Affairs] to develop 
more active partnerships with volunteer groups, public organisations and citizen 
activists. This concerns not just order on the roads, but also crime and corruption 
prevention, work with people who could be drawn into crime, and other serious 
and important issues. (The Kremlin, 2017)
In this address, Russia’s President called on the Ministry of Internal Affairs to involve 
citizens in crime prevention activities, leaving the spectrum of “serious and important 
issues” broad. This message directly legitimises and endorses pro-Kremlin vigilante 
groups like StopXam and Hrushi Protiv. These groups illustrate the scenario in which 
“many” are “watching the many on behalf of the few” (Larsen & Piché, 2009, p. 196), 
where the state’s reach is extended via citizen activists, resembling Lenin’s vision of 
socialist democracy.
The state encourages citizen activism and participation in justice matters. While 
motives for participation in digital vigilantism are diverse, loyalty to the ruling regime 
can afford longevity, legitimacy, post-participation career opportunities, and financial 
resources in the form of state grants. Some former Nashi activists and founders of pro-
Kremlin digital vigilante groups have become members of Russia’s Civic Chamber,11 and 
others serve as assistants to policymakers. Indeed, vigilante practices not only expose 
the target but also the participant. In this case, participation can either be anonymous 
for the sake of protection of participants from legal retribution and/or counter-
retaliation or, on the contrary, be purposefully open so as to build a certain reputation 
and recognition in society.
11 “The Civic Chamber was established in 2005 under the Federal Law ‘On the Civic Chamber of the 
Russian Federation’. Its purpose is to help citizens interact with government officials and local 
authorities in order to take into account the needs and interests of citizens, to protect their rights 
and freedoms in the process of shaping and implementing state policies, and to exercise public 
control over the activities of executive authorities”. https://www.oprf.ru/en/about/
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2.5. Comparing comrades’ courts and dotcomrade vigilantism
Table 1 below is intended to provide a brief list of similarities and differences between 
the Soviet comrades’ courts and post-communist digital vigilantism in Russia. 
Soviet Comrades’ Courts Digital Vigilantism in Post-communist Russia 
State role Initiation, endorsement, provision of 
legislative framework, provision of 
legitimacy 
Endorsement in some instances, financial 
support through state grants to groups loyal 
to the state and legal control over groups 
working despite or against the state
Participants Prominent community members, targets’ 
colleagues, neighbours, veterans of war 
and industrialisation, the elder generation
Youth activists. Theoretically, anyone with a 
camera and internet connection. In practice, 
groups loyal to the state enjoy financial 
support, state endorsement and censorship-
free presence on social media 
Targets People with ‘anti-socialist behaviour’: 
hooligans, drunks, freeloaders, people 
with anti-Soviet ideology, negligent 
workers
Depending on the group: drivers, merchants, 
smokers, drinkers, Muslims, women, 
‘paedophiles’ (usually, sexual minorities), 
ethnic minorities, migrants, drug dealers, etc. 
Retaliation Public shaming and moralising 
culminating in target’s repentance, 
damaged reputation
Public shaming and moralising, embodied 
retaliation, humiliation, damaged reputation 
Venue Workplace, collective and state farms, 
club rooms, housing facilities
A variety of settings from public spaces to 
targets’ or participants’ private property
Use of media Displayed images on ‘shame boards’, 
coverage in a local newspaper
Retaliation is filmed and consequently 
disseminated online
Audience Colleagues, neighbours, townspeople Global web users 
Collaboration 
with police
Full collaboration Instances range from direct and indirect 
collaboration to working despite and against 
the police to falling under police jurisdiction
Motives for 
engagement 
Representation of the state, utilisation 
of own status in the community as a 
respected member of the collective; 
entertainment; retaliation on colleagues 
and neighbours
Financial (monetisation of social media 
presence), ideological, religious, political, 
among others
Table 1. Comrades’ Courts vs. Dotcomrade Vigilantism 
Comrades’ courts were mostly limited to the audience immediately present at the scene. 
In digital vigilantism, platforms where the Foucauldian “spectacle of punishment” takes 
place are highly interactive, as participants can connect with their audience and vice 
versa. If comrades’ courts culminated in a target’s repentance before colleagues and 
neighbours, the global audience in digital vigilantism is a weapon in itself since exposure 
can be intensified and perpetuated by means of shares, (dis)likes, and comments on 
social media. In the process, the digital audience is both entertained and disciplined by 
example, much like the audience of the comrades’ courts.
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In the Soviet comrades’ courts, collaboration with police was a given. At times, 
police officers were present at the hearings, while cases superseding the scope and 
capacities of comrades’ courts were passed to higher legal entities. Citizen-led justice 
was exercised not out of the impotence of the police but due to the disciplinary power 
of collective shaming that, at times, had a more severe impact than the legal court 
of justice. In digital vigilantism, the police are often portrayed as dysfunctional or 
corrupt, thus justifying the activities of concerned citizens. Police can, in fact, by default 
contribute to the activities of digital vigilantes as most targets in Russia do not seek help 
from law enforcement, especially if they are sexual minorities or labour migrants. Police 
officers arriving at the scene of activities conducted by groups like StopXam and Hrushi 
Protiv have been conditioned to take the side of participants, since higher authorities 
including the president justify, encourage, and endorse such public participation of 
citizen vigilantes.
There has been a shift in the use of special actors to represent the state in society 
when it comes to mediated citizen-led justice. In Soviet comrades’ courts, the role of 
a patriotic representative of collective values empowered to shame and moralise was 
given to the elder generation—those whose achievements before the state were 
renown through service on military and industrial fronts. In modern-day Russia, digital 
vigilantes are usually young people without any prominent stance in the community. 
In fact, popularity and recognition can come as a result of engagement in mediated 
citizen-led justice. Members of vigilante groups are known through their logos, stickers, 
costumes, and other identifying paraphernalia, essentially creating a brand image of 
self. 
Digital vigilantes enjoy editorial capacities that allow them to frame targets and 
other actors, such as the police. In this case, footage of retaliation is not accidental 
but an intentionally and systematically created product. Each video is accompanied 
by a catchy title and soundtrack. Consistently uploaded on YouTube and disseminated 
across social media, video material builds a name for participants and can be monetised. 
Both StopXam and Hrushi Protiv use YouTube video episodes of their activities as an 
opportunity to advertise products before displaying the acts of offence and retaliation; 
Soviet comrades’ courts were certainly deprived of these commercial and media 
opportunities.
Thus, compared to Soviet times, the role of the contemporary Russian state has 
shifted in the sense that citizen-led justice can be conducted despite the state or even 
against it. Nevertheless, the concept of “many watching the many on behalf of the few” 
(Larsen & Piché, 2009, p. 196) is still present as groups loyal to the ruling regime enjoy 
greater space to manoeuvre compared to those targeting the regime or crossing the 
invisible boundaries of approved activities. Groups that get out of hand (i.e., Restruct) 
get shut down, though state response tends to be slow. Groups or individuals who target 
the ruling regime are dealt with faster, using a vast set of tools including censorship, 
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content removal, and arrests. Having loyal or controllable groups active on social media 
provides a sphere where people get to let off some steam and serves as a type of staged 
show to demonstrate that there is active citizenry present in the otherwise repressive 
state.
Where comrades’ courts judged people for anti-socialist behaviour—hooligans, 
drunks, freeloaders, and negligent workers, each digital vigilante group has its own 
specific targets—drivers, merchants, smokers, drinkers, Muslims, women, paedophiles 
(sometimes purposely confused with sexual minorities), ethnic minorities, migrants, 
drug dealers, and so on. The wide focus of digital vigilantes produces conditions of 
intersecting vulnerabilities for citizens who fit several target groups at once. Specific 
focus and media savviness allow for branding, as activities spread across and beyond 
the country in the form of franchise branches of vigilante groups.
Digital media brought about new affordances where transparency, accessibility 
of information, and the speed and distance with which it travels make a wider set of 
targets vulnerable to retaliation. This produces circumstances of “many watching the 
many despite the few” and “many watching the few on behalf of the many”. Vigilantes 
themselves can fall target to retaliation by other vigilantes, affected citizens, or the state. 
While capacities vary among these actors, Russia’s ruling regime has an advantageous 
position in relation to media corporations and social media users with its tight control 
over political, economic, public, and media spheres.
In comrades’ courts, some forms of mediated exposure were practised through 
boards of shame and articles in local papers. In digital vigilantism, traditional media 
also play a significant role since it can lend meaning to citizen-led justice by framing 
participants, targets, and other actors such as the police.
2.6. Concluding remarks
Russia’s unique case of digital vigilantism was selected due to its Soviet-era pretext for 
citizens’ involvement in surveillance and justice matters as well as its state-encouraged 
digitally mediated post-Soviet manifestation. This chapter provides a theoretical 
conceptualisation of digital vigilantism in the Russian Federation with the objective of 
addressing the complex relationship between digital vigilantes and the state. Practices 
of outsourced vigilance and judicial functions to citizens in the Soviet Union have been 
compared to modern-day citizen participation in vigilantism. Soviet comrades’ courts 
were selected as a point of comparison with digital vigilantism due to several applicable 
features. These include shaming and moralisation of citizens by fellow citizens; state 
approval of such practices; and the role of the audience in the Foucauldian “spectacle 
of punishment” of citizen-to-citizen and state-citizen relations. 
Digital vigilantism in contemporary post-communist Russia is a systematic and 
institutionalised phenomenon that indeed resembles practices of citizen-led justice 
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widely present in the Soviet Union. However, digital media brought about new 
affordances that transformed participants, targets, and the audience. Unlike Soviet 
comrades’ courts, digital vigilante groups in post-communist Russia take offence on 
a wide range of issues and target individuals far beyond their own collectives and 
neighbourhoods. Motives for engagement in citizen-led justice are wide and range 
from political to ideological, religious, and financial among others. If Soviet citizen-led 
justice was entrusted to the hands of respected members of the community, mediated 
citizen-led justice in post-communist Russia is in the hands of the younger generation. 
Theoretically, anyone equipped with a video recorder and an internet connection 
can engage in digital vigilantism and expose fellow citizens online. In practice, 
traditional media, police, policymakers, and other actors play a significant role in 
rendering digital vigilantism meaningful and in framing participants, targets, and state 
authorities among other actors. In Russia, the ruling regime plays a significant role 
in the longevity, legitimacy, and other aspects of citizen-led surveillance and justice 
participation. Controlled digital vigilante groups can serve as a façade to exemplify 
active citizenry and establish a counter-force to those unsatisfied with the status quo. 
However, while loyal to the regime, digitally savvy, and socially active youth constitute 
a convenient force to resist opposition, this very force can just as easily turn against its 
creators. Digital vigilantes can cross certain boundaries that the ruling regime would 
not tolerate, in which case the state can retaliate against them.
When it comes to visibility and exposure, the state is in an advantageous position 
in relation to other actors, such as media corporations and social media users, given 
that legal mechanisms, mainstream media, and other useful tools of control and 
self-protection are in the hands of the ruling elite. The scenario of regime immunity 
to exposure may not be unique to Russia. As demonisation of traditional media and 
social media surveillance are taking place in renowned democracies, the case of Russia 
illustrates a unique scheme where several control mechanisms are simultaneously used 
by the ruling regime to manage traditional media and domestic social media. This is 
accomplished while allowing operation of foreign social media but pressuring it to 
comply with the state’s demands. Thus, the Russian state provides favourable conditions 
for some digital vigilantes while suppressing others.
Further research on the subject should address discourses surrounding mediated 
citizen-led justice in Russia with a focus on pro-state and independent media. 
Additionally, studies focusing on content analysis of video materials produced by digital 
vigilantes will allow for a nuanced understanding of the predispositions in vigilante-
target relations regarding political, sexual, gender, ethnic, national, and other biases. 
The concept of franchising digital vigilantism should be carefully addressed considering 
monetisation, branding, and other motives and responses. Other areas for scholarly 
exploration could include target experience with digital vigilantism, police stance on 
active citizen participation in justice-provision, and counter-narratives among digital 
vigilantes.

YouTube as a stage for 
vigilantism and citizen-critical 
publics in Russia12
12 This chapter is an adaptation of the following article: Gabdulhakov, R. (in press). Are some 
pigs more equal than others? Media control and citizen-critical publics in Russia. Media and 





Amid the intensification of state control over the digital domain in Russia, what types 
of online activism are tolerated and even endorsed by the government and why? 
Some entities such as the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) exposing the state are 
silenced through various tactics including content blocking and removal, labelling 
the foundation a foreign agent and deeming it extremist. At the same time, other 
formations of citizens using digital media to expose ‘offences’ performed by fellow 
citizens are operating freely. This chapter focuses on Hrushi Protiv [Piggy Against]–a 
vigilante group targeting merchants (often ethnic minorities and labour migrants) 
for alleged sale of expired produce. Supported by the government, Hrushi Protiv 
participants survey chain grocery stores and open-air markets for expired produce. 
This practice often escalates into violence, the process is routinely filmed, and edited 
footage is uploaded on YouTube. These videos constitute unique media products that 
entertain the audience, ensuring the longevity of punitive measures via public exposure 
and shaming. Relying on the theory of “authoritarian publics” (Toepfl, 2018), the chapter 
proposes a new category of citizen-critical publics to describe state-approved digital 
vigilantes in Russia. A collaboration with such publics allows the state to maintain a 
façade of civil society activism amid the silencing of “leadership-critical” and “policy-
critical” publics (Litvinenko & Toepfl, 2019), while participants gain financial rewards and 
fame. Foucauldian discourse analysis revealed that vulnerable groups such as labour 
migrants and ethnic minorities fall victim to the side effects of this collaboration.  12
12 
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“There is a face beneath this mask, but it isn’t me. I’m no more that face than I am the 
muscles beneath it, or the bones beneath that.”
– Steve Moore, V for Vendetta
3.1. Introduction
Since 2010, in grocery store chains and open-air food markets across Russia, one can 
witness people wearing full-body pig costumes surveilling the shelves and counters for 
expired products. Such raids tend to escalate into verbal confrontations and physical 
violence between merchants and amateur inspectors who film everything and share 
edited videos on YouTube and other social media, making them available to wide 
audiences. Beneath the pig outfits are former commissars of the pro-government 
youth movement Nashi [Ours] (also known as Putin’s youth) and other concerned 
citizens. Established in 2005 as a continuation of another pro-government organisation, 
Idushchiye Vmestye [Walking Together], Nashi was endorsed and sponsored by the 
state while actively supporting Vladimir Putin (for more on Nashi see Hemment, 2012; 
Khalymonchik, 2016). Amid the decentralisation of Nashi and its consequent dissolution, 
several youth-led thematic activist formations emerged. One of the most prominent 
and still active projects among such groups is Hrushi Protiv. As per the group itself, the 
title translates as “piggy against”, although the literal translation is “piggies against”. 
Transliteration from Cyrillic [Хрюши Против] into English can vary between Hrushi 
Protiv, Khrushi Protiv, Khryushi Protiv, Khriushi Protiv, etc. The option Hrushi Protiv will 
be used through this chapter based on the group’s own preferences for use across their 
social media accounts. 
In the case of Hrushi Protiv, retaliation turns into a form of entertainment while 
participants acquire powers that turn them into grocery store reputation assassins. To 
conceptualise this form of citizen-led digitally mediated justice provision the chapter 
relies on the notion of digital vigilantism. Digital vigilantism can be defined as “direct 
online actions of targeted surveillance, dissuasion or punishment which tend to rely 
on public denunciation or an excess of unsolicited attention, and are carried out in the 
name of justice, order or safety” (Loveluck, 2019, p. 4). In digital vigilantism, visibility 
is “the means and the end of retaliation” (Gabdulhakov, 2018, p. 317), as the very fact 
of publicity can have damaging effects when the names and locations of concerned 
businesses as well as personal information of merchants are exposed to wide audiences. 
In this regard, being an entity with a unique online presence, Hrushi Protiv is not simply 
a case of conventional offline vigilantism transferred to the online milieu. Rather, it 
constitutes its own category of digitally mediated citizen-led justice–digital vigilantism.
Like Nashi, Hrushi Protiv is financially supported by the government and endorsed 
by Russia’s top political leadership. On several occasions, Hrushi Protiv members have 
personally met with Vladimir Putin and former president Dmitriy Medvedev, taking 
‘selfies’ and discussing social problems. Beyond verbal endorsements, the group has 
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benefited from receiving millions of rubles (Around 340,000 USD as of December 2019) 
in state grants in support of its activities (Lvov, 2015). Group founders are loyal supporters 
of the political status quo in the country. This intricate relationship of activists and 
state leadership is especially intriguing given the wave of measures adopted by the 
government to regulate the digital domain (see, for instance, Lokot, 2020; Ognyanova, 
2019; Vendil Pallin, 2016). Yet, the liaison that the state established with its loyal digitally 
savvy youth cannot be described one-dimensionally (Favarel-Garrigues & Shukan, 2019) 
and has been shown to be in flux. Similar groups that emerged out of Nashi, such as 
the StopXam [Stop a Douchebag] movement countering bad parking, for instance, have 
had periods of both praise and condemnation by traditional media. Initially endorsed 
by the state in the same manner as Hrushi Protiv, StopXam may have crossed some 
boundaries of trust when they started targeting high-profile individuals. In 2016, 
for instance, the group publicly shamed and physically fought a Russian Olympic 
champion, consequently receiving a liquidation order issued by the Ministry of Justice 
(Gabdulhakov, 2019a). 
This chapter addresses the complex relationship between digital vigilantes and the 
ruling elites amid the process of tightening state control applied in the digital domain. 
In doing so, the chapter unveils various power hierarchies and webs of interests in state-
citizen and citizen-to-citizen justice provision. Thus, the following questions are raised: 
Amid the ongoing crackdown on online self-expression in Russia, what types of citizen-
initiated forms of online activism are tolerated and even endorsed by the government 
and why? In addition, the chapter relies on three supporting questions: What are the 
motivations for participation in digital vigilantism? What are the impacts of digital 
vigilantism on targets? What role do platform affordances and regulation play in digital 
vigilantism?
The chapter first offers an overview of scholarly discussions surrounding digital 
vigilantism and media systems in autocratic contexts generally, and in Russia specifically. 
It proceeds with a description of its methodology and presentation of the results of 
applying Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) on the 20 most popular Hrushi Protiv 
YouTube episodes. This is followed by a discussion of findings in reaction to the stated 
research questions. In conclusion, the chapter addresses theoretical implications and 
makes suggestions for future research.  
3.2. Digital vigilantism and media control in Russia  
“Connective actions” in which digital media serve as “organizing agents” for sharing 
“internalized or personalized ideas” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, pp. 752-753) have 
become a global phenomenon, at times capable of instigating social change through 
such movements as #MeToo (Mendes et al., 2018) or #BlackLivesMatter (Carney, 2016). 
Yet exposure and public shaming on social media can be characterised by different 
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power dynamics, subjecting targets to various forms of both immunity and vulnerability 
while participation can be both empowering and harmful (Gabdulhakov, 2019b; 2020). 
Citizen-led justice manifested online can imply resistance against injustices and 
oppression as well as retaliation against already vulnerable groups and individuals, 
such as minorities and migrants (Bjørgo & Mareš, 2019). Furthermore, vigilantes might 
use a façade cause to justify their actions while pursuing a set of other motives, be 
they political, ideological, financial or other aspirations. Sometimes the motives are 
presented in bizarre combinations, such as the Serbian far-right nationalist vigilante 
group Levijatan [Leviathan], which claims to protect animal rights while engaging in 
“violent actions against Roma, LGBT and other ‘enemies of Serbs’” (Colborne, 2020). 
Social justice and mob laws raise a number of questions related to legality, morality, 
effectiveness, and proportionality of citizen-to-citizen retaliation, especially when it 
comes to situations where, for whatever reason, authorised state services are replaced 
(or assisted) by vigilante forces. 
3.2.1. Digital Vigilantism in Russia
After decades of scant scholarly attention to the notion of vigilantism, the phenomenon 
has recently gained momentum in the literature, with conceptual and empirical 
contributions featuring cases of divergent socio-political realities. Trottier (2017), 
for instance, offers a theoretical discussion on the role and impacts of visibility 
weaponisation in denunciatory acts. Moncada (2017), in turn, presents a classification 
of the varieties of vigilante practices and proposes core definitional dimensions for 
understanding the notion. With the focus on Russia’s far-right, Kasra (2017) addresses 
the role of networked images in humiliation and socio-political control mechanisms. 
Loveluck (2019) develops a typology of digital vigilantism, relied upon in this chapter. 
Favarel-Garrigues, (2019) elaborates on the entrepreneurial affordances of participants 
and their relationship with law enforcement. Furthermore, the role of traditional media 
in facilitating digitally mediated retaliation and rendering the phenomenon meaningful 
has been addressed in an ongoing debate (Gabdulhakov, 2019a). Despite the richness 
and depth of these contributions, the phenomenon requires further continuous 
attention, as approaches, environments, affordances and nuances develop and evolve 
in real-time. Therefore, it is important to work towards an understanding of specific 
rules of engagement, respective power positions, benefits and side effects of vigilante 
actions while also considering the unique affordances of social media and digital tools.
Loveluck (2019) addresses the modes of coordination in digitally mediated vigilante 
practices and categorises them as ranging from “ad-hoc and loosely coordinated 
activities” to “pre-existing networks” that engage in “rehearsed collective efforts” (p. 
5). In the quest for a typology of “online self-justice”, he identifies four ideal types of 
digital vigilantism practices, namely: “flagging, investigating, hounding and organised 
leaking” (p. 2). Loveluck argues that in the process of flagging, the targeting of a specific 
person involved is avoided. Instead, the “low intensity” cases are meant to alert social 
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media users by bringing to their attention instances of perceived norm-breaching 
(p. 5). Flagging via text and images is a global practice shared across social media 
platforms and political contexts. Unlike flagging, investigating implies naming the 
concerned target and a “collective effort” in investigating cases ranging from theft to 
more serious crimes and terrorist activities (Loveluck, 2019, p. 11). In this case, citizen-
investigators are compared to “websleuths” who can provide their “technical expertise” 
in a given case (p. 12). Loveluck illustrates a complex dynamic between authorities, 
media and websleuths in which crowdsourced investigations do not terminate at the 
level of assisting police with the identification of criminals but can further evolve into 
digitally mediated harassment. Hounding takes matters on yet another level, referred 
to by Loveluck as “the epitomy of digital vigilantism” it combines punitive intentions 
with investigations and mobilises participants against a specific target (2019, p. 15). 
Discreditation and public humiliation are the central aims in hounding. Finally, Loveluck 
presents organised leaking where participation is highly institutionalised and is centred 
around the “documenting of problematic situations” and “the disclosure of confidential–
and potentially incriminating–information” (p. 22). Examples of such organised groups 
can be Russia’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) whose activists investigate state 
corruption cases and make secret transactions of state officials public. Some of the 
loudest investigations of the Foundation shared on YouTube include the 2017 “Don’t call 
him Dimon” exposure of Russia’s ex-president Dmitry Medvedev, and “Putin’s palace. 
History of world’s largest bribe” revelation of the riches of Russia’s current president 
Vladimir Putin (Alexei Navalny, 2017; 2021). 
Activities of FBK can serve as an example of what Rosenbaum and Sederberg 
categorised as regime control vigilantism. In the absence of an official control mechanism 
that could be applied to the ruling elites, citizens take these duties into their own hands. 
Another group that can be classified as an example of organised leaking is Dissernet–a 
collective of academic enthusiasts who reveal plagiarism in doctoral dissertations. 
Operating in Russia and other former-Soviet states, Dissernet’s frequent targets are 
state officials.   
In the selected case study of Russia’s Hrushi Protiv, hounding as a practice in digital 
vigilantism is most applicable. Much like other similar formations, activists of Hrushi 
Protiv indeed combine investigative approaches with practices of targeting specific 
businesses and individuals. Retaliation takes place not only in the form of verbal 
confrontations, physical fights, and destruction of produce; targets and business that 
they represent can suffer from long-lasting or even permanent reputation damage. 
3.2.2. Media Control in Russia
Digitally mediated vigilante practices are part of the larger system combining political 
culture, social structures, media landscapes and legal frameworks. Thus, it is necessary 
to elaborate on the milieu in which Hrushi Protiv operate. With the focus on Russia, this 
chapter seeks to address a context where the watchful gaze and control ambitions of 
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the state, create a system that endorses some forms of online activism while cracking 
down on others. Having established nearly totalitarian control over its traditional media 
sector, the government went after the digital domain with new legislation aimed at 
service providers, professional content creators, and individual users.  
The waves of media landscape transformation in Russia are concurrent with major 
socio-political transformations in the country. Significant historical events, of course, 
include the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and nearly 75 years of totalitarian rule that 
followed. Such a lengthy period of state control of all domains tends to produce inertia 
that is capable re-packaging old practices despite the seemingly new political structures. 
The structures themselves demonstrate a past-oriented focus by applying pressure on 
service providers and amending the legislation to criminalise certain forms of online self-
expression, leading to consequent mass-scale social media user arrests (Gabdulhakov, 
2020; Lokot, 2020). This tendency for increased control is ongoing and reactionary, since 
the government, for instance, also intervenes in the otherwise automated/algorithmic 
process of generating news feeds (Wijermars, 2021) among other approaches.  
In their canonical work “Comparing Media Systems”, Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
propose three ideal types of media systems, namely Democratic Corporatist, Liberal 
and Polarised Pluralist. Each of the proposed systems is composed of dimensions such 
as media market structure; political parallelism in news reporting; professionalisation 
of journalists; and the role of the state. Given the limited, West-centric case focus of 
Hallin and Mancini’s original conceptualisation, Oates (2007) suggests that none of the 
three models can be applied to Russia. Instead, Oates (2007) proposes the term “neo-
Soviet” for the country’s media model. Oates offers a unique perspective by focusing 
on the position and the demands of the audience amid the multifaceted components 
that inform this model, including bias, censorship, state and commercial influences, 
mass media law, free speech protection, funding, media harassment, and violence 
against journalists. Thus, when another major transformative wave came about amid 
the collapse of the USSR, the audience did not necessarily embrace the accompanying 
role of the media as a state critic. Akin to the Soviet media, which broadcasted based on 
national values “giving the audience a sense of contentment and pride in their society”, 
audiences in post-Soviet Russia with a much wider variety of products at their disposal 
valued mass media “as an institution that guides (rather than questions or undermines) 
the nation” (Oates, 2007, pp. 1295-1296).  
Litvinenko and Toepfl (2019) react to another major political event in Russia’s history, 
namely, massive 2011-2013 protests for “Free and Fair Elections” (also known as protests 
on Bolotnaya Square). Dissent-curbing measures that followed these events once again 
reshaped Russia’s media landscape. To understand the nature of this shift within the 
authoritarian public sphere, Litvinenko and Toepfl apply Toepfl’s (2018) “authoritarian 
publics” theory (with the consideration of participants, environment and discursive 
practices) to Russia’s case. As a result, they propose three types of publics–leadership-
critical, policy-critical and uncritical.  
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Several strategies have been adopted to counter the leadership-critical publics, 
following the mass protests in Moscow. Among these measures, Litvinenko and Toepfl 
identify “reining in discursive practices” via adaptation of legal frameworks governing 
the digital domain and online self-expression; “shutting down environments” by 
blocking individual websites and platforms (blocking LinkedIn and attempting to 
block Telegram); and “intimidating participants” by limiting foreign media ownership, 
banning certain types of advertisement and replacing media owners with government-
loyal elites (2019, pp. 232-233). Based on Schedler’s (2013) “institutional gardening” 
concept to describe control measures, Litvinenko and Toepfl explain that policy-critical 
publics came out of the process of reshaping or “gardening” of leadership-critical 
publics (Litvinenko & Toepfl, 2019, pp. 236). A vivid illustration of this reshaping is the 
metamorphosis of top leadership-critical news websites into policy-critical publics 
between 2012-2018 (Litvinenko & Toepfl, 2019, p. 235). Strategies shaping uncritical 
publics included recruiting civil servants, celebrities, active internet users and paid PR 
workers known as “trolls” to exude vivid support for the political status quo “in novel 
Internet environments” (Litvinenko & Toepfl, 2019, pp. 235-236).   
The intensity of authoritarian gardening in Russia is increasing. During the 2011 
meeting with his supporters among online activists, then-president Medvedev called 
the Internet “an open space” and stated that even “things immoral in nature” have to be 
preserved online (The Kremlin, 2011). The official rhetoric has shifted dramatically in one 
decade. During the 2021 meeting with the COVID-19 pandemic-countering volunteer 
movement “We Are Together”, President Putin called on the Internet to “obey not even 
just laws, [as] formal legal rules, but also the moral laws of society”, proceeding to label 
the Internet as a source of “child pornography, child prostitution, promotion [and] 
distribution of drugs”, and a space where adolescents are “being pulled to the streets in 
order to misbehave there, [and] to fight with the police” (The Kremlin 2021). Amid these 
shifts in perspective, state critics are forced to balance between reaching out to online 
audiences and managing personal risks that come along with such visibility (Lokot, 
2018). At the same time, topics that can be subjected to public criticism are shrinking. 
By adopting strategic legislation and selectively applying the law, Russia’s ruling elites 
are continuously discouraging citizens from criticizing the government and its policies 
(Lokot, 2020). Discussing, commenting and even ‘liking’ social media posts featuring 
taboo topics such as, for instance, protests, Crimea’s annexation or Russia’s role in World 
War II, can lead to legal scrutiny, fines and prison sentences (Gabdulhakov, 2020). Yet in 
this set of authoritarian gardening mechanisms in Russia, it is still possible to engage 
in some forms of online activism, as is evident from the case of Hrushi Protiv. Building 
on Litvinenko and Toepfl’s (2019) conceptualisation of leadership-critical, policy-critical 
and uncritical publics, this article proposes another category to describe the acts of 
permitted digital vigilantism–“citizen-critical publics”. Digital vigilantes can operate 
and target other citizens, as long as these citizens are not representing or otherwise 
connected to the ruling elites.
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3.3. Methodology
Amid the wide variety of content analysis methods, the chapter relies on qualitative 
discourse analysis in Foucauldian terms. While the approach is rather broad and built 
on the principles of non-formalisation, Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008) propose 
the following methodological guidelines for conducting FDA: selecting a corpus of 
statements, problematization, technologies, subject positions, and subjectification. Arribas-
Ayllon & Walkerdine identify five non-exhaustive types of corpora of statements 
suitable for FDA, namely spatiality and social practice, political discourse, expert discourse, 
social interaction, and autobiographical accounts (2008, p. 100). Per Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, problematisation may base itself on a response to the following questions: 
“Under what circumstances and by whom are aspects of human being rendered 
problematic, according to what moral domains or judgement are these concerns 
allowed to circulate? What official discourses and counter-discourses render these 
problems visible and intelligible?” (2008, p. 101). In FDA, technologies are a concept that 
focuses on “power and self”–a type of “‘truth games’ in which participants engage in 
conflict, competition and power” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008, p. 102). Subject 
positions in FDA have to do with the moral order and the structure of rights and duties. 
Finally, subjectification refers to instances where individuals self-regulate to “transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality” (Foucault, 1988, p. 18, as cited in Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008, p. 103).
Commonly used in geography and psychology, FDA is useful in addressing the 
aims of this interdisciplinary study, which incorporates elements of Media Studies and 
Political Science by virtue of focusing on digital media affordances for citizen-led justice 
as well as the role of the state in media system formation and regulation. Applying FDA 
approaches to the case of Hrushi Protiv in Russia, the chapter investigates how social 
hierarchies (Toelstede, 2020) inform current vigilante practices in the country and assess 
the role of the official state position in rendering such practices meaningful, amid the 
ongoing efforts of imposing strict control over the digital domain. 
Since 2010 Hrushi Protiv uploaded over 340 YouTube videos (as of 28 February 2021). 
As its corpus of statements, the chapter selected 20 of the most popular episodes, in terms 
of the total number of views. When it comes to spatiality and social practice, FDA allows 
for reliance on personal observations and ethnographic approaches. Hrushi Protiv is an 
entity with a unique online presence, in the sense that it is not simply conventional offline 
vigilantism transferred to the online environment. Rather, is its own category of digitally 
mediated citizen-led justice. Online visibility is a weapon (Trottier, 2017) of punishment 
that Hrushi Protiv uses to harm its targets while simultaneously building its own brand 
and the position of justice providers in society. Given the significance of online artefacts 
in such practices, the chapter relied on netnographic approaches (Kozinets, 2015; 2019), 
which implied continuous online observations of Hrushi Protiv activities and content 
analysis of videos shared on the original Moscow-based group’s YouTube channel. 
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Such observations were useful in understanding the nature and evolution of Hrushi 
Protiv raids. The author looked at the frequency of video uploads; the length of episodes; 
the number of views, comments, ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’; and titles of the episodes, often 
resembling click bait and yellow press headlines. In the initial phase, episodes were 
watched without a particular set of codes or categories in mind, and the main goal 
was to get to know the group and become familiar with its actions. As of 28 February 
2021, the Hrushi Protiv YouTube channel had 332,000 subscribers with 91,022,156 total 
views of 340 videos, the first one of which was uploaded on 23 September 2010. Hrushi 
Protiv upload videos with varied frequency, but the practice is systematic with at least 
one video released per month. The shortest video in the sample is 2 minutes and 31 
seconds long, and it is dedicated entirely to a fight between participants and targets 
at the Moskvoretskaya produce base. The episode begins with a display of a link to a 
petition calling for the ban migrants from retail work. The longest video is 26 minutes 
featuring a grocery store raid with ethnic minority employees. Out of 20 top videos, 
11 were released in 2013, one in 2015, five in 2016, two in 2017, and one in 2019. This 
variation on the timeline of Hrushi Protiv activities suits FDA’s spatial focus. 
The analysis additionally accounted for political and expert discourses, as Hrushi 
Protiv and similar formations that came out of Nashi have been endorsed by the 
state, while other manifestations of online citizen activism experience heavy state 
suppression. Political artefacts, in this respect, are public speeches as well as formal 
and informal interactions between the government and participants. Expert discourses 
involve traditional media framing of participants and targets. 
Social media affordances allow Hrushi Protiv to narrate their own autobiography, since 
it is communicated via online self-construction. The group and its members are relying on 
online communication modes in the process of defining the norms of morality and justice-
provision methods while negotiating their own position in this equation. Inspired by 
methodological approaches of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2017), this phase relied 
on an in-depth qualitative analysis (Altheide & Schneider, 2013) of Hrushi Protiv YouTube 
episodes with the focus on positioning of self and framing of targets, police and other 
actors appearing in the videos. YouTube itself constitutes a unique tool and stage for digital 
vigilantism, enabling both access to wide audiences and money-making opportunities.
The author made several attempts to interview the founder as well as former and 
current members of Hrushi Protiv in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Despite exchanging 
a few messages online, no agreement for an interview was given by participants after 
all. The author offered interview questions in written form, but the offer received no 
reaction. Why Hrushi Protiv members are reluctant to partake in an academic study 
is not particularly clear, but several reasons can be assumed. Perhaps, members were 
already approached by one too many journalists and are either tired of giving interviews 
or see no personal benefit in participating. The group is rather well-known already and 
can deliver any message they wish to communicate directly on their own social media 
pages and channels, without the involvement of third parties. 
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3.4. Hrushi Protiv on YouTube and beyond
3.4.1. Corpus of Statements
Hrushi Protiv runs a website and has accounts on YouTube, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, 
Facebook,13 Instagram, Twitter, Telegram, Live Journal and Tik-Tok. Social media profiles 
of Hrushi Protiv invite the viewers to financially support the project. Participants 
maintain an online store, where group branded clothing items, bags and mugs can 
be purchased. A separate website describing Hrushi Protiv as a “volunteer movement 
aimed at identifying trade in substandard products in stores” (Hrushi Protiv, n.d.b.) 
states that in 2016 a branch was established in Belarus, making the group international. 
Most of the featured Hrushi Protiv episodes follow the same scenario where the 
activists equipped with video cameras enter stores and start loading the allegedly 
expired produce into shopping carts. Such acts lead to verbal and physical confrontations 
with store personnel and, in some cases, escalate into physical fighting. Content analysis 
revealed that violence featured in videos and/or promised in the titles correlated with 
the popularity of these YouTube episodes. The most viewed episode was uploaded on 
29 May 2019 and is called “let’s step outside”–a phrase commonly associated with an 
invitation to settle a conflict physically. Being 20 minutes and 15 seconds in length, 
this is one of the longer episodes of Hrushi Protiv with 3,665,938 views, 47,000 “likes”, 
11,000 “dislikes”, and 21,439 comments as of December 2019. In the episode, at least nine 
participants are shown entering the store. Grocery store personnel film participants 
with their phones, while the latter raid the shelves. Verbal confrontations begin when 
personnel tell participants that filming is not allowed. Participants demand from targets 
an elaboration on the legal grounds for the prohibition of filming. The verbal back-and-
forth continues for some time, until the personnel give in and destroy expired produce 
collected by participants. Overall, 12 episodes out of 20 feature verbal and physical 
confrontation between participants and targets.  
The signature trademark of Hrushi Protiv has been their full-body piggy outfit. The 
outfits are featured in half of the analysed episodes. Up until 2016, participants wore their 
piggy costumes consistently during the raids. Signature costumes made participants 
immediately visible and recognisable. In several videos police ask participants “where are 
the costumes?” indicating popularity and recognition of the brand. For unclear reasons, 
starting from 2016 wearing piggy outfits became less consistent. Sometimes, activists are 
seen wearing branded shirts and hoodies featuring a piggy’s head–the group’s brand 
logo. Such merchandise is also available for sale in the group’s online store. Other clothing 
items worn by participants include patriotic sports suits that read “Russia” across the back 
and hoodies with prints of Vladimir Putin in military uniform of the commander in chief, 
emphasising the group’s patriotic values and loyalty to the ruling regime. 
13 The link to Facebook was provided on their official website, and the YouTube channel of the group 
was not functional in February 2021.
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In 10 out of 20 analysed episodes, Hrushi Protiv target non-Slavic minorities. In 
another six episodes, the targets are mixed and include both non-Slavic minorities 
and Slavs. Four episodes make no explicit reference to the ethnic backgrounds of 
targets. Thus, in 16 out of 20 episodes a direct link between non-Slavic merchants and 
unscrupulousness in retail is emphasised. Hrushi Protiv openly expresses its prejudice 
towards labour migrants in Russia. In 2013-2014, participants called on their audience 
to sign a petition to condemn migrants from working in retail–an act suggesting 
nationalist biases in these state-encouraged vigilante practices. One of the analysed 
episodes, titled “Hostages at Moskvoretskaya produce base”, features participants 
stating that “non-Russian employees run away when the police arrives”, emphasising 
both the “foreignness” of unscrupulous retailers as well as the potential illegality of 
“police-fearing” migrant workers. 
Each episode uploaded by Hrushi Protiv is given a media-headline-like title, some of 
which are openly biased in terms of the ethnic background of the merchants. Examples 
include: “Asian showdown”, “We don’t speak Russian”, “Tajiks are indignant”, “Migrants 
beat up piggies”, etc. Other selected episodes included such titles as “Real jigits” (in 
some Turkic languages and in the Caucasus the term jigit is used to describe brave 
young men)–referring to non-Slavic backgrounds of the targets, and “Moya Magazin” 
[Mine store]–with an intentional grammatical mistake in the masculine noun, stressing 
featured targets’ poor command of the Russian language. Overall, seven episode titles 
make explicit references to targeted retail workers’ foreignness. 
Police are featured in 11 of the 20 selected episodes. On three occasions participants 
call the police to the site. In four cases it is the targets who make such calls, and in five 
instances it is not clear whose call the police responded to. Police officers are generally 
passive, they register the names of all actors in both parties, collect the appeals and 
leave. In one episode, the activists are featured calling Russia’s Chief Sanitary Inspector, 
Gennady Onishchenko (Hrushi Protiv, 2013). In the video, Evgeniya Smorchkova 
apologises to Onishchenko for “calling again” and asks for help with a particular store 
that is not compliant with the demands. The next scene features the arrival of police 
officers at the concerned store. The scenario in which participants directly call such 
a high-profile official (on more than one occasion) and ask for help, indicates the 
administrative capacities of the group, state endorsement and support of their activities, 
and points to the power advantages that participants have over their targets. 
Hrushi Protiv episodes occasionally feature informal leaders, such as celebrities. In 
one of the raids in the selected sample participants are joined by a pop singer, a member 
of a famous Russian boy band, Ivanushki International. The artist does not engage in 
physical or verbal violence but is brought along to demonstrate the level of support and 
solidarity that Hrushi Protiv enjoy as citizen activists. Such informal endorsement once 
again stresses the unique capacities of participants and their ascendancy over targets. 
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3.4.2. Problematization
The internet and smart mobile devices have transformed the process of socialisation 
and surveillance at state-citizen and citizen-to-citizen levels in Russia. Numerous 
citizen formations establish thematic vigilante forces and target fellow citizens over 
alleged and perceived offences such as bad parking; drinking and smoking in public 
spaces; paedophilia (an accusation to which sexual minorities often fall target); drug 
dealing; and other ‘violations’ of legal and moral boundaries. In some instances, no 
action is needed to attract the retaliation of vigilantes, it is just enough to be a female 
(Avramov, 2019) or an ethnic minority (Chapman et al., 2018). The instrumentalisation 
of perceptions of morality for control of social order is a way for Hrushi Protiv to fulfill 
their function as an extension of the state, rather than being a collective of autonomous 
citizens. Much like the nostalgia for the Soviet-era media that communicated a sense of 
pride for the society, state-supported vigilante formations in Russia resemble various 
concerned groups of the past, such as the Tzarist and subsequently Soviet druzhina 
[volunteer militia formations] (Sokolov, 2019); the All-Union Leninist Young Communist 
League “Komsomol”; or the system of comrades’ courts that addressed minor mischiefs 
in breaching both legal and moral norms (Gabdulhakov, 2018). 
3.4.3. Technologies
The case of Hrushi Protiv demonstrates how a citizen-led organisation can acquire 
legitimacy, recognition and powers not only akin to those of official control entities 
(i.e., Russia’s state sanitation service Rospotrebnadzor), but defying these entities in 
technological savviness and retaliation approaches. Hrushi Protiv activities, in this 
regard, go beyond mere flagging and cannot be compared to regular and widely 
practised consumer reviews, which inform fellow citizens about a particular business 
or product. Hrushi Protiv positions itself as a force operating between consumers and 
businesses as the former can report on the latter to participants. This position raises 
questions related to the possibility of intentional reputation damage upon orders from 
competitors of raided stores. What could stop “business A” from directly employing 
Hrushi Protiv or similar formations to expose a competing “business B”? One can only 
rely on the “good faith” of participants in this regard. At the same time, even with the 
assumed incorruptibility of participants, issues of legitimacy and proportionality of 
retaliation remain in question. 
3.4.4. Subject Positions
Unlike a privately paid fine to state control services due to misconduct, exposure on 
social media as a result of citizen-led retaliation brings about long-lasting reputation 
damage. Edited video materials uploaded by participants have the power to subject 
non-Russian targets to further scrutiny by police and immigration authorities. Given 
that three Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are highly 
remittance dependent (Bhutia, 2019), a labour migrant’s job loss and/or deportation 
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can lead to severe economic consequences for their families. The structure of power 
asymmetries (Toelstede, 2020) between participants and targets is informed by access 
to mass audiences (and lack thereof) on the one hand; as well as social frustration, and 
ethnic and national biases on the other hand. Episodes tend to portray Hrushi Protiv 
and their targets as two fundamentally separate cultural clusters, with Slavic youth 
participants and grocery store/market personnel comprised of non-Slavs.  
3.4.5. Subjectification
Hrushi Protiv exemplifies a case where vigilant citizens acquire powers that give them 
wide social and media recognition. This visibly affords participants an almost TV 
persona stance. Hrushi Protiv resembles the TV show “Revizorro”–an adaptation of a 
Ukrainian show “Revizor” airing on Russia’s Pyatnitsa [Friday] TV Channel since 2014. 
The show’s host engages in public exposure of poor service provision practices in 
hotels, restaurants and other spaces of public service. The power of public exposure is 
significant to the point that businesses opt for collaboration with amateur controllers 
and sign agreements with Hrushi Protiv, promising to comply with imposed regulations 
(Hrushi Protiv, 2010). 
3.5. Discussion
Amid the intensification of state control over who can say what online in Russia, it is 
important to address the motives of the government in supporting digital vigilantes 
like Hrushi Protiv. These motives are a product of an evolution of the Kremlin’s youth 
policies and strategies that have undergone several overhauls. Nashi was formed as 
a national-patriotic movement with the aim of supporting the ruling elite and acting 
as a counter-force to the opposition. Given that Nashi ceased to exist in 2010, former 
commissars of the movement were in need of a new project and issue-specific vigilante 
formations came into being. Having active and digitally savvy youth in its ranks is 
a convenient scenario for the regime, as long as this force does not turn against its 
patrons. The anti-migrant narratives of Hrushi Protiv were handy in political campaigns 
constructed around the sentiments of threats coming from foreigners. In recent years, 
however, the Kremlin adopted a harsher approach to relations with its former youth 
commissars. Active citizens are expected to turn into entities resembling Soviet-era 
loyal citizen squads which extends the powers and omnipresence of the state. 
Formations such as Hrushi Protiv are not threatening to the state unless they start 
targeting businesses that belong to the ruling elite. As long as certain boundaries are 
not crossed, the presence of such formations in the system allows for a display of an 
allegedly active civil society amid realities where challenging state authority can cost 
people large fines and lengthy prison sentences. Now in their 30s and having been 
engaged in the same vigilante practices for over a decade, some former Nashi activists 
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have tried building political careers to various degrees of success. Perhaps, the elites are 
allowing these citizen-critical publics to operate as a way of rewarding the once-loyal 
youth commissars for their support of the Putin-Medvedev tandem in the 2000s.
What are the motivations for participation in digital vigilantism? When it comes 
to motivation for participation in digital vigilantism, there are certain entrepreneurial 
interests (Favarel-Garrigues, 2019; 2021) and social media “financialization” (Elmer, 2018) 
affordances. Groups monetise YouTube channels, sell merchandise and receive state 
grants in support of their activities. In this sense, Hrushi Protiv is a formation with a hyper 
identity, simultaneously resembling citizen-led activism, a state-supported NGO, and a 
group of digitally-savvy entrepreneurs. Therefore, engagement in vigilante practices 
can afford participants financial and social benefits. Furthermore, endorsement from 
the state’s highest authority affords legitimacy and provides certain immunities in 
interaction with law enforcement. 
What are the impacts of digital vigilantism on targets? Content analysis of the most 
viewed episodes shared by Hrushi Protiv on YouTube revealed ethnic and national 
biases in the group’s activities. In most of the episodes, non-Russian/non-Slavic ethnic 
minorities are framed as untrustworthy, unscrupulous, aggressive and violent. In fact, 
labour migrants are often in a fragile situation in terms of their legal status, difficult 
economic situation and scarce employment opportunities in their home state. In their 
host state, then, they are even more vulnerable to online vigilantes amid a culture of 
xenophobia, police abuse and a variety of other challenges. Sociological othering of 
non-Russian merchants might be a reflection of on-the-ground offline frustrations in 
the country, but such framing also creates discourses that shape and feed perceptions, 
leading to biased presumptions and stereotypes. In this regard, platforms such as 
YouTube become the central stage for such intra-citizen relations.
Beyond the questions of motive for participation and state support of digital 
vigilantes as well as the impact of such practices on individual and group targets, it 
is important to address platform affordances for digital vigilantism. Platforms such as 
YouTube allow participants to acquire a large following and generate an income via 
monetisation and advertising. Participants are able to create discourse through their 
own channels by editing videos and the comments beneath. As such, YouTube produces 
an environment in which digital vigilantism is manifest. Such manifestation, however, is 
taking place on uneven grounds and at the crossroads of various interests. For instance, 
citizen-critical content featuring inter-ethnic hostility, such as Hrushi Protiv’s calls for 
banning migrants from working in retail, can freely circulate the internet, while state-
critical and policy-critical content is deemed extremist. 
Several important aspects come to the surface here. The first has to do with 
political regimes and internet governance. When pressure is put on platforms to 
moderate content, there is a threat that select voices that challenge the political status 
quo will be muted, as is often the case in Russia. When the opposition-led FBK anti-
corruption foundation exposed Russia’s deputy prime minister for accepting a bribe 
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from a prominent oligarch, the government put pressure on several platforms and 
Facebook’s daughter company Instagram complied with the requests to remove posts 
(Nechepurenko, 2018). The fine line between the right to privacy and power abuse for 
covering up corruption is blurred in this case. 
Those with political and financial power seem to continue enjoying the privileges 
and immunities online, while the powerless, such as migrants, ethnic, sexual and 
other minorities, political activists, women, journalists, etc., are experiencing multiple 
vulnerabilities. The role of platforms in the facilitation of select hounding practices and 
the power and logic of the removal of undesired content need to be addressed at both 
analytical and policy levels. At the same time, an important question to ask is, would 
critical publics in Russia benefit from any state regulation of platforms in a context 
where the ruing elites are actively silencing critical voices? 
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed account of Hrushi Protiv activists operating across 
and beyond the country. Having addressed peculiarities of vigilante practices in Russia, 
the chapter demonstrated that the state plays a central role in (dis)approving digitally 
mediated citizen-led initiatives amid its strategies for gardening the publics (Litvinenko 
& Toepfl, 2019). Through the selected case, this paper offers a detailed account of how 
vigilante formations such as Hrushi Protiv weaponise hounding (Loveluck, 2019) to 
acquire financial, political, and other benefits from their activities. By being loyal to the 
ruling elites and not crossing the boundaries that could potentially harm these elites, 
formations like Hrushi Protiv are allowed to operate in the otherwise controlled digital 
and public domains. The government gains benefits from such citizen-critical publics. 
First of all, the blame is taken off the political elites and policies. Citizen-critical publics 
elevate on-the-ground unscrupulousness, as opposed to challenging the system itself. 
At the same time, amid the intensification of state control, the government may aim 
to appear less repressive than it actually is by demonstrating a façade of civil social 
activism in the country.
In Russia and elsewhere, digital vigilantism is practiced and perceived as a form 
of entertainment akin to reality TV shows, with each episode carefully edited and 
professionally arranged with catchy titles, music and other view-attracting strategies 
such as featuring celebrity guests. It is evident that vigilante activities constitute a 
reflection of on-the-ground societal frustrations and tensions. Traffic jams and poor 
parking, cheated customers, xenophobia, homophobia, labour migration and other 
‘hot’ societal issues in Russia are picked up and instrumentalised by vigilantes, who 
then step in and turn battling against perceived injustices into a spectacle. In this case, 
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the citizen-critical focus of YouTube videos is not only safe but arguably beneficial for 
the ruling elites and their strategy to discourage leadership-critical and policy-critical 
discourse.
Further research on the subject could focus on comments left under YouTube 
episodes to measure audience perceptions of citizen-critical publics, although it should 
be noted that channel owners can mute and otherwise moderate reactions. Comparative 
studies focusing on formations similar to Hrushi Protiv in other sociopolitical and media 
contexts would help in advancing theoretical boundaries of the phenomenon of digital 
vigilantism and media system models. 

Heroes or hooligans? The role of 
traditional media in rendering 
digital vigilantism meaningful14
14 This chapter is an adaptation of the following article: Gabdulhakov, R. (2020). Heroes or hooligans? 
Media portrayal of StopXam [Stop a Douchebag] vigilantes in Russia. Laboratorium: Russian Review 





StopXam [Stop a Douchebag] vigilantes, specialising in road-traffic and parking 
violations, confront drivers and retaliate by placing stickers that read “I don’t care 
about anyone, I park where I want” on targets’ windshields. The retaliation is often 
accompanied by verbal and physical fighting. This process is filmed, edited, and shared 
on YouTube, receiving millions of views. While digital media made such practices 
possible, traditional broadcasters maintain significance in rendering meaning to the 
phenomenon of vigilantism and in framing vigilantes, their targets, police, and other 
actors. As the existing literature on digital vigilantism is predominantly focused on 
digital media affordances, this chapter aims to address this gap through a qualitative 
analysis of traditional media coverage of StopXam. Media analysis highlights intriguing 
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“Heroes are ordinary people who make themselves extraordinary.”
– Gerard Way
4.1. Introduction
Several state-endorsed vigilante groups spawned across Russia in 2010 as Kremlin’s Nashi 
[Ours] youth movement entered its period of decline and consequent dissolution (for 
more on Nashi, see Atwal & Bacon, 2012; Hemment, 2012; Mijnssen & Perović, 2014). One 
of the most successful projects to come out of Nashi is the StopXam [Stop a Douchebag]15 
movement against rudeness on the roads. With branches across Russia’s major cities and 
abroad,16 StopXam specialises in the pressing issue of road-traffic and parking violations. 
Vigilantes use digital media to frame, expose, shame, humiliate, and otherwise punish 
their targets. Retaliation is achieved through embodied harm and the “weaponisation 
of visibility” (Trottier, 2017). StopXam participants confront the drivers and retaliate by 
placing stickers that read “I don’t care about anyone, I park where I want” on the targets’ 
windshields. The retaliation is filmed, edited, and shared on StopXam’s YouTube channels, 
receiving millions of views. As such, the audience plays a key role in digital vigilantism, 
as exposure is used in punitive terms and each new view, ‘(dis)like’, comment, and repost 
can intensify the impact of harm. While digital media made such practices possible, 
traditional media remains a significant player in rendering meaning to digital vigilantism 
and in the framing of participants, their targets, police, and other actors (Gabdulhakov, 
2019a, p. 233). The audience is informed both by vigilantes through their media products 
and by traditional media outlets reporting on cases. Thus, traditional media coverage not 
only has the capacity to impact the perception of digitally mediated social justice by the 
public but also has the power to frame the very notion of justice amid social frustrations 
and biases–gender, ethnic, socioeconomic, political, and оther–that come to the surface 
with each case. Beyond this, traditional media reports can afford popularity to vigilantes 
while harming the targets through additional exposure.
As conceptualised by Les Johnston (1996), vigilantism implies autonomy of 
participants from the state. For Johnston, autonomy is key to understanding vigilantism 
as it sets the practice apart from other forms of “responsible citizenship” that can be 
“sanctioned and sponsored by the state” (1996, p. 226). Digital vigilantes are not entirely 
autonomous but are asserting “new boundaries” (Trottier, 2017, p. 59) for establishing 
and negotiating relations with the state. In Russia, certain participants such as StopXam 
have been endorsed and supported by the government. Leaders of vigilante groups 
have not only taken selfies with key state leaders including Dmitriy Medvedev17 and 
15 Pronounced “StopKham”. While transliteration of the title varies between “StopHam,” “StopXam”, 
and “StopKham”, this article relies on the spelling “StopXam” and the translation “Stop a douchebag” 
as used by the group itself across its social networking profiles.
16 In Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Peru.
17 Russian president in 2008–2012 and prime minister since 2012.
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Vladimir Putin18 but also received state financial support for their activities (Gabdulhakov, 
2018). In this regard, digital vigilantism in Russia is not taking place as a response to 
the absence of state authority but is instead approved by that authority, taking on an 
institutionalised form such that participants resemble government-organised non-
governmental organisations (GONGOs).
As the existing literature on the phenomenon of digital vigilantism is predominantly 
focused on digital media (Cheong & Gong, 2010; Kasra, 2017; Smallridge et al., 2016; 
Stratton et al., 2017), the assessment of traditional media’s role and power often remains 
outside of scholarly attention. Traditional media demonstrates a continual “influence in 
social media environments” (Meraz, 2016, p. 66), yet the current literature lacks empirical 
studies addressing the complex dynamics of relations between traditional media, 
digital vigilantes, and state/corporate actors, especially in a context where the ruling 
elite both controls the media and endorses vigilantism. In order to fill this scholarly 
gap and to investigate these boundaries, this chapter provides a detailed account of 
media framing of one of Russia’s most prominent vigilante groups–StopXam. Guided by 
the methodological work of David Altheide and Christopher Schneider (2013), as well 
as Helene Starks and Susan Brown Trinidad (2007), the study carried out a qualitative 
content analysis of 307 news reports from Russia’s four mainstream state-controlled 
television channels–Pervyi Kanal [Channel One], NTV, REN TV, Rossiia 24, and a non-
state broadcaster Telekanal Dozhd’ [TV Rain]. Furthermore, the study is informed by 
interviews with three StopXam participants. By looking at the coverage period between 
2010 and 2018, the chapter illustrates the uneven framing of StopXam as a group 
that was endorsed by the country’s leadership, shut down by court decision in 2016, 
rehabilitated six months later, and liquidated again in 2018.
This study makes a timely contribution to the literature surrounding digital 
vigilantism and aims to expand theoretical frames of definitional dimensions of 
vigilantism by addressing the role of audience and traditional media in the digitally 
mediated manifestation of this phenomenon. The chapter aims to do so by addressing 
the following questions: How are StopXam participants, their targets, and police forces 
portrayed in Russia’s traditional media? What is the role of traditional media in rendering 
digital vigilantism meaningful?
The chapter first introduces StopXam as a movement and elaborates on the existing 
conceptual frameworks to address the phenomenon of digitally mediated social justice. 
It then provides a brief background on Russia’s traditional media and the selected 
platforms, followed by a detailed account of StopXam’s portrayal by these broadcasters. 
The chapter concludes that traditional media is a powerful actor and discourse setter 
that can justify and condemn targets, police, and participants in spite of the vast digital 
media capacities of the latter.
18 Russian president in 2000–2008, prime minister in 2008–2012, and again president since 2012.
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4.2. StopXam background
One of the key figures behind StopXam is a former Nashi Commissar, Dmitrii Chugunov. 
According to his official biography listed on the website of Russia’s Civic Chamber,19 of 
which he was a member between 2014 and 2017, Chugunov served in Russia’s special 
police units–Vitiaz’ and Taifun–in 2006–2008 and was deployed to Dagestan in 2007 as 
a sniper. Chugunov is the champion of the Eastern Regional Command of the Internal 
Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in judo, sambo,20 and rifle firing. As the leader 
of StopXam, Chugunov reported on its successes to Putin during personal meetings in 
2011 and 2012. In response, Putin expressed his positive views of the movement:
You are doing a very important and good deed–fighting rudeness. Behaviour on 
the road is part of a person, and I very much count on the fact that you yourself, 
while doing your work, will be on top, and will not be like those people who 
behave ugly towards others. (NTV, 2013)
The signature retaliatory act of StopXam (the group itself and media reports refer to 
activities as “raids”) is a sticker placed on the target’s windshield. The raids are often 
accompanied by verbal and physical confrontations between participants and the 
drivers. Targets’ appearance in the edited videos subjects them to further shaming and 
exposes them in a manner that can harm their reputation. As Trottier (2017, p. 56) puts it:
The visibility produced through DV [digital vigilantism] is unwanted (the target 
is typically not soliciting publicity), intense (content like blog posts, photos and 
video evidence can circulate to hundreds of thousands or even millions of users 
within a few days) and enduring (the vigilantism campaign may be the first item 
to appear when searching the individual’s name, and may become a cultural 
reference in its own right). 
Indeed, several targets of the group, including high-profile state functionaries and their 
relatives, have lost their jobs following exposure on YouTube and in traditional media 
reports. Among the biggest cases are the dismissal of Chechnya’s deputy presidential 
plenipotentiary in Moscow whose wife had a clash with StopXam, and the resignation 
of the head of Moscow’s Mar’ino district, who appeared in a video where his wife was 
19 The Civic Chamber was established in 2005 under the Federal Law on the Civic Chamber of the 
Russian Federation. The Civic Chamber comprises prominent citizens of Russia, representatives 
of national, regional, and interregional NGOs (https://www.oprf.ru/en/about/). Chugunov’s 
biography in Russian is available here: https://www.oprf.ru/ru/chambermembers/members/ 
user/1681?year=2014.
20 Sambo is a form of martial arts and combat sport developed in the Soviet Union; the word “sambo” 
stands for “self-defence without weapons” in Russian.
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confronted by the group (“Dos’e: StopXam”, n.d.). Such negative publicity of high-profile 
targets fuels the legitimisation, popularity, and power of StopXam participants. In a 2012 
interview, StopXam’s former spokesperson Oksana Mitrofanova was asked if she could 
identify the moment that popularity came to the group. Mitrofanova came up with two 
cases: “when the owner of a Maybach [a German luxury car] was hit in the face” and the 
confrontation with the wife of Chechnya’s deputy presidential plenipotentiary in Moscow 
(Smimimi Russia, 2012). In the same interview Mitrofanova stressed the importance of 
visibility as a disciplinary tool, explaining that “those violating orders understand in their 
head that their actions can end up on YouTube” (Smimimi Russia, 2012).
When traditional media relies on “evidence” submitted by StopXam activists and 
provides links to their social media channels, it turns into a mediator of retaliation, linking 
“conventional” viewers to online content. Traditional media platforms increasingly use 
digital media for dissemination of their content, thus blurring the lines between offline and 
online news delivery. At the same time, vigilantes’ media products can enjoy an extra layer 
of legitimation by virtue of being featured in official media. By reporting on vigilantism 
in a manner that justifies such practices, traditional media can set “a fashionable trend 
for young people” (A. P., 2018, para. 13), potentially inspiring new participants across and 
beyond Russia. As one former member of StopXam in Moldova explained:
We were thinking about starting our own initiative to fight against bad 
parking. However, Russia’s StopXam was already well known and we decided to 
collaborate with them and open a branch of StopXam as opposed to starting 
from scratch. (Interview with a participant from Moldova)
A global network of affiliated movements further boosts the significance, popularity, 
and recognition of the brand; Chugunov dedicated a special episode to presenting 
the steps necessary for establishing a local StopXam branch. In the YouTube video, 
Chugunov states that StopXam treats branches “very seriously” as “branches contribute 
to the impression of the movement as a whole” (StopXam, 2017). Chugunov suggests 
that viewers film a short video about themselves and their team and send it to the 
provided email. Approved branches are promised help with “all possible resources”, 
namely “expert advice, legal help, StopXam media resources, and help with the 
journalists” (StopXam, 2017). The last point underscores the importance of establishing 
relations with traditional media for the successful operation of a digital vigilante group.
As of 2016, StopXam is represented in Peru under the name Mal Estacionado [Badly 
Parked], which is a rare case of operation outside of the post-Soviet bloc. Mal Estacionado 
was inspired by StopXam and is endorsed by the original Moscow-based group:
I was watching YouTube one day and saw Stop a Douchebag videos. I thought, 
“wow, we need something like this here”. A friend helped me with the stickers 
and we made some videos. I was afraid they [original StopXam in Russia] would 
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not like it that I copy them. I contacted them and sent my videos and they said 
“go ahead, keep doing it”. They featured us on their channel. (Interview with a 
participant from Peru) 
The group was featured on StopXam’s YouTube channel on December 30, 2018, as a 
“Peruvian branch” (StopXam, 2018). As of June 2019, Mal Estacionado is a small-scale 
operation, with six participants in Lima who hope to grow into something bigger:
It is hard to recruit people, they say “yes, I will come, you are doing a great job, 
I want to join” and then they never show up. I think the Russian movement is 
much larger, they have so many people. We are operating only in Lima and it 
is just six of us, while two people deal with cameras, so really, just four people. 
(Interview with a participant from Peru)
Members in Lima mentioned that besides their activism they hold full-time jobs and 
participation is a “side project”. During the conversation, they expressed satisfaction 
with the traditional media coverage of their activities in the country. Upon the advice of 
StopXam Moscow, Lima participants adopted the practice of placing English-language 
subtitles in their videos to engage a wider global audience. As of June 2019, Mal 
Estacionado’s YouTube channel featured 16 videos, 10 thousand subscribers, and 1.7 
million total video views.
The original Moscow-based movement runs two YouTube channels, in Russian 
and English languages. Videos are uploaded on average once a week, with total views 
numbering in the hundreds of millions. As of June 2019, StopXam’s official Russian-
language YouTube channel featured 216 videos, with 1,631,464 subscribers and 
426,635,221 total video views (StopXam, n.d.a.). The English-language channel, Stop a 
Douchebag, featured 200 videos with 781,000 subscribers and 224,618,484 total video 
views (Stop a Douchebag, n.d.b.). The vast following and popularity of StopXam affords 
unique powers to participants, allowing them to widely expose their targets, monetise 
YouTube videos, sell merchandise, and acquire other forms of capital, including social 
recognition and status.21
In addition to these media capacities, StopXam has enjoyed the endorsement 
of the highest authorities in Russia. In 2017, President Putin called on the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs to collaborate with citizen activists, thus legitimising movements such 
as StopXam and ensuring their police protection (Gabdulhakov, 2018). As Chugunov has 
put it, through public endorsement, Putin essentially gave the project his “blessing” 
(Suzdaltsev, 2015). Registered as an NGO, StopXam received presidential grants in 
support of its activities. Media reports estimate these grants to amount to 21,000,000 
21 For instance, membership in the Civic Chamber.
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rubles (NTV, 2016c).22 Court decisions to liquidate StopXam as a legal entity in 2016 and 
2018 made the group ineligible for state grants.
4.3. Conceptualising StopXam as a vigilante force
Although vigilantism as a social scientific category of citizen-led policing and social 
justice is rooted in nineteenth-century practices in the USA, digital vigilantism emerged 
as a global phenomenon amid the visibility and wide participation capabilities afforded 
by digital media in recent decades.
Among the very few other scholars, conceptualisation of vigilantism was initially 
developed by Rosenbaum and Sederberg in the 1970s. In their take on the phenomenon, 
Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974, p. 542) proposed that “when individuals or groups 
identifying with the established order defend that order by resorting to means that 
violate these formal boundaries, they can be usefully classified as vigilantes”. After a 
lengthy pause in scholarly attention to the phenomenon, Johnston took on the task of 
conceptualising vigilantism by narrowing key definitions. For Johnston, 
Vigilantism is a social movement giving rise to premeditated acts of force–
or threatened force–by autonomous citizens. It arises as a reaction to the 
transgression of institutionalized norms by individuals or groups–or to their 
potential or imputed transgression. Such acts are focused upon crime control 
and/or social control and aim to offer assurances (or “guarantees”) of security 
both to participants and to other members of a given established order. (1996, 
p. 232)
In his definition, Johnston proposed six “necessary features” of vigilantism: (1) planning 
and premeditation; (2) private and voluntary participation; (3) autonomous citizenship 
constituting a social movement; (4) use or threat of use of force; (5) vigilantism “arises 
when an established order is under threat from the transgression, the potential 
transgression, or the imputed transgression of institutionalized norms”; and (6) 
vigilantism “aims to control crime or other social infractions by offering assurances (or 
“guarantees”) of security both to participants and to others” (1996, p. 220).
The quest for a definitional conceptualisation of vigilantism was further carried 
out by Trottier (2017, 2019) and Moncada (2017). Trottier focuses on digital media 
affordances for vigilante practices and defines digital vigilantism as “a process where 
citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, and coordinate retaliation 
on mobile devices and social platforms” (2017, p. 56). In the same article, Trottier 
22 On the day of the NTV report release (June 21, 2016) this amounted to roughly 326,527 USD.
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compares Johnston’s six necessary features of conventional vigilantism with its digital 
manifestation, suggesting a layer of spontaneity to planning; possible links between 
vigilantes and state/corporate actors; new boundaries in “autonomous citizenship”; 
weaponised visibility in addition to embodied use of force; a “fusion of local and 
mediated norms” (p. 59) in reaction to crime; and “mediated” as opposed to localised 
policing in the attempted provision of personal and collective security.
Moncada defines vigilantism as “the collective use or threat of extralegal violence 
in response to an alleged criminal act” (2017, p. 408). He proposes five core definitional 
dimensions for the conceptualisation of vigilantism, namely: (1) social organisation: 
social ties shaping the “coordination and execution of vigilantism”; (2) targets: 
individuals who violate orders and thus commit formal (breaking the law) or informal 
(perceived) offences; (3) repertoire: lethal (for instance, hanging) and nonlethal (bodily 
harm, psychological torture) practices that vigilantes utilise to make their claims; (4) 
justification: legitimisation of vigilante behaviour in the public eye through claiming 
to act on behalf of the community; and (5) motivation: reasons for participation in 
vigilantism (pp. 407–408).
When applied to StopXam, Moncada’s definitional dimensions fit in a rather 
straightforward manner. The group is a collective with identified targets–road-traffic and 
parking violators (formal offence); participants retaliate through a nonlethal repertoire 
of shameful stickers, as well as verbal and physical confrontation with the drivers, which 
is filmed and uploaded to YouTube leading to reputation damage and other undesired 
consequences (such as job loss) for the targets; and they justify their acts by framing 
the police as dysfunctional and explain their motives as a genuine struggle against 
“traffic rule violations and arrogance on the road” (Stop a Douchebag, n.d.). However, 
beyond the conceptual fit, there is a significant amount of nuance accompanying each 
dimension. Table 3 illustrates the application of Moncada’s definitional dimensions to 
the case of StopXam. Building upon Trottier’s visibility weaponisation, I propose a sixth 
dimension crucial to digital vigilante practices–the audience.
When retaliation is broadcast to mass audiences through the group’s social media 
channels and through traditional media reports, visibility in itself becomes a weapon 
of vigilantes (Trottier, 2017), affording the “longevity and recurrence” of exposure 
and intensifying the harm (Gabdulhakov, 2019b, p. 231). The audience is, therefore, by 
default fundamental to amplification of harm experienced by targets. Platforms such 
as YouTube, in this regard, serve a unique role as the theatre for digital vigilantism and 
at times “tolerate or even cultivate such coordinated forms of social harm”, given that 
the latter can be beneficial for the “business models” (Trottier, 2019, p.13). In a way, 
StopXam’s YouTube channel operates as a professional entertainment program and 
not as an extemporaneous amateur product. Participants often interrupt their videos 
with homemade ads for hedge funds, video games, and other products and services. 
Targeting famous people helps attract wider audiences, affording positive visibility for 







Social organisation Initially endorsed by the state. New 
branches across and beyond Russia are 
approved by the original founders in 
Moscow.
Brand-like position of the original group 
allows for (dis)approval of similar formations 
across Russia and beyond its boundaries.
Targets Targets violate formal orders–
parking and driving on sidewalks. At 
times, informal violations enter the 
scene during the confrontation, as 
participants attack the target’s speech, 
appearance, ethnic background, social 
status, and other actions and identity 
markers.
Among StopXam’s targets are ordinary 
and famous people (and their relatives). 
StopXam has also targeted the police, who 
are depicted as dysfunctional. Targeting the 
elite socioeconomic caste driving expensive 
cars turns retaliation into a class struggle 
and collective citizen-led justice/order 
restoration phenomenon.
Repertoire The infamous sticker, verbal and 
physical confrontations, exposure 
through edited YouTube videos.
Violence is a significant component of 
StopXam’s repertoire. Videos with verbal 
and physical confrontation attract wider 
audiences and make sensational news 
pieces for traditional media, bringing 
greater recognition to participants and 
further undesired exposure to the targets.
Justification Justification comes from underlining 
the dysfunctionality of police forces 
who are framed as indifferent at best 
and corrupt and fearful of approaching 
expensive cars at worst.
In spite of accusations in dysfunctionality 
and corruption, participants turn to the 
police in certain cases. The police can be 
called in to the scene; video materials are 
evidently sent by participants to the police 
(StopXam, n.d.a.).
Motivation Participants claim moral motives for 
their activities, with the following 
mission statement of their official social 
networks: “We do not fight for the law. 
We fight for people to think about the 
rights and the convenience of others 
regardless of whether there is a police 
officer near them or not” (StopXam, 
n.d.b.).
Beyond the genuine concern for the 
situation on the roads, a set of capitals and 
benefits is afforded by participation, from 
YouTube content monetisation to receiving 
state grants to building political careers and 
acquiring other kinds of capital through 
publicity.
Proposed definitional dimension
The audience StopXam enjoys a significant following 
on YouTube, with total video views 
counting in the hundreds of millions. 
A YouTube channel with a massive 
following is a powerful tool in the 
hands of vigilantes, which grants them 
colossal comparative advantages in 
punitive exposure. With branches 
across and beyond Russia, context 
in featured videos is tailored to local 
realities. StopXam, however, is not 
limited to “the” channel; the group is 
turning into a recognised brand and 
method.
Digital vigilante groups such as StopXam 
(among similar vigilante formations in 
Russia are Hrushi Protiv, Lev Protiv, and 
others) are dependent on audience as 
visibility amplifies the harm experienced by 
targets. Furthermore, successful YouTube 
monetisation requires a vast audience. The 
audience can also support participants 
through donations and merchandise 
purchase.
Table 2. Eduardo Moncada’s definitional dimensions of vigilantism and the case of StopXam
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Here it is important to consider the role of the audience and potential sympathy or 
condemnation projected on participants and targets. In 2016, NTV conducted a Twitter 
survey where the readers were asked to express their opinions on StopXam’s legitimacy 
by answering the question “Is StopXam activism legal or not?” The results showed that 
35% of 6,767 respondents view the group’s activity as legal; another 35% said “no”; and 
30% said “no, but I support them” (NTV, 2016b). The image of StopXam participants 
as agents of social justice who work on behalf of the audience and in spite of police 
corruption/dysfunctionality (Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huérou, 2004; Oleinik, 2016; Wilson 
et al., 2008) is further supported by traditional media when participants are framed as 
public avengers bringing the “road boors” to justice. 
4.4. Traditional media framing
Over the course of decades of empirical testing, the “agenda-setting theory” (McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972) has been divided into three levels. The first level “asserts that the 
public considers objects that are prioritised in the news as the most important”; the 
second level states that “properties or characteristics the news media use to portray 
a certain object will influence how the audience perceives that object”; and the third 
level, or the Network Agenda Setting Model, “asserts that the news not only tells us what 
to think and how to think, but also determines how we associate different messages 
to conceptualize social reality” (Guo 2016, pp. 3–4). The difference between agenda-
setting and framing, as argued by Carroll (2016), is in the focus on explicit linkages 
(uniting objects, actors, and attributes as nodes) of the former and implicit linkages of 
the latter. As such, “salience for framing concerns intensity” while in agenda setting it 
concerns frequency (Carroll, 2016, p. 36).
Chong and Druckman define framing as “the process by which people develop 
a particular conceptualisation of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” 
(2007, p. 104). Entman (2007, p. 164). takes the definition a step further suggesting that 
framing can be viewed as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and 
assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular 
interpretation”. Entman (2007) assigns an active element to framing by specific actors, 
beyond the passive development of a perception by the audience. In this case, when 
applied to StopXam in Russia, participants themselves can construct frames for self-
promotion and mobilisation of supporters and new members. In turn, traditional media 
has the power of spotlighting a variety of voices, including those of the state, police, 
targets, and counterforces. With the help of mass media, a group of participants can 
appear larger than it is, as viewers can develop a sense that activists are omnipresent.
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4.5. Russia’s traditional media
Before elaborating on the nature of reports on StopXam, it is important to provide a 
basic overview of the state of Russia’s traditional media and selected platforms. The 
current media landscape in Russia can be described as one controlled by “regime-
friendly businesses” providing viewers “with an officially-approved version of what 
is happening in Russia and the world” (Orttung & Walker, 2013, p. 2). Hutchings and 
Szostek (2015, p. 184) argue that controlling the circulation of media narratives at home 
and abroad is a matter of national security in Russia. Being concerned with domestic 
narratives, this research focuses on broadcasters targeting domestic audiences. While 
some “alternative” sources of information are still available amid the intense media 
control in Russia, “critical voices have been increasingly stifled” (Hutchings & Szostek, 
2015, p. 184). One example of such pressure is TV Rain. In this particular case, cable 
companies unplugged the broadcaster, forcing it to move into the online domain and 
rely on viewer donations to sustain operations (TV Rain, n.d.b.).
Oates (2016, p. 402) argues that any understanding of the Russian media landscape 
should be constructed around three fundamental points: (1) Russian media is diverse, 
but not on “key political topics”; (2) most media outlets do not challenge the state 
(especially on political topics); and (3) media in Russia is consumed with enthusiasm. In 
summary, state-sponsored media outlets and Russia’s ruling regime present a strategic 
dynamic where regime-loyal narratives are a default necessity. These narratives, in 
turn, are expected to support regime stability. Of course, the level of audience trust in 
consumed media comes into play. Television remains the most popular source of news 
for 72% of Russia’s population (Volkov & Goncharov, 2019). In 2009, this number was 
at 94% indicating a decline in television news consumption amid an increase in the 
consumption of news from online sources–a practice that saw an increase from 9% to 
30% between 2009 and 2019 (Volkov & Goncharov, 2019). Viewers’ trust in television as 
a source of news also experienced a decline from 80% in 2009 to 55% in 2019 (Volkov & 
Goncharov, 2019). 
State-controlled media in Russia underwent several waves of restructuring and, as 
Tolz and Teper argue, these “major changes” in approaches to coverage can no longer be 
viewed from the standpoint of “neo-Soviet” or “neoauthoritarian” models. Rather, there 
is an increase in political and “ideological messaging,” which at the same time allows the 
broadcasters to maintain their position as “the chief producers of agitainment content” 
(2018, pp. 11–12). Tolz and Teper define “agitainment” as “controlled media output, 
alongside its systematic employment of specific global media formats to enhance its 
impact on viewers” (2018, p. 2). Thus, controlled state broadcasters in Russia appear to 
take on the roles of norm setters and official discourse articulators while entertaining 
the audience.
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4.6. Methodology and data collection
This research draws its sample from the country’s top broadcasters Channel One, NTV, 
REN TV, and Rossiia 24. In addition to these state broadcasters, the study features a 
non-state platform representing the scant independent media in the country–TV Rain. 
Selected broadcasters maintain websites with archived news blocks in the form of 
videos and transcribed text, serving as artefacts for the purposes of the current research. 
In the selected time period keywords вигилантизм/виджилантизм (vigilantism) and 
вигилант (vigilante) bore no results.23 News reports were sought by typing in keywords, 
namely variations of spellings of the group’s name in the Cyrillic alphabet: СтопХам, 
Стоп Хам, стопхам, стоп хам. Select results that featured unrelated topics due to 
algorithmic errors were removed. A total of 307 news pieces were analysed in this study: 
4 from Channel One, 48 from NTV, 149 from REN TV, 98 from Rossiia 24, and 8 from TV 
Rain.
Data in the form of screenshots was collected directly from the archives available on 
the broadcasters’ websites. The broadcasters were chosen with the aim of featuring the 
most prominent, regime-loyal platforms representing the voice of the state, as well as a 
nonstate voice represented by TV Rain. While the collected data is public, I refrain from 
directly revealing the names of targets in the text, so as not to confer any additional 
undesired publicity.
The data were collected with the awareness of the limitations of online archives. 
They are not guaranteed to be fully comprehensive due to the fact that broadcasters 
may not necessarily archive the entirety of their news products. As well, some digitally 
archived content is vulnerable to disappearance, as broadcasters tend to remove certain 
sensitive pieces from their otherwise open-access archives (The Moscow Times, 2019a). 
In spite of these limitations, 307 news pieces representing every year of the selected 
coverage period between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2018, were gathered. 
The period was selected to comprehensively address media coverage since StopXam’s 
formation in 2010 until initial liquidation in 2016; its subsequent rehabilitation by the 
Supreme Court; and the most recent liquidation in 2018. All the data in the form of 
screenshots was stored in the secure digital vault provided by the author’s institution. 
The study utilised specialised software, Atlas.ti, to organise, code, and analyse the data. 
Data analysis involved a detailed study of every news piece for identification of recurring 
themes in the portrayal of actors involved: participants, targets, police, and so on. As 
per Altheide and Schneider (2013), the report-production phase of the chapter involved 
summarising each of the categories in short paragraphs, using illustrative materials 
where appropriate, and including descriptions and quotations. A detailed description 
of the protocol is available in the Appendix.
23 Only in 2019 was the term “vigilantes” used to address StopXam by Russia’s parliament member 




With 98.8% domestic audience reach (Pervyi Kanal, 2016) and a global audience of “more 
than 250 million in 190 countries”, Channel One is “the most popular” Russian-language 
broadcaster (Channel One Russia, n.d.). The channel is owned by the Federal Agency for 
State Property Management as well as by the National Media Group, a private media 
holding (National Media Group, n.d.a.). Among other share-holders are the TASS news 
agency, Ostankino Technical Centre, and Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich (Dziadul, 
2018). Reportedly, 47% of Russia’s domestic audience get their news from this channel 
(Volkov & Goncharov, 2019).
Founded in 1993, NTV was a prominent critic of the state until the ruling regime 
initiated a “purge” of the channel in 2001 (Traynor, 2001). Since the Russian government-
owned Joint Stock Company Gazprom appropriated NTV, the broadcaster has 
transformed from a critic of the state into a loyal voice of the ruling regime. According 
to NTV’s LinkedIn profile, the channel’s audience across the former Soviet bloc includes 
100 million people. Among the global satellite broadcasters, NTV is “the main Russian 
language channel” (NTV Broadcasting Company, n.d.), while 36% of Russia’s domestic 
audience get their news from this channel (Volkov & Goncharov, 2019). 
REN TV was founded as a brand on January 1, 1991, and has been airing in Russia 
since 1997 (REN TV, n.d.). Like Channel One, REN TV is majority-owned by the National 
Media Group with 82% of the shares (National Media Group, 2016). The owners estimate 
that the channel is “potentially” available to 120 million people, while its website is “one 
of the most cited in the Russian market” with a reach of “2 million of unique visitors 
per day” (National Media Group, n.d.b.). REN TV is a source of news for 17% of Russia’s 
domestic audience (Volkov & Goncharov, 2019).
Launched in 2006, Rossiia 24 channel operates under the All-Russia State Television 
and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK). According to its owners, the channel “has 
the leading position at the national broadcasting market, and is one of the leading 
producers of content” (VGTRK, n.d.). Specialising solely in 24/7 news delivery to an 
audience of 50 million people (Media International Russia, n.d.), Rossiia 24 is a sister 
channel of another influential channel owned by VGTRK, Rossiia 1. The online archive 
of Rossiia 24’s news program Vesti [The News] contained pieces that were aired both 
on Rossiia 24 and Rossiia 1. Rossiia 24 is a source of news for 31% of Russia’s domestic 
audience, while a reported 48% receive their news from Rossiia 1 (Volkov & Goncharov, 
2019).
Founded in 2010, TV Rain is a unique phenomenon in Russian broadcasting that 
positions itself as a platform designed “for those who care” (TV Rain, n.d.a.). During 
the anti-Kremlin protests of 2011 and 2012 (Chaisty & Whitefield, 2013), TV Rain openly 
covered the events. Russia’s television providers unplugged the “liberal-leaning” TV 
Rain in 2014 amid a scandal surrounding a public poll that the channel carried out (BBC, 
2014). TV Rain is currently limited to online streaming and much of its content is paid; in 
2016 the number of registered paying viewers was 72,000 people (Sat-World.net, 2016). 
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Only 1% of Russia’s domestic audience gets their news via TV Rain (Volkov & Goncharov, 
2019).24
4.6.2. StopXam in Traditional Media
While this study employs qualitative approaches to media content analysis, some 
quantitative features such as the number and distribution of news reports featuring 
StopXam are helpful in illustrating the volume and frequency of coverage. As can be 
seen in Table 3, selected broadcasters differ in the frequency and volume of their 
reporting on StopXam.
 Channel One NTV REN TV Rossiia 24 TV Rain Totals
2010 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 0.65% 0 0.00% 2 0.65%
2011 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 0.65% 0 0.00% 2 0.65%
2012 1 0.33% 6 1.95% 0 0.00% 20 6.51% 0 0.00% 27 8.79%
2013 1 0.33% 5 1.63% 0 0.00% 19 6.19% 0 0.00% 25 8.14%
2014 0 0.00% 7 2.28% 16 5.21% 5 1.63% 0 0.00% 28 9.12%
2015 0 0.00% 4 1.30% 28 9.12% 7 2.28% 1 0.33% 40 13.03%
2016 2 0.65% 17 5.54% 58 18.89% 32 10.42% 5 1.63% 114 37.13%
2017 0 0.00% 5 1.63% 43 14.01% 6 1.95% 1 0.33% 55 17.92%
2018 0 0.00% 4 1.30% 4 1.30% 5 1.63% 1 0.33% 14 4.56%
Totals 4 1.30% 48 15.64% 149 48.53% 98 31.92% 8 2.61% 307 100.00%
Table 3. News pieces covering StopXam per broadcaster, disaggregated by year
Table 3 illustrates the number of reports per each broadcaster disaggregated by year in 
the period between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2018. The majority of coverage 
comes from REN TV with 48.53% of news pieces; followed by Rossiia 24 with 31.92%; 
NTV with 15.64%; and TV Rain and Channel One with 2.61% and 1.30%, respectively. 
The table also indicates that the coverage spikes across all platforms in 2016, the year 
when StopXam was initially liquidated by the decision of the Moscow City Court. The 
decision was overruled by the Supreme Court later that year, but applied again under 
the provision of the Moscow branch of the Ministry of Justice in 2018 (NTV, 2018).
Russia’s main broadcaster, Channel One, features four stories on StopXam in its 
online news archive. Two reports present the already mentioned sensational cases–a 
conflict that took place in Moscow between the “activists” and the wife of Chechnya’s 
deputy presidential plenipotentiary in Moscow, as well as the confrontation with the 
wife of the head of Mar’ino district of Russia’s capital. The remaining two pieces report 
on the court decision to shut down StopXam. The incidents involving politicians’ wives 
24 The Levada Center report authored by Volkov and Goncharov (2019) does not specify whether the 
viewers access TV Rain content via the channel’s website or its mobile application.
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were widely covered by all selected broadcasters, while only TV Rain faced legal issues 
over copyright violation of StopXam, as the channel featured original footage from the 
group’s YouTube channel (SecurityLab.ru, 2012). StopXam’s YouTube videos (edited by 
participants) often made it into the reports of other broadcasters serving as evidence of 
what happened on the ground. Numerous online reports of state broadcasters in over 
a hundred instances provided direct links to the original videos on YouTube and links to 
the group’s VKontakte25 page.
NTV, REN TV, and Rossiia 24 lead in the frequency of their reporting on StopXam. 
Despite the varying volume of the news items, these three broadcasters often report 
on the same cases and use similar language to describe, comment on, and frame the 
events. REN TV is the leader in coverage, with 149 news pieces responding to the 
majority of most notorious cases of StopXam’s confrontations with drivers. Rossiia 24 
has covered StopXam since the early days of the group’s formation, with the first report 
dating back to June 2010. Rossiia 24’s first report, dated June 22, 2010, quoted then 
mayor of Moscow, Iurii Luzhkov, describing StopXam as “useless”. In this case, Luzhkov 
is somewhat of an outlier when it comes to representation of the ruling regime, as he 
was dismissed from his post in September 2010 over then President Medvedev’s “loss of 
confidence” in his persona (Odynova, 2010).
In its modest scope, TV Rain’s coverage of StopXam is similar to that of Channel One. 
The online archive features eight news pieces covering StopXam’s confrontations with 
the police; the court’s liquidation of the group; Chugunov’s political ambitions; and a 
“Sharia patrol” project “Stop Haram”.26 Stop Haram is a curious case, as it was founded 
by former StopXam member Islam Ismailov and aimed to morally confront Muslims 
about life choices such as drinking alcohol and smoking. Chugunov denied any links 
between StopXam and Stop Haram, stating that several activists broke away due to 
“disagreements” and that Ismailov was “parasitically exploiting the brand” (Vesti, 2017b).
4.7. Media analysis
4.7.1. The Genesis of StopXam’s Portrayal 
All selected platforms referred to StopXam participants as “activists” and as members 
of a “public movement”. Words such as “project”, “organisation”, “NGO”, “volunteers”, 
“youth”, and “fighters” were used to describe the group. Several of the initial reports 
linked the “activists” to the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi. In this regard, NTV 
and Rossiia 24 featured meetings between StopXam and Russia’s political leadership, 
represented by Putin and Medvedev. In 2011 Rossiia 24 reported on then President 
Medvedev’s meeting with the “non-indifferent” youth activists and internet users 
25 Russia’s analogue of Facebook.
26 “Haram” refers to things and activities forbidden in Islam.
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(Skabeeva, 2011). During the meeting StopXam leaders gave Medvedev one of 
their infamous stickers, suggesting he put it on the windshield of a bad driver. Such 
endorsement on national television granted informal powers to participants, as their 
acts were by default legitimised by the country’s highest authority.
As can be seen in Image 4, StopXam activists took a group photo with Putin in a “no 
tie” meeting. All but two participants are wearing branded StopXam sweatshirts and 
the stickers are displayed in the background. Wearing a long-sleeved shirt depicting 
the first man in space, Soviet cosmonaut Yury Gagarin, is StopXam’s leader Chugunov. 
The woman in a scarlet dress, not facing the camera, is the group’s former spokesperson 
Mitrofanova.
  
Image 4. Vladimir Putin with StopXam participants and founders.
Photo credit: Mikhail Kliment’ev/ITAR-TASS.
In the majority of the reports, coverage concerned Russia’s capital, the city of Moscow, 
and its second largest city and historical capital, St. Petersburg. News reports on 
NTV, REN TV, and Rossiia 24 covered StopXam “raids” across the country, namely in 
Bashkortostan, Chelyabinsk, Karelia, Khabarovsk, Omsk, Perm’, Petrozavodsk, Voronezh, 
and other locations. News pieces covering cases from the periphery, as a rule, implied 
coverage of the newly established StopXam branches, scandalous cases taking place in 
the regions, or both types of events in a single report.
4.7.2. Targets and Retaliation
Throughout the reports, targets of StopXam have included businessmen and 
businesswomen, singers, athletes, porn stars, politicians and their relatives (spouses, 
children, and grandchildren), and other famous and non-famous people. On several 
occasions, StopXam targeted police officers. All broadcasters except TV Rain have 
framed targets as aggressive, guilty, and/or rich.
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Female targets have dominated the reports on the four state broadcasters. None 
of REN TV’s 149 reports on StopXam covered in this research assumed the potential 
innocence of targets. In its reports, TV Rain emphasised the violence performed by 
participants and underscored the fact that targets’ guilt was “alleged” and offences 
were “perceived”. The remaining broadcasters framed targets as “potentially innocent” 
on a couple of occasions each. NTV, REN TV, and Rossiia 24 framed female drivers as 
“inadequate”, referring to them as “damochka” [missy], “autolady”, or “a blonde”. Male 
drivers were not described in terms of hair colour or gender.
Image 5 illustrates a report by REN TV (2018) featuring female targets of StopXam. 
The report is titled “In Moscow Ladies behind the Wheel Have Aggressively Reacted to 
the Remark of ‘StopXam’ Activists”. The subtitle states: “One of them started threatening 
with some powerful connections”. The “catch” line in the first two sentences of the 
report states that “In Moscow, stubborn and vicious gals attacked side-walks with their 
cars. They responded aggressively to any inquiry made by social activists [StopXam]”. 
The material is presented as “exclusive” and is accompanied by the tags “Moscow” and 
“activists”. This particular report, like most REN TV reports, features footage taken and 
edited by participants.
Image 5. REN TV report screenshot. Gender biases in the reports.
Presumption of guilt of the targets, exposure of their identity, and gendered commentary 
were also prevalent on Rossiia 24. Image 6 illustrates a report titled “The Blonde from 
around the Corner” (Blinnikov, 2013).27 The report features footage from StopXam’s 
YouTube channel and states the following:
27 The title is an allusion to the 1984 Soviet romantic comedy The Blonde around the Corner.
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She drove over a foot, gave a ride on the hood, and went on to a physical attack. 
All of this was performed by a heroine of a scandalous video that appeared 
online–a Saransk-native, 31-year-old [the report provides the target’s full name] 
owner of a snow-white Audi. In this very car, the fragile blonde tried to detour 
the traffic via a sidewalk.
Image 6. Rossiia 24 screenshot. Target’s personal information disclosed (redacted by the 
author).
Beyond gender and appearance markers, the targets are described through the Soviet-
era term of being owners of an inomarka [a foreign-made car], which underscores the 
higher socioeconomic status of the driver. Vehicles are described as being “expensive” 
and “elite”. Some reports describe the gender, socioeconomic status, and ethnic 
background of the target. NTV report titled “‘Nashi’ versus the Chechens: Scandalous 
Video Stirred Up the Internet” (NTV, 2012) sets up an Us versus Them contestation 
wherein the Chechens are framed as a group distinct from Russians, turning the 
parking violation into an interethnic matter. Once again NTV features video footage 
from StopXam’s YouTube channel, which contributes to further one-sided framing of 
the events, as the account is informed through the perspective of participants. The 
target is portrayed as an aggressive, rude, rich power abuser and is quoted to have 
threatened the activists. This particular case features the wife of Chechnya’s deputy 
presidential plenipotentiary to Moscow and was also widely covered by REN TV, Rossiia 
24, and Channel One. As a result of this incident, the deputy plenipotentiary lost his 
job, while his wife was further shamed by the President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, 
who accused the target of “acting in a manner not suitable for the Chechen mentality”. 
Kadyrov emphasised that “as a Chechen woman, she should have known that all this is 
contrary to our moral and ethical standards” (Vesti, 2012).
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These cases demonstrate how, by entering traditional media discourse, the incidents 
are further framed from the perspective of participants and lead to reactions from 
state leadership. Female targets experience pressure of societal norms that still find it 
somewhat unusual to see that a woman is driving a car, hence the term “autolady”, as 
well as the pressure of having to conform to special moral and ethical standards.
 
Image 7. Rossiia 24 report screenshot. Maksim Martsinkevich (also known as ‘Tesak’ [Axe]), the 
founder of several hate-based vigilante formations, is featured on national television in the 
process of humiliating his target.
Whereas NTV, REN TV, and Rossiia 24 all report on the dysfunctionality and inactivity of 
law enforcement, Rossiia 24 is the only platform that quoted one of the youth activists 
accusing police forces of direct collaboration with criminals. As such, an article dated 
June 16, 2013, reported on “people’s avengers fighting paedophiles, road boores, and 
drug mafia” (Mamontov, 2013). The report lumped numerous vigilante formations in 
Russia, including anti-migrant and neo-Nazi vigilante movements28 alongside Kremlin-
supported groups, into a single force of “citizen-led justice”. Thus, traditional media 
provide a platform for openly criminal participants who use social media to “intimidate 
and humiliate their targets” (Kasra, 2017, p. 186) and express their views on national 
television. In the same report, a StopXam representative states that police are afraid 
of approaching cars with “cool license plates”.29 Traditional media, therefore, provide 
justification for vigilantism when they frame police forces as dysfunctional and vigilantes 
as superheroes–“the avengers”.
28 For a detailed account of these groups and their entrepreneurship in vigilantism, see Favarel-
Garrigues (2019).
29 In Russia, a licence plate with a specific combination of letters and digits can be a status symbol. 
For more information, please see https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/327032-hidden-messages-of-
russian-license
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All platforms, except for Channel One, have reported on police becoming a target for 
StopXam. Image 8 illustrates a 2014 NTV report from Karelia where “a StopXam activist 
was detained for placing the sticker on a police car” (NTV, 2014).
Image 8. NTV report screenshot. StopXam participant places the group’s sticker on a police 
vehicle.
NTV and Rossiia 24 reported on the “internationality” of the “movement” with branches 
established in neighbouring states. The stickers are mentioned as the main retaliation 
tool in almost all reports of all broadcasters. Rossiia 24 reported both on the fact that 
the stickers were easy to remove and on the fact that removal “takes time and effort”; 
indicating lack of objectivity in controversies surrounding this form of retaliation. 
The reports also mention “moralisation” and “online exposure” as part of the group’s 
activist repertoire. When it comes to physical confrontations and fights, the majority of 
coverage framed targets as the ones attacking participants.
4.7.3. Different Voices and Shifting Perspectives
As far as the granting of voice is concerned, of all actors involved, StopXam leader 
Chugunov was given the most chances to comment on incidents and processes 
surrounding the group. NTV and Rossiia 24 gave voice to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
to comment, while only NTV featured an anti-StopXam citizen activist speaking up 
and communicating his views on the group amid the court decision to shut it down. 
StopXam’s voice was represented by Chugunov or other members who were interviewed 
or quoted from their social media posts and TV appearances. In the case of targets, 
their voices were presented in the form of quoted speech from videos produced and 
edited by StopXam participants. This means that in spite of the perceived presence 
of the targets’ voice, the message is subjected to manipulation by participants and 
broadcasters. When it comes to the voices of police officers, only Rossiia 24 provided a 
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platform for them. In these reports police communicated through official statements 
made by their press services. In all reports featuring such press statements, StopXam 
members were presented as the instigators of conflict.
It is curious to note that every report featuring lawyers as commentators and police 
as targets framed the participants as hooligans and inferred avaricious motives behind 
their activism. Rossiia 24 accused StopXam of removing a self-incriminating video 
(GTRK “Kareliia”, 2015) and quoted Karelia’s internal affairs minister accusing StopXam 
of hooliganism and damaging private property (Vesti, 2015).
  
Image 9. Rossiia 24 report screenshot. Police in Karelia deemed StopXam as “hooligans”. 
In this report the lawyers are quoted stating that StopXam participants violate the 
law, slander their targets, practice mob rule, and block the vision of drivers by placing 
stickers on their windshields. Beyond these accusations, the monetisation of YouTube 
videos featuring famous people is addressed in the report by NTV presented in Image 10: 
“StopXam is making tens of thousands of dollars on scandalous videos with celebrities” 
(NTV, 2016c).
Image 10. NTV report screenshot. StopXam’s motives are questioned.
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A lawyer featured in this report breaks down the nature of activities of this “organized 
movement” and is quoted next to “anti-StopXam” activists (NTV, 2016c). The report 
estimates that on YouTube alone participants make tens of thousands of US dollars per 
month on top of presidential grants. Subsequent reports continue to question StopXam’s 
motives and approaches, reminding the audience that StopXam was liquidated by the 
Moscow City Court and that its members are infamous for fights and aggression in their 
videos, especially when it comes to celebrities (NTV, 2016a).
4.8. Heroes or hooligans? Media revelations
The portrayal and framing of StopXam in Russia’s traditional media are rather inconsistent 
and fluctuate across time and among broadcasters. In 2016, StopXam received the most 
mentions in the news: it was the year the group confronted a prominent Russian athlete 
and Olympic champion. While other rich and famous people had been approached by 
participants in the past, the case of the confrontation with this athlete is distinct as 
athletes occupy an important niche in the process of authoritarian nation building (see, 
for instance, Koch, 2013). Mega sporting events and athletes’ achievements help Russia 
construct its image as a superpower, even though the price tag that comes along with 
this ambition is very high (Puddington, 2017). Thus, having put an Olympic champion 
on the ground during a fight, StopXam activists essentially assaulted Russia’s national 
pride. Such a bold move could have served as the trigger for scrutiny of the group 
that had otherwise enjoyed the endorsement and support of the state and its media. 
Having crossed this unspoken boundary, StopXam demonstrated that it might be more 
ferocious than the ruling regime hoped when it initially endorsed the group. In 2016 
StopXam was liquidated as a legal entity. Although this decision was overruled by the 
Supreme Court six months later, liquidation was, nevertheless, reinforced in 2018. NTV, 
REN TV, and Rossiia 24 aired news on StopXam following the court decision, reporting 
that their “raids” and activities would continue in spite of the liquidation.
As per StopXam itself, it is unclear who specifically ordered their liquidation. Following 
the court decision, Chugunov gave several interviews where he spoke about the fact 
that StopXam had targeted public servants and parliament members, bandits, police, 
prosecutor’s office employees, and even the head of Medvedev’s secretariat. Chugunov 
mentioned that on several occasions StopXam was offered millions of rubles in bribes not 
to upload videos to YouTube but refused such offers. In the same interview, he denounced 
Russia’s ruling party Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia), announced his participation in the 
parliamentary election, and promised to open “new formats, new channels, new leaders” 
in a variety of directions countering “bores” (Pasmi.ru, 2016). This interview was not 
featured on the news platforms covered by current research. Chugunov indeed ran in the 
2016 parliamentary election but came in second to last in his electoral district, in tenth 
place. As of 2017, Chugunov no longer serves in the Civic Chamber. 
102
Chapter 4
In the most recent interview dated 29 January 2020, Chugunov answered the 
questions of several interviewers including Maria Butina (infamously convicted in the 
United States as an unregistered foreign agent), speaking about Nashi, StopXam, and his 
current life (Prekrasnaya Rossiya bu-bu-bu, 2020). Namely, he elaborated on his decision 
to leave Nashi in 2011 as he “did not want to take people to public actions not related 
to the organisation’s objectives” (Prekrasnaya Rossiya bu-bu-bu, 2020). Chugunov 
expressed concerns over the excessive paternalism of Russia’s ruling elite and the gap 
between the state and the youth, as the former redirected finances to other projects. He 
also stated that “if a person was not a revolutionary at the age of 19, he is a scoundrel, 
but if he remained a revolutionary at age 30, he is an idiot” and explained that he is 
a “happy person” since his departure from public and political activism (Prekrasnaya 
Rossiya bu-bu-bu, 2020).
4.9. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to achieve three objectives–to test the existing conceptual 
framework of digital vigilantism using the example of StopXam; investigate the nature 
of portrayal of vigilantes, their targets, and police forces in Russia’s state-owned and 
independent media; and evaluate the role of traditional media in digital vigilantism 
manifestation.
Having compared StopXam against the existing definitional characteristics of digital 
vigilantism, the chapter makes a contribution by demonstrating the significance of 
audience in mediated retaliation. Exposure to wider audiences amplifies the harm 
experienced by targets and can lead to consequences that conventional encounters 
with legal police forces would not necessarily yield. In this regard, traditional media 
plays an important role in framing cases and granting a voice to the actors involved.
Content analysis demonstrates the important role of traditional media in framing 
social justice and in giving voice to respective actors. In the case of digital vigilantism, 
where mediated exposure is at the core of retaliation, traditional media can be an 
important stage for targets to deliver their side of the story. Given their vast social media 
following, StopXam possess enormous capacities in exposing their targets. In such cases, 
if the target wants to tell their side of the story to the masses, traditional media is one of 
the few channels available to them. However, this channel is jeopardised when featured 
stories are delivered from a one-sided and biased perspective of StopXam participants.
When it comes to the framing of respective actors, StopXam’s portrayal neither 
consistent nor homogeneous. State leadership, represented by Medvedev and Putin, 
expressed support for StopXam and other similar groups that came out of the Nashi 
youth movement. Such endorsement, broadcasted on national television, granted 
informal powers to participants as their acts were automatically legitimised. While all 
broadcasters referred to the group as “activists” and a “public movement”, descriptions 
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such as “organisation”, “project”, “scandalous organisation”, “NGO”, “concerned citizens”, 
and “fighters” were also prevalent. Reports on all platforms peaked in 2016 amid the 
scandal involving StopXam’s retaliation against Russia’s prominent athlete. Following 
the incident, news reports began questioning the motives of StopXam participants, 
some openly accusing them of being avaricious and benefiting from large state grants 
and the monetisation of “scandalous” videos on YouTube.
TV Rain faced copyright issues with StopXam for featuring the group’s YouTube 
videos in its reports, while other platforms systematically featured the same footage 
and faced no issues. Furthermore, platforms such as YouTube play an important role 
in providing a stage for vigilantes and in allowing StopXam participants to generate 
income from their activities while the privacy of targets is violated.
Unlike TV Rain, broadcasters such as NTV, REN TV, and Rossiia 24 showed bias against 
female targets by highlighting their physical features, referring to them as “the blonde” 
or “a fragile gal”. The term “autolady” was used in reference to female drivers, hinting at 
the special circumstances of participants dealing with a female driver. Female targets 
were also portrayed as aggressive, scandalous, and incompetent at driving. Targets’ 
personal information such as full name, age, and license plates were systematically 
disclosed in the reports.
The “rich and powerful” of Russian society were framed through references to their 
social status–politicians, singers, athletes, prominent businessmen/women, or relatives 
of the above. Their vehicles were described as “expensive”, “elite”, “with special license 
plates”, and “foreign-made”. Some reports portrayed police as dysfunctional, which 
provided further justification for vigilantes’ role and acts of social justice. State media 
did not shy away from referring to targets by their ethnic origins such as “the Chechens”. 
Because in some cases confrontation with StopXam and subsequent media attention led 
to targets losing their jobs, the power of exposure in retaliation is once again evident. If 
violators are approached by police for parking in the wrong place, they would normally 
be issued a fine which they would then pay and go on with their lives. In mediated 
exposure, the price of parking in the wrong place is much higher. Digital vigilantism is a 
phenomenon where each wave of exposure can harm individuals.
Reporting on the road-traffic related cases through the frame of “anarchy exercised 
by elite citizens on expensive cars” is a scenario that speaks to the greater masses in 
Russia. References to “Chechens” and “inadequate female drivers” hold anecdotal 
significance in a society where gender biases and interethnic confrontations are familiar 
points of discussion. Perhaps, reports featuring young people confronting the “rich and 
famous” of society serve the purpose of presenting a sense of justice to the greater 
masses–so long as the confronted targets are not the ruling elite itself.
Explaining why selected state broadcasters framed actors in a specific manner in 
the specific period of time is a challenge that requires further investigation through 
interviews with journalists, editors, and other media professionals in Russia. What 
can be elaborated at this point is the fact that in the current state of Russian media 
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there are unspoken rules for what can and cannot be said on state television. At the 
same time, broadcasters enjoy a level of autonomy on certain topics. During the time 
when StopXam was openly endorsed by state leadership, most of the reports on state 
television framed the group as a volunteer formation of young activists. The narratives 
in state media shifted and started to question the motives of StopXam amid the 
deterioration of relations between vigilantes and the state.
This research contributes to current literature on vigilantism by addressing a case 
where a vigilante group has turned into a brand-like formation with branches across and 
beyond Russia. StopXam is a unique movement in the sense that it is in possession of 
the power to inspire and endorse similar movements around the world. Conversations 
with members and branch founders beyond Russia revealed that when launching their 
own initiatives, people feel the need for StopXam’s approval. Furthermore, StopXam’s 
success makes it a recognisable movement to the point that affiliating oneself with the 
existing brand appears to make more sense than founding a unique initiative. Whether 
StopXam members are heroes or hooligans is a contested view, and media analysis 
reveals that perceptions have changed over time.
Future research is needed on media portrayal of other vigilante formations in 
Russia and beyond. Comparative studies involving different groups nationally and 
internationally can shed light further on the role and place of traditional media in digital 
vigilantism. Other avenues for exploration could include qualitative content analysis of 
videos produced by vigilantes in order to identify their frames and biases and compare 
them with perspectives in traditional media. Relations between vigilantes and social 
media platforms require further investigation.
Interviewees
- Former StopXam participant in Moldova. In-person interview, May 2017. 
- Mal Estacionado founders in Peru. Online interview, June 2019.
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Layers of target vulnerabilities 
in digital vigilantism30
30 This chapter is an adaptation of the following article: Gabdulhakov, R. (2019). In the bullseye of 
vigilantes: Mediated vulnerabilities of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia. Media and Communication, 





Hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz labour migrants seek opportunities in Russia where 
they fall target to retaliation of vigilante citizens who find offence in the presence 
of alien labourers in their homeland. Vigilantism also takes place within this migrant 
‘community’ where male Kyrgyz labour migrants engage in retaliation on female 
migrants over perceived offences such as dating non-Kyrgyz men. On several occasions 
between 2011 and 2016 videos featuring honour beatings of female labour migrants 
by fellow countrymen shook the internet. The selected case illustrates vulnerabilities 
experienced by migrants due to xenophobia and hostility of the host state, as well as 
additional layers of vulnerabilities linked to gendered biases that ‘travel’ across borders 
along with compatriots in migration. The study argues that offline structures, norms, 
biases, violence, and stigma not only reincarnate online where they culminate in 
vigilante acts, but consequently re-enter the offline discourse and go through further 
normalisation and justification.
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“It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing.”
– Michel Foucault 
5.1. Introduction
Social media and smart mobile devices brought about intrinsic changes to various 
aspects of modern life, including the process and experience of migration. Digital media 
provides unprecedented affordances for migrants, such as access to crucial information, 
on-the-spot translation, navigation tools, and other services conveniently accessible 
through a single device. As is evident from recent literature on the role of digital media 
in the lives of refugees, displaced people, and migrants–smart mobile devices, social 
media, and the connectivity that they afford can be positively instrumental during 
and after the migratory journey. From coordination with others in the community to 
maintaining contact with people back home, to document storing, smartphones provide 
a “sense of security” and help with “preserving memories” of the journey (Alencar 
et al., 2018, pp. 12–13). Social media is used by refugees for “acquisition of language 
and cultural competences” and helps with “contacting family and friends in the home 
country in order to obtain social and emotional support” (Alencar, 2017, p. 1600). At 
the same time, there are certain “information precarities” experienced by refugees 
and displaced people. Such precarities constitute instabilities and vulnerabilities to 
“misinformation, stereotyping, and rumors” (Wall et al., 2017, p. 240). While being an 
essential tool used by refugees, smart mobile devices can carry risk as they are used by 
governments and border control officers for surveillance purposes (Gabrielsen Jumbert 
et al., 2018). Yet further, as this chapter illustrates, digitally mediated threats can radiate 
from fellow migrants.
This chapter aims to make a scientific contribution by addressing mediated 
vulnerabilities of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia who are pushed out of their home 
state by economic factors, and whose precarious status in the host state amplifies 
their fragility in the digital domain. In particular, the chapter inquires into how digital 
vigilantism affects female labour migrants in the framework of digital divides (Miller & 
Norris, 2016; Ragnedda & Ruiu, 2017; van Dijk, 2017; among others) that imply divergence 
across groups and individuals in their access to digital media, respective skills, as well as 
various capitals and benefits of using these media. By addressing the selected case, this 
chapter aims to further inform the scientific discussion, debate, and exchange on the 
role, benefit and harm that digital media can bring into the lives of migrants. The study 
considers how the established social, political, and economic inequalities, as well as 
racial, ethnic, and other biases transfer into the digital sphere, thus reinforcing “existing 
social relationships” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 243), where they “culminate in a coordinated mass 




Falling target to vigilante citizens in the host state, labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan 
engage in mediated moral policing within their own perceived community. On several 
occasions between 2011 and 2016, videos of honour beatings of female Kyrgyz labour 
migrants by fellow countrymen shook the internet. Referring to themselves as ‘patriots’, 
men who do not reveal their own identity in the videos humiliate and punish women over 
perceived offences, such as being seen in public with non-Kyrgyz males. Having found 
offence in women’s behaviour, the ‘patriots’ capture and beat their targets, threaten 
them with knives, sexually assault them, film the process, and spread the footage online 
(Beishinbek Kyzy & Bigg, 2012; Botoeva, 2012; SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 
2012; Ibraeva et al, 2015; Lelik, 2016). Beyond the suffered embodied harm, the visibility 
of the targets is exploited (Trottier, 2017) as they are forced to reveal their names and 
home addresses on camera, which intensifies the harm and paves the way for further 
online and offline retaliation, shaming, and harassment.
Certain identity markers such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, 
and gender as well as social norms and perceived obligations affect the subjection to 
and experience of digitally mediated citizen-led retaliation. The selected case illustrates 
vulnerabilities that migrants experience due to xenophobia and hostility in the host 
state, as well as gendered biases and violence inside of the migrant ‘community’. Such 
vulnerabilities are, of course, numerous and extend into economic circumstances, 
education, healthcare, employment conditions, immigration status, and so on. This 
chapter focuses on vulnerabilities associated with subjection to vigilante acts that 
instrumentalise embodied and digitally mediated retaliation.
After elaboration on its methodology, the chapter provides a theoretical framework 
for digital vigilantism and digital divides. In doing so, it covers related literature and 
the encompassing scholarly discussions. The chapter proceeds to elaborate on various 
threats and vulnerabilities faced by Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia amid the multitude 
of ‘offences’ that certain targets commit. Women are targeted by vigilantes in the host 
state and by compatriots in migration. In this case, there are vulnerabilities applicable to 
the general group ‘Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia’, as well as additional vulnerabilities 
experienced by women within the group. Beyond this, women experience barriers to 
seeking legal help, as sexual violence, shame, weak rule of law, and their uncertain 
legal status in Russia prevent them from being vocal. Appalling public solidarity with 
vigilante acts in the home state of Kyrgyzstan is informed by stigma, victim-blaming 
discourses, and the vulnerable position of women within the set social norms.
5.2. Methodology
While retaliation videos were freely circulating on various social media platforms, 
the author viewed them to gather an understanding of the nature of retaliation. 
Though scarce, the existing literature on the selected case assisted in constructing an 
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understanding of perceptions and public reactions to instances of digitally mediated 
vigilante retaliation. Semi-structured in-depth interviews (11) with a participant 
in vigilantism (1), human rights defenders (3), police (2), an academic (1), an NGO 
representative (1), and journalists (3), conducted in Russia and Kyrgyzstan in person and 
via Skype, have further informed this research. Interviews were conducted between 
April and June 2018. The option of interviewing targets of digital vigilantism was 
intentionally avoided due to ethical considerations and the do no harm approach of the 
researcher. All featured interviewees in the study are anonymised, which has no impact 
on the substance and quality of the data. Interview material particularly helped with the 
contextualisation of digitally mediated retaliation and its impacts on targets within the 
Kyrgyz migrant ‘community’. Interviews revealed instances of collaboration between 
law enforcement officers and vigilante citizens in Russia, disclosing curious nuances of 
acquired capitals and powers that allow media-savvy participants to apply pressure on 
the police. Furthermore, the informants helped shed light on the barriers that prevent 
targets from seeking legal help both in the host state and in their home country. A full 
list of interviews conducted during the PhD trajectory is available in Annexe III. 
5.3. Digital vigilantism
Finding offence in other citizens, taking personal retaliation measures while filming the 
process, and subsequently disseminating the footage online is a rampant practise among 
various vigilante groups in Russia. In the majority of cases, participatory practices are group 
acts where citizens organise themselves around a selected offence theme, such as exposing 
and punishing alleged paedophiles, countering ‘unscrupulous’ merchants, shaming parking 
‘violators’, or busting ‘illegal migrants’. This chapter relies on the concept of digital vigilantism 
to address such acts. Researching vigilantism through the prism of its digital manifestations 
should not be perceived as a phenomenon limited to hacking and doxing. Instead, digital 
vigilantism can be defined as “a process where citizens are collectively offended by other 
citizen activity, and coordinate retaliation on mobile devices and social platforms” (Trottier, 
2017, p. 56). As such, embodied acts performed by vigilantes and broadcasted online are 
also regarded as acts of digital vigilantism. The element of digitally mediated exposure of 
targets can increase longevity and recurrence of the waves of harm that a sole physical 
assault would not be able to produce, thus intensifying and amplifying the impact of 
retaliation. Russia’s neo-Nazi vigilante group Occupy Paedophilia, for instance, engaged in 
intentional dissemination of the footage of their punitive acts “in order to extend the sexual 
humiliation and punishment beyond the actual physical assault behind closed doors” 
(Kasra, 2017, p. 185). While such “unwanted”, “intense” and “enduring” (Trottier, 2017, p. 56) 
visibility is forced on the targets, publicity can be the desired opportunity for vigilantes, 
granting them social recognition as informal justice providers. However, participants too 
can experience negative consequences of their own visibility.
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Moncada (2017) proposes five core definitional dimensions of vigilantism, namely, 
social organisation, targets, repertoire, justification, and motivation (pp. 407–408). Here 
it is important to consider biases that might subject certain categories of people to 
vulnerability to retaliation in specific contexts. These include ethnic/religious/sexual 
minorities, representatives of a certain socioeconomic class, women, migrants, etc. 
As digital media brought about “dramatic increases in harassment, abuse, and threats 
targeting women” (Jane, 2017, p. 186), the very biology as an identity marker can lead 
to vulnerability. When it comes to citizen response to perceived offences, questions 
of motivation, legality, and proportionality of retaliation arise. These questions are, 
of course, also applicable to the authorised state forces such as the police and the 
Federal Migration Service. Unlike conventional vigilantes, who, according to Johnston 
(1996), constitute autonomous citizenship, digital vigilantism participants assert “new 
boundaries” (Trottier, 2017, p. 59) in their relationship with authorised powers. Political, 
ideological, and other convictions of vigilantes can be shared by members of the state 
apparatus, and other functionaries holding legal power and authority. Some vigilante 
groups in Russia have even received presidential grants in support of their activities 
(Favarel-Garrigues, 2018; Gabdulhakov, 2018) in exchange for loyalty.
5.3.1. Vigilantism in the Absence of Police
When migrant communities find themselves in the situation where they are reluctant 
to turn to the formal police due to brittle immigration status in the host state, resorting 
to informal policing within their own group is a way of maintaining unity and order. In 
his study on undocumented Mozambican migrants in Johannesburg, Madsen illustrates 
how internal migrant-over-migrant “policing produces the moral community and not 
the other way around” (2004, p. 174). As interaction with the formal police forces can 
lead to “harassment and deportation”, migrants rely on each other in the phenomenon 
which Madsen describes as “neither policing in the traditional sense nor vigilante activity, 
but rather, a form of communally effected non-violent policing” (2004, p. 173). Migrants 
develop a dependency on each other for moral policing where “social exclusion is a 
highly effective form of sanctions as survival depends on inclusion” (Madsen, 2004, pp. 
188–189). Contrary to the case of Mozambican migrants in Johannesburg, actions of the 
so-called Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ largely fit the definition of digital vigilantism. Acts of retaliation 
are filmed and distributed online while shaming “serves as a moral justification in order 
to facilitate information sharing and socially harmful visibility” (Trottier, 2018, p. 171). 
The subjective moral motivations of the ‘patriots’ lead to acts of community policing.
Vigilante acts can be centred around offences that imply the breaking of the law– 
“formal legal orders”, as well as offences based on the violation of subjective social 
norms–informal “not legally codified” orders “established and enforced by a range of 
non-state actors” (Moncada, 2017, p. 407). Applying this scheme to the case of Kyrgyz 
labour migrants in Russia stipulates that unlawful employment and violation of 
immigration regulations resemble the breaking of the formal orders in the host state. At 
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the same time, migrants whose immigration status is in accord with the law still violate 
the informal orders in the perception of certain groups and individuals who view the 
very fact that foreigners live in Russia as offensive. In addition to this, the case illustrates 
that informal orders can be further violated within the target group, creating layers of 
vulnerabilities that subject targets to retaliation.
5.3.2. Image as Power
In their 2015 study on media discourses surrounding the case of Kyrgyz ‘patriots’, 
Ibraeva et al. conclude that “male migrants find themselves in a situation of identity 
destabilisation” amid the “loss of the normative role for a traditional society model of 
masculinity” (2015, p. 24). Furthermore, the authors discover that respective discourses 
in the Russian and Kyrgyz media have “framed violence as patriotic, truly male and 
ethnic” and “became the backbone for new legitimation of violence” (Ibraeva et al., 
2015, p. 25). These findings raise concerns over frames and discourses that surround 
such acts of crime. Traditional media reports not only justify violence but can also aid 
the offenders in amplifying the harm of undesired visibility by revealing the identity of 
targets in the reports. In cases where online content would otherwise not be available 
to some audiences, traditional media reports assist in disseminating the message.
In its turn, social media enables spectators to participate in digitally mediated 
retaliation. As a result, the audience is not just a passive observer; it plays an 
instrumental role in retaliation, intensifying and surpassing the impact of embodied 
assaults. Members of the audience can take sides and express their position on the 
issue through ‘likes’, ‘dislikes’, shares, and comments. Some vigilantes in Russia maintain 
an active and systematic approach to uploading videos on YouTube, with respective 
viewings counting in millions. Although select videos can get removed by platforms 
due to violent content, the nature of file storing and sharing on social media enables 
their continuous circulation. Besides, legal frameworks, approaches and capacities for 
removal of harmful content from platforms vary across contexts. While each wave of 
circulation of media material exposing the targets brings about new waves of harm, the 
longevity of online availability of these media implies the longevity of their damaging 
impacts on the targets.
In mediated retaliation, traditional media reports play a crucial role as their coverage 
of a given incident can boost online searches and hype a particular case. Furthermore, 
traditional media frame cases, participants, and targets in their reports. If the victims 
are unable to speak up (out of fear of further retaliation, shame, or other reasons), their 
voice is missing. As is argued by Jane (2017), in gendered cyberhate there is a “silencing 
effect” that leads to self-censorship of female targets (p. 191). Meanwhile, vigilantes 
who have an interest in instrumentalising their visibility enjoy the publicity. On top of 
this, participants’ (in)formal collaboration with the police further limits targets’ options 
for seeking legal help, as dysfunctionality of the legal system and structural advantages 
of vigilantes prevail. 
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5.4. Digital divides… and unites
Scholars theorising the notion of digital divides (among others: Miller & Norris, 2016; 
Ragnedda & Ruiu, 2017; van Dijk, 2017) suggest a three-level distinction. The first level 
concerns physical and material access to electricity, the internet, and devices; the second 
level focuses on the character of use of digital media, respective skills and savviness of 
the users; while the third level of digital divides looks into different types of capital and 
benefits of using digital media. Within their definition of the digital divide, Miller and 
Norris (2016, p. 2) suggest that:
[S]ocial inequalities and power relationships that exist online at any given 
moment or in any given space shape, and are shaped by, access to and uses of 
ICT. To the extent that men and women are socialized differently and unequally, 
offline gender roles, responsibilities, and opportunities influence online 
behaviour and any corresponding benefits. 
As such, at the third level, people’s background and various types of acquired capital 
influence how they “reinvest valuable information in the social realm” (Ragnedda & Ruiu, 
2017, p. 25). Certain discourses and acts can create a sense of unity for specific audiences 
in an us vs. them representation of targets, i.e., men versus women, migrants versus 
locals, sexual minorities versus majorities, drivers versus pedestrians, merchants versus 
consumers, etc. These unifying sentiments are constructed over the condemnation 
of perceived norm breaching. The “imagined” online communities (Gruzd et al., 
2011) inform and inspire offline discourses and acts. Among the many examples, this 
dynamic can be illustrated by a vigilante group based in Chechnya where participants 
find offence in how some Chechen women dress. Vigilantes take pictures of their 
targets and make use of the images that targets share on social media. They expose 
women to digital audiences, but also provide addresses of targets and call on offline 
actions, urging the relatives to take measures such as honour murder for the perceived 
misconduct (BBC, 2017b). On their public platforms, participants warn the audience 
that only men can leave comments and that non-Chechens will be banned from the 
discussion. Such categorisation creates a sense of unity among participants and the 
audience. Online perceptions of unity are intertwined with offline contestations of 
norms and negotiation of Us and Them.
The discrepancy in the acquired benefits of social media use is evident in 
vulnerabilities and immunities of different users. The third level digital divide can be 
applied to mediated capacities of actors involved. Users with a social media following 
in the millions obviously have a greater audience reach than those with just a few 
subscribers. Respective traditional media framing and official endorsement can turn 
vigilantes into informal public leaders. In this regard, such publicity and endorsement 
can grant vigilantes greater respect and support from the audience than the official 
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state police could enjoy. Furthermore, traditional media and public discourses over viral 
cases of digital vigilantism can further inform collective perceptions and reactions to 
these events and practices, and in doing so, further inform social frustrations, biases, 
divides, and vulnerabilities.
In contexts where citizen involvement in justice matters is encouraged by the highest 
authority (in the case of Russia, by President Putin), the police are by default invited to 
collaborate with vigilante citizens (Gabdulhakov, 2018, p. 325). In this regard, the police 
can initiate formal collaboration with vigilantes by calling for public involvement in 
investigations and in the enforcement of legal orders through citizen-led surveillance, 
snitching, and denunciation of fellow citizens (The Moscow Times, 2018a). Such 
practices, however, are not limited to formal orders and formal collaboration. The police 
and vigilantes can engage in informal solidarity and patron-client relations. Beyond 
this, police officers are also subjected to the power of visibility and can be respectively 
framed by vigilantes and/or by traditional media. As a Moscow-based leader of a 
vigilante group explained:
Sometimes I blackmail the police. For instance, I made a critical post on Facebook 
and exposed the investigator, and so on and so forth. At first, I received a phone 
call from the assistant of the Head of the press service and he asked me to remove 
the post. I said, “I will not remove anything, you deal with it yourself”. To this, he 
said, “how can I help you?” I said, “put the paedophile in prison, and I will write 
positively about you…[i]f you take action, I will tell all media outlets how great 
you are”. (Participant I)
This case exemplifies different media capacities of actors involved, which further 
complicates the relations between vigilantes, police officers, and targets.
5.5. Migrants in the bullseye of the host state
Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are large suppliers 
of labour migrants for Russia. This section of the chapter addresses vigilante acts 
where labour migrants are targeted by ‘concerned’ citizens in Russia. Described to be 
“the most violent country in the former Soviet Union for ethnic and racial minorities” 
(Arnold, 2015, p. 243), Russia presents a challenging environment for migrants as 
their perceived offence is being foreign and non-Slavic. Vulnerable status induced by 
corruption, lawlessness, legal bureaucracy, legal illiteracy, language barriers, and fear 
of deportation, subjects Central Asians to abuse and retaliation performed both by 
the police (Alekseyeva, 2013; Kaliyev, 2018; Kislov & Zhanaev, 2017; Sindelar et al., 2013) 
and by Russian citizens (Kimmage, 2006; Parkin, 2018; SOVA Center for Information and 
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Analysis, 2014; Yudina & Alperovich, 2013, 2014). As one researcher from a Moscow-
based NGO explained, “In the past, there was a negative perception of people from 
the North Caucasus republics, now the focus has shifted towards people from Central 
Asia… they are now perceived in sociological terms as ‘the other’” (NGO I).
5.5.1. Kyrgyz Labour Migrants in Russia: A Brief Profile
Out of Kyrgyzstan’s 6.2 million citizens (The World Bank, 2017), state migration 
service estimates 800 thousand people to be living abroad (Interfax, 2018). Precise 
information on the number of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia is not available. While 
Kyrgyz State Migration Service officials declare this number to be 640–650 thousand 
(Interfax, 2018), Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs is suggesting “more than 800,000” 
(Hasanova & Kapushenko, 2018). Beyond this, Kyrgyzstan is leading globally in the 
share of remittances in the gross domestic product (GDP), with “nearly 40%” of its GDP 
comprised of the money transferred by labour migrants (Hasanova & Kapushenko, 2018, 
para. 20). International Federation for Human Rights reports that women constituted 
40% of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia in 2016 (2016, p. 4). In comparison, female 
migrants to Russia from other Central Asian republics, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
represented less than 20% in each case (International Federation for Human Rights, 
2016, p. 19). Based on the data available for 2014, estimated 60% of all Kyrgyz migrants 
did not possess proper documentation “to comply with current migration rules of 
countries of destination” (International Federation for Human Rights, 2016, p. 6). These 
data illustrate several important factors. Contrary to the case of other labour migrant-
supplier states in the region, where men dominate the composition of this labour force, 
migrants from Kyrgyzstan are nearly equally balanced in the representation of men and 
women. While there is a domestic dependency on income from labour migration, lack 
of proper documentation during the stay in the host state creates a fertile ground for 
exploitation and abuse by the police, employers, human traffickers, vigilantes, fellow 
migrants, etc.
5.5.2. Migrant-Focused Vigilantes
Among Russia’s numerous citizen groups who have taken justice into own hands and 
retaliated on migrants and other minorities are the nationalists, football hooligans, 
pro-Kremlin youth groups, and neo-Nazi movements. Migrant-focused vigilante 
groups include Occupy Viselay [Occupy Evict], Mestnie [The Locals], Russkie [Russians], 
Movement Against Illegal Immigration, Scheet Moskvi [The Shield of Moscow], and 
numerous other formations that are in the constant flux of appearing and disappearing 
across the country. In most cases, social media is used by these groups to coordinate 
activities with members and to spotlight these activities to the broader audience. 
Such visibility subjects the targets to greater retaliation and “further dehumanizes and 
relentlessly shames” them, while the punitive show is also used “to intimidate anyone 
who may have been watching and violating social rules” (Kasra, 2017, p. 185). Photo and 
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video materials produced by such vigilantes not only harm the targeted individual, but 
serve as tools for mapping and targeting the larger ‘other’–the alien group that these 
individuals represent, i.e., migrants, Central Asians, Muslims, non-Slavs, homosexuals, 
and other ‘deviants’.
Having peaked in the mid-2000s, Russia’s racist and neo-Nazi violence is experiencing 
a decline. As such, in 2008 Moscow-based SOVA Center reported that across Russia, “no 
less than 525 people were the victims of racist and xenophobic violence, 97 of whom 
died” (Kozhevnikova, 2009, para. 10). In 2010, “42 people died and 401 were injured,” 
while “23 people died and 154 received injuries” in 2011 (Yudina et al., 2012, para. 11). 
Preliminary findings for 2018 report on 57 victims of “racist and other ideologically 
motivated violence” and “at least 4” deaths (Yudina, 2019, para. 6). The precise number 
of attacks on migrants is difficult to acquire as targets avoid the police, while the 
“attackers, who used to brag about their ‘achievements’ online, have grown more 
cautious in the wake of more active law enforcement pushback” observable in the last 
few years (Yudina, 2019, para. 7). Russia’s vigilantes, thus, are manoeuvring between the 
benefits and the threats of visibility. Traditional media portrayal of events and actors 
further informs the audience. Framed as invaders and dangerous outsiders (Tolz, 2017), 
migrants have fewer chances for the compassion of the host state public in Russia. The 
respective legitimising framing of vigilantism, on the other hand, can inspire and attract 
supporters.
5.5.3. Solidarity of Police and Vigilantes
Until recent state-sanctioned crackdowns on the far-right groups and movements in 
Russia (Lenta.ru, 2017, 2018a; Petkova, 2017; Yudina, 2018), the police largely neglected 
cases of vigilante attacks on migrants and other minorities. Beyond this, a collaboration 
between vigilantes and the police was not an unusual arrangement. This collaboration 
concerned not only the pro-Kremlin youth groups but extended to the nationalists 
who joined the so-called raids and “were also going side-by-side with the police and 
UFMS [Federal Migration Service]” (Rights defender I). While one of the interviewed law 
enforcement officers in Russia explained that rogue vigilantes more often get in the 
way of the police, rather than providing real assistance, collaboration, nevertheless, was 
viewed as a plausible option.
If they [vigilantes] want to help us, they should turn to us; we will find a job for 
them. Therefore, I, in fact, propose acting in accordance with the principle in 
which the Soviet druzhinas [volunteer militia] functioned. They did not determine 
the area of their own work and own actions, but the police did so. The police 
determined where it needed assistance. This is exactly the key difference between 
the currently present movements and their help…although it is hard to even refer 
to this as help. There were druzhinas that were really of help for the police or the 
militia of that time. There is a huge difference between the two. (Police I)
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Other interviewed law enforcement officers shared the sentiment of collaboration 
and stated that when it comes to law enforcement, “the police alone cannot manage, 
the society should be involved” (Police II).
Among the many disturbing acts performed by vigilantes targeting ethnic minorities 
in Russia were the so-called “white wagon” flash mobs, where the nationalists attacked 
“non-Slavic” people on a “train or subway car” (SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 
2014, para. 1). Sometimes in groups as small as five people, other times in mobs of 40–50 
people wearing “knitted and medical masks” ultra-right groups committed hate crimes 
in public transport across Russia and while doing so, enjoyed “relative impunity” (SOVA 
Center for Information and Analysis, 2014, para. 10). Moscow-based rights defender 
further explains this police patronage over vigilantes as follows:
The main idea here is to have some fun, to beat someone up, and to have some 
coordinated relation in collaboration with the police. Without this link to the 
police, this activity would not be possible. No neighbourhood officer needs 
this amateur activity at all. This is only tolerated because there is some order for 
patronage from above. This is done to prevent mass fights. If they [nationalist 
vigilantes] are already going to be there anyway, it is better to take them under 
the patronage and to take their side as these are authorised activities, in a rather 
broad sense. (Rights defender I)
An academic specialising in Russia explains this relationship as a grey zone where state 
forces find some benefit in collaboration with vigilantes. “The state is not interested 
in completely eradicating this grey zone as there is always space for negotiation here. 
I don’t think the state is very much interested in protecting gay rights or protecting 
migrant rights” (Academic I). Beyond media savviness, vigilante citizens are savvy 
about the methods they use in the context of Russia’s legal system. When someone is 
murdered, a legal investigation has to be launched by default, but when someone is 
beaten and humiliated, the victim must first appeal to the police. “When the nationalists 
switched their methods and went from murder to beating and humiliating, it became 
even harder to keep them accountable, as no one files any complaints” (Rights defender 
II). Naturally, within the state-vigilante tandem and amid an array of other nuances and 
barriers, the process of seeking justice after subjection to retaliation is challenged. “If a 
person turns to the police, especially in a small town, they essentially bury themselves”– 
a Moscow-based rights defender explained (Rights defender II). Furthermore, “turning 
to the police would cause recurrence of trauma, as victims would have to face their 
perpetrators again” (Rights defender III). Thus, even if the police were willing to take 
measures against vigilante forces, technically they would be lacking legal grounds to 
do so. A journalist from Kyrgyzstan who extensively researched and covered the life of 
Central Asian labour migrants in Russia explained the absence of legal appeals to the 
police as follows:
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There are several reasons why the targets are silent. One of the reasons is that 
whenever there are illegal activities performed affecting the target, the target 
cannot necessarily turn to the police, because many migrants are undocumented 
or have an illegal registration. If such a person turns to the police for help, they 
would have to present an immigration card, but they cannot. They cannot 
present one, because their employers do not register them. There is a violation 
on top of a violation. (Journalist I)
Even if the victim decides to turn to the police “in many cases the perpetrators are not 
arrested–and when some of them are, they are quite unlikely to be prosecuted for what 
their actions really consist in, that is, hate crimes” (SOVA Center for Information and 
Analysis, 2014, para. 10). These arrangements leave labour migrants with scant options 
for seeking justice. Gender biases, patriarchal structures and traditional masculinity 
accompanied by social frustrations in the host state, subject female labour migrants to 
yet another stratum of violence.
5.6. Female migrants in the bullseye of the home state
Female labour migrants are not only subjected to nationalism-based violence of host 
state vigilantes but also fall target to fellow compatriots. Weaponising the methods 
similar to those used against them by host state vigilantes, self-proclaimed ‘patriots’ 
target women for being “morally loose ‘traitors’ of the nation” because they establish 
relations with “men of other ethnicities (most often Tajiks)” (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 4). 
While the target is humiliated and exposed, vigilantes prefer to remain anonymous. 
One of the obvious reasons for anonymity is “the opportunity to avoid punishment”, 
yet it apparently also serves a purpose of symbolising “a de-personified category of 
‘defenders of the fatherland, patriots’” (Ibraeva et al., 2015, p. 7). Expert interviews reveal 
that the ‘patriots’ are not a single or necessarily unified formation. Groups appear to be 
acting spontaneously across Russia. Much like in the case with anti-migrant vigilantes, 
after experiencing retaliation, targets are limited in their options for seeking justice and 
face the same barriers and obstacles that prevent them from turning to the police, i.e., 
fear, lack of proper documentation, shame, the unreliability of the legal system, etc. 
5.6.1. Challenges in Being Vocal
Journalists covering the case hold an important role in their interactions with the targets. 
Sometimes, during their interviews with the targets, the journalists persuaded them to 
be vocal and to turn to the police with the hope that publicity of the case would scare 
the perpetrators and, as a result, would prevent future attacks. A journalist who worked 
closely with victims of the ‘patriots’ recalls: “One girl had written an appeal. I asked 
her to write it. She wrote an appeal to the police, to the local police [in Kyrgyzstan]. 
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They started the case. They identified these men. But nothing happened. No one was 
brought to justice” (Journalist III). Sometimes the journalists covering the case are the 
only party the victim can rely on for assistance:
I found her [target of the ‘patriots’] phone number and I called her, and I talked 
to her. Another girl, she came back to Kyrgyzstan and I found her with the help 
of the local police. They found her for me, as she was living with her parents. 
Her mother died and they [the police] helped me find her. I went there and 
interviewed her. She told me everything. We helped her. We took her to the crisis 
centre; we helped her out financially. (Journalist III)
At the same time, there are also concerns about the manner in which the journalists, 
the experts, and rights defenders respond to the issue. “What is interesting is that the 
experts and rights defenders, while having the desire to express their own stance on 
the matter, they share the videos. They, thus, contribute to the dissemination of these 
videos” (Journalist I). The stance on the issue of harms caused by traditional media 
reports is contested among the journalists themselves:
On the one hand, yes, you can view it as a perpetuation of retaliation. But, on 
the other hand, you also attract the attention of the society to a given issue. 
Many people were sharing [these videos] not because they support such acts, 
but because they were disturbed by them. (Journalist II)
Having failed to find justice, targets prefer to stay out of the media spotlight and are 
reluctant to continue cooperating with the journalists or other parties interested in the 
case. One of the interviewed journalists who had extensively written on the targets of 
the ‘patriots’ attempted to write a follow-up story on a prominent case a few years after 
the initial coverage, but the victim refused to participate. “She does not want us to write 
about her, because she has children and they might read this material” (Journalist III). 
Additional harm results when media coverage does not lead to the accountability of the 
perpetrators and instead intensifies the suffering of targets.
5.6.2. No Support on the Home Front
The society in the home state was polarised in its stance on the issue of digitally mediated 
honour beating of women by their male compatriots. One of the interviewed journalists 
provided the following account: “Many were against the methods [of the ‘patriots’], but 
some were in support. This may sound wild, but some people were supporting [the 
‘patriots’] and saying, ‘yes, this is right, our girls should not be dating others’” (Journalist 
II). The appalling supportive moods are also evident in the survey conducted by the 
United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], according to which:
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A fairly large proportion of respondents (38% of women and 45% of men) believe 
that women in migration, working away from home, begin to lead immoral life. 
On this basis, 51% of women and 55% of men support the activities of nationalist 
organisations, who “follow/or trace” the moral image of women from the Kyrgyz 
Republic, stripping, raping them and uploading their photos and “punishment” 
videos for bad behaviour. (2016, p. 155)
While condemning broader violence, state officials provide further legitimisation of the 
activities of the ‘patriots’ by scrutinising the victims. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Internal 
Affairs representative in Moscow, for instance, made the following statement on 
Facebook after the punitive videos spread online:
The view of knives and stun guns should scare anybody who has seen these 
videos. But naturally, as a brother and future father, I cannot support the lifestyle 
that some of our young women lead, which provokes a strong reaction amongst 
Kyrgyz countrymen. (International Federation for Human Rights, 2016, p. 38)
The official also added that “when they [Kyrgyz women] come to Russia in search of work, 
they cannot resist all the challenges they encounter, and they become the playthings of 
Kyrgyz, Tajik, Uzbek and Caucasian men, who take advantage them” (Lelik, 2016). These 
perceptions, moods and discourses constitute social realities where female targets of 
digitally mediated abuse are further blamed offline.
Beyond this, back in the home state, nationalist movements engaging in moral 
policing with the focus on women, sexual minorities, and foreigners are also prevalent. 
An example of such forces is the so-called Kyrk Choro [Forty Knights] movement 
claiming membership of 5,000 across Kyrgyzstan (Lelik, 2015). Kyrk Choro carried out 
several nightclub raids in the country’s capital of Bishkek where they have “lined up 
local women before a video camera” accusing them of prostitution (Lelik, 2015). Just like 
the Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ in Russia, Kyrk Choro members are concerned about Kyrgyz women 
dating foreigners and express anti-Chinese and anti-Uyghur sentiments (Chynybaeva & 
Najibullah, 2015). These cases illustrate contested morality and nationalism in the host 
state of Kyrgyz migrants and raise important questions about the perceived role and 
position of women amid these contestations.
5.7. Conclusion
Digital media is a source important affordances in the lives of migrants, providing 
the ability to connect with friends and family, store and access important documents, 
connect with people in the host state, and numerous other possibilities. Yet, it is evident 
that offline inequalities, biases, and divides transmit into the digital sphere. Groups 
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and individuals vulnerable offline are also vulnerable to online threats such as digital 
vigilantism, where visibility is exploited as a magnifier of embodied harms. Through 
the selected case study of Kyrgyz labour migrants in Russia, this chapter illustrated 
how digital divides affect vulnerabilities across and within groups. Namely, the study 
presented a scenario where offline biases penetrate online and consequently re-inform 
the offline sphere. The study, in particular, demonstrated how within such a structure, 
women are subjected to multivector scrutiny, while their ability to be vocal and seek 
justice is jeopardised. Having crossed the Russian border, a female labour migrant from 
Kyrgyzstan is subjected to police abuse, retaliation by host state nationalist groups, and 
retaliation performed by male compatriots in migration. Falling victim to citizen-led 
retaliation in the host state, labour migrants are reluctant to turn to the police, as the 
police itself is an abusive force which engages in patronage over vigilantes. As such, 
turning to the police can lead to abuse and deportation, while the chances of bringing 
perpetrators to justice are minimal. Moreover, female labour migrants experience 
additional barriers to seeking justice in the home state due to social norms and biases 
that culminate in online and offline victim-blaming and shaming. Upon returning home, 
they are confronted by their relatives, domestic nationalist groups, and the greater 
community in their neighbourhood, village/town, and beyond. Digitally mediated 
retaliation, in turn, brings about globality and permanence of exposure.
Further cross-national empirical research is necessary for a nuanced assessment 
of the digital divides and vulnerabilities in the context of social change, benefit and 
harm that digital media can produce. Specific contexts can include variable political 
environments as well as divergent social dynamics, positions, and norms. Studies could 
look beyond South-North migration and address cases in South-South and North-South 
migratory scenarios.
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Interviewees 
- Academic I. Professor specialising in Runet (Russian internet). Skype interview in 
Moscow, Russia. April 2018.
- Journalist I. Extensively covered Central Asian labour migrants in Russia. Interviewed 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.
- Journalist II. Extensively covered the case of Kyrgyz ‘patriots’. Interviewed in Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.
- Journalist III. Has access to the targets of the Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ and extensively covered 
the case. Interviewed in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. July 2018.
- NGO I. Public opinion researcher in Russia. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
- Rights defender I. Specialising in cases of xenophobia. Interviewed in Moscow, 
Russia. May 2018.
- Rights defender II. Specialising in legal aid for the victims of police abuse and 
vigilantes. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
- Rights defender III. Specialising in legal aid for the victims of police abuse and 
vigilantes. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
- Participant I. Paedophile buster. Interviewed in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
- Police I. Lieutenant colonel. Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.
- Police II. Moscow, Russia. Skype interview in Moscow, Russia. May 2018.

(Con)Trolling the web: Internet 
governance in Russia31
31 This chapter is an adaptation of the following article: Gabdulhakov, R. (2020). (Con)trolling the 
web: Social media user arrests, state-supported vigilantism and citizen counter-forces in Russia. 





This Chapter applies Haggerty and Ericson’s surveillant assemblage concept to the 
wave of social media user arrests that have been taking place in Russia in the second 
half of the 2010s. In doing so, it addresses the legislative frameworks applied to online 
self-expression; depicts the nuances of legal charges facing select social media users; 
assesses the role of formal law enforcement and vigilant citizens recruited to extend the 
state’s watchful gaze; and elaborates on citizen counter-forces resisting the tightening 
state control over the digital domain. The Chapter argues that Russia’s internet users 
appear to be trolled by the ruling elite through the use of obscure legal frameworks and 
the stampede of actors and practices where select individuals face legal charges for 
their activities on social media, while other users face no consequences for the same 
engagements. Such unpredictability stimulates self-censorship, making the system 
effective by virtue of its dysfunctionality. Methodologically, the study relies on desk 
research and field interviews.31
31 
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“For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.”
– Óscar Raymundo Benavides Larrea32
6.1. Introduction
In November 2016, a regional coordinator of Open Russia Foundation33 in Chuvashia, 
Dmitry Semenov, faced administrative charges for posts on his VKontakte page (Russia’s 
prototype of Facebook). The posts exposed Russia’s parliament member wearing 
a shirt with a sign “Orthodoxy or death” and were qualified by law enforcement as 
“production and distribution of extremist materials” (Meduza, 2017). While the police 
did not go after the politician who was the source of such “materials”, Semenov faced 
charges and was fined.34 This is one of hundreds of similarly preposterous cases that 
took place across Russia following waves of amendments to the criminal code. The 2014, 
amendments incorporated online speech into offences governed by anti-extremism 
laws. Subsequently, the 2016 Yarovaya law package intensified punishment for such 
offences (Ozerova, 2018), and 2019 “anti-fake news” legislation made it illegal for citizens 
to express disrespect of those with political power. As the definitions of “extremism” 
(Kravchenko, 2018, p. 1) and “disrespect” remain open to interpretation, a mere ‘like’ 
on social media can lead to criminal charges, sentences and fines, making all internet 
users in Russia potentially vulnerable to legal repercussions. Indeed, there has been 
a steady increase in extremism charges in Russia, with most of the cases concerning 
online speech (Romashenko, 2018).
What is the logic behind social media user arrests in Russia? What specific online 
activities can lead to litigation? To answer these questions, the study identifies legal 
frameworks and investigates formal and informal forces serving the state’s web control, 
as well as the citizen counter-forces opposing these control measures. Among state 
actors are Centre E–Russia’s extremism-countering police involved in heavy monitoring 
of the digital domain (Meduza, 2019). In 2011, the state has established the Safe Internet 
League and recruited citizen Cyberguards to monitor, identify and report on dangerous 
online content. Other pro-state vigilante formations include Je Suis Maidan [I am 
Maidan]35 and SILOVIKI [Security officers]36 who engage in what Loveluck (2019) classifies 
as “hounding” by exposing protestors, opposition leaders and activists and calling on 
the followers to retaliate on these targets.
32 Quoted by ”Lawyer I“ during interview.
33 Advocating for democracy and human rights in Russia, founded by former businessman and 
democracy activist Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
34 Semenov was fined again in 2017 for a social media post about the outcome of this court case (see 
RFE/RL’s Russian service, 2017a.). 
35 [I am Maidan] – evidently inspired by merging Je Suis Charlie solidarity movement and Ukraine’s 
Euromaidan demonstrations. 
36 Little is known about this formation’s relationship with official state security forces. On several 
occasions SILOVIKI were cited in Russia’s traditional media (see, for instance, RT, 2019). 
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Counter-forces to the state include the civil analytics project Database, which 
specialises in exposing snitches (Kustikova, 2017) and “those responsible for human 
rights violations and corruption in Russia” (Beware of Them, n.d.); the Internet Protection 
Society, opposing censorship, excessive regulation, and administrative arbitrariness in 
internet governance (Internet Protection Society, n.d.); and Roskomsvoboda, a public 
organisation “countering Internet censorship and promoting the ideas of freedom 
of information and self-regulation of the Internet industry” (Roskomsvoboda, n.d.). 
While the analysis of select user arrests seeks to identify themes in ‘offences’ that cost 
users their freedom, mapping the actors and forces allows for an informed analysis of 
their capacities, interrelations, and the clashing interests in regulation of online self-
expression.
The chapter relies on Haggerty and Ericson’s concept of surveillant assemblage–a 
compendium of surveillance practices where extra state institutions, machines, flows, 
and other components come together in rhizomatic practices that level surveillance 
hierarchies (2000). The concept is applied to the case of Russia where the ruling elite’s 
quest for securing control over online self-expression has led to the adaptation of 
strategic regulatory and punitive practices targeting users. A variety of methods and 
actors are instrumentalised by the state in this endeavour, leading to a rhizomatic 
multitude of motivations and approaches on the one hand and realisation of the central 
plan of the ruling elites on the other.
The current literature on surveillance addresses an array of issues related to Internet 
governance (Mueller, 2010), platforms (see, for instance, Surveillance & Society, 2019), 
authoritarian states (see, for instance, Surveillance & Society, 2017), and surveillance in 
post-communist societies (see, for instance, Surveillance & Society, 2018). However, the 
case of Russia requires further scholarly attention as the country represents a peculiar 
case of selectivity in the application of restrictive legislation. At the same time, strategic 
legislation adapted by the Kremlin faces challenges in implementation when actors 
struggle to serve-up to the state amid the vagueness of legal definitions. As a result, 
Russia’s digital domain and social media users appear to be trolled37 by the ruling elite 
through the use of obscure legal frameworks and the stampede of actors and practices 
where select individuals face legal charges for their activities on social media, while 
other users face no consequences for the same engagements.
The author first elaborates on the methods and proceeds to introduce theoretical 
frameworks operationalised to address the Kremlin’s attempts to discipline social 
media users. After unpacking Russia’s surveillant assemblage and discussing its past-
oriented governance measures, the author proposes and addresses three pillars for 
understanding current practices of online self-expression control in the country: (1) 
37 To Troll – “to harass, criticize, or antagonize (someone) especially by provocatively disparaging 
or mocking public statements, postings, or acts” https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/
troll.
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legal frameworks; (2) targeted individuals/online speech; and (3) state-loyal vigilantes/
citizen counter-forces. The discussion of key findings is followed by a conclusion.
6.2. Methodology
This chapter utilises desk research and field interviews. Desk research focused on 
the review of legislation and analysis of 990 criminal cases instigated against social 
media users in Russia. Semi-structured in-depth interviews (10) were conducted with 
a diverse set of informants, including lawyers working on internet-related cases (2), 
rights defenders (3), academics working on issues of internet freedom and online 
activism in Russia (3), a representative of an NGO working on public opinion analysis 
(1), and a law enforcement representative (1). Interviewees were selected based on their 
expertise in the domain of Russia’s internet governance and were recruited with the 
aim of representing various clusters of actors. The informants were asked questions 
concerning online activism, vigilantism, and internet governance in the country. 
Interviews were conducted in 2018 and 2019 in-person and via online messengers. The 
author transcribed and translated content from Russian into English. 
To protect privacy and safety of the informants, their names will not be disclosed in 
this chapter. Instead, a reference to the general position of informants will be made, i.e., 
academic, lawyer, rights defender, police officer, etc. Such anonymisation has no impact 
on the data and its quality. Legal cases addressed in the scope of this work are public 
and thus will not be anonymised. Interview materials are used throughout the text of 
the chapter in the form of short and extended quotations, providing expert and insider 
views and knowledge on given cases, notions, or practices.
6.3. Theoretical Background
Surveillance studies gained momentum in the second half of the twentieth century due 
to an increase in the “number and type of surveillance technologies” (Galič, Timan, & 
Koops, 2017, p. 10). Building on Jeremy Bentham’s panoptic architectural design, Michel 
Foucault proposed the idea of a “discipline society” in which an individual is not only 
watched but is “carefully fabricated” (Foucault, 1995, p. 217). Taking the analogy of 
prisoners and the all-seeing yet discrete guard, Foucault views power structures and 
hierarchies in society beyond the prison cell in “the relations of discipline” (Foucault, 
1995, p. 208). For several decades, Foucault’s panopticism dominated scholarship as 
the canonical foundation for conceptualising surveillance practices (for a chronological 
overview of surveillance theories see Galič, Timan, & Koops, 2017). Yet, with technological 
advances, surveillance capacities and approaches have transformed vastly since the 
1970s leading to the search for new theories and analogies.
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Proposing not to overreach in applying panopticism to contemporary post-
disciplinary-confinement surveillance practices, Haggerty and Ericson build upon 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of “a convergence of what were once discrete surveillance 
systems” in the societal shift from discipline to control (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). 
Instead, the concept of the surveillant assemblage is proposed (Haggerty & Ericson, 
2000, p. 606). The authors describe the assemblage as a sphere where there is a “desire 
to bring systems together” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 610), meaning that all separate 
clusters, institutions, mechanisms, machines, and so on are coming together in an all-
seeing and all-tracing entity. Thus, being composed of various mechanisms, the modus 
operandi of the assemblage is no longer solely state-centric since it tends to incorporate 
“extra-state institutions” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 610). As such, Haggerty and 
Ericson argue that surveillance is no longer carried out in a purely Orwellian top-down 
approach. Instead, rhizomatic practices allow for bottom-up scrutiny of the powerful 
by the wider masses and institutions through the levelling of surveillance hierarchies, 
thus bringing new groups which were “previously exempt from surveillance” under the 
watchful gaze (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 606). Escaping the gaze of the assemblage 
is a nearly impossible task, because the conglomerate of mechanisms, measures, and 
practices of control breeds the phenomenon of “disappearance of disappearance” 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 609), as social institutions are increasingly armed with far-
reaching surveillance apparatuses.
In his “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, Deleuze proposes to replace the 
concept of “individual” that was relevant to the Foucauldian discipline society with the 
concept of “dividual” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5) as surveillance is no longer body-centric. 
Haggerty and Ericson further develop the idea that not only has surveillance moved 
beyond state institutions and towards a multi-actor assemblage, but it has also moved 
beyond the physical body and towards “a decorporealized body, a ‘data double’ of pure 
virtuality” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 611). (In)dividuals, leave a constant digital trace 
by virtue of continuous scanning and storing of interactions, purchases, movements, 
expressions, habits, searches, etc.
While such turns in surveillance affordances certainly affect all social strata, online 
vulnerabilities can be directly linked to the offline precarity of persons in question 
(Gabdulhakov, 2019b). For instance, building his arguments on the example of intensified 
welfare monitoring in Canada, Hier (2003) demonstrates how by means of the surveillant 
assemblage social institutions intrude into the lives of already disadvantaged people 
with prejudicial evaluations and populist underpinnings. In the words of Eubanks (2018), 
inequality is “automated” in the system that puts “the poor” and disadvantaged people 
into further conditions of fragility. 
Over the years, the scholarly thought surrounding surveillance has moved beyond 
Foucauldian panopticism. Instead, it proposes the idea of an assemblage where amid 
the near-impossibility of avoiding ‘the gaze’ due to the rhizomatic nature of its [the 
assemblage’s] components, anyone can watch anyone. Here, of course, it is important 
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to consider various capacities of the actors involved. Beyond the departure from 
institutions and top-down surveillance, there is a departure from viewing the physical 
body as a sole subject amid digital traces that make up the digital twins of (in)dividuals. 
As per Haggerty and Ericson, “sub-assemblages” are groups, systems, and counter-
forces that are “themselves multiple,” consisting of “different discrete assemblages” 
each with their own agenda, ambitions, and approaches (2000, p. 608).
6.4. Unpacking Russia’s surveillant assemblage: Towards the ‘digital 
iron curtain’?
Having secured control over traditional media (Becker, 2004), Russia’s ruling regime 
entered a battle with content shared on social media “to consolidate an information 
dominance over citizens” (Oates, 2016, p. 399). The online sphere poses several 
perceived threats for regime stability in Moscow, including counter-narratives to official 
propaganda (Oates, 2016, p. 399), dissent, activist resistance practices (Lokot, 2018), and 
coordination of potential revolutionary forces (White & McAllister, 2013). At the same 
time, digital media is not solely a challenge but an opportunity for the ruling elite. As 
is argued by Oates, it provides a set of “particular advantages to a repressive regime 
that can proactively shape the media narrative” (Oates, 2016, p. 399). Beyond direct 
control over broadcasters through ownership and indirect control over domestic social 
media secured through the loyalty of platform owners, Russia’s political elite does not 
tolerate competition when it comes to strategic discourse. As Oates puts it, “it is not so 
much about who owns or controls the media, it is more about who is constructing and 
disseminating the most compelling national narrative” (2016, p. 399). While traditional 
media adapts its pitching tactics amid the new challenges imposed by the online 
sphere, the regime finds itself in need of taking further actions to protect its monopoly 
on digitally-dispersed information.
Current actions and practices of control applied to the digital domain resemble an 
echo from Russia’s Soviet past. The concept of post-communism implies the state of “in-
betweenness” where past legacies and “poor institutional performance and leadership” 
are preventing positive transformation in certain political contexts (Svenonius & Björklund, 
2018, p. 273). During the period of transition which in itself does not bond to any specific 
time frame, the regime, while certainly adapting to new realities with new strategies, 
may, nevertheless, turn to familiar past practices such as censorship, showcase arrests, 
adaptation of punitive legislation, and recruitment of vigilante citizens.
Selective social media user arrests are a by-product of Russia’s surveillant assemblage, 
which is programmed to secure state-approved narratives at any cost and aided by 
strategic legislation. While appearing to be inspired by The Great Firewall of China, 




Russia does not have the required resources to build a firewall, nor does it set 
such a task for itself. Russia’s regulatory framework grounds itself on the idea of 
a broad definition of restrictions with their selective consequent application... It 
is quite obvious, as a thousand people can make the same post and only one will 
suffer the consequences. (Rights Defender III, Moscow, 2018)
Therefore, Russia’s throwback to authoritarianism is accompanied by opaque conditions 
for understanding what is allowed and what is not in online self-expression. This lack of 
clarity influences the assemblage by making its function subjective and flexible in the 
hands of multiple sub-assemblages.
The term Digital Iron Curtain that appears in the title of this subsection is intended to 
illustrate this past-oriented motion in the Kremlin’s aim to control the internet. It refers to 
the Soviet Iron Curtain, which worked to isolate the Soviet people from contact with the 
‘evil West’. In Russia, the internet is framed by the regime as a “CIA tool” (Goncharenko, 
2018)–something that threatens national security and endangers users. Furthermore, 
the Kremlin is taking steps towards potential isolation of Russia’s internet users from 
the World Wide Web by making the country’s internet “sovereign” (Lindenau, 2019). The 
state justifies these measures as an intent to make the internet more stable and immune 
to external attacks, while rights defenders and activists are concerned that “sovereign 
internet” law would give the state more control and further jeopardise internet freedom 
(RFE/RL’s Russian Service, 2019).
6.5. Legal frameworks applied to social media
The web of forces comprising Russia’s surveillant assemblage certainly includes 
legislative frameworks targeting social media users. In the majority of cases, criminal 
code articles dealing with terrorism, extremism and xenophobia are applied to social 
media activity. “Nearly every day in 2017 and first half of 2018” criminal charges were 
being pressed against users over ‘likes’, posts, and other social media engagements 
(Gazeta.ru, 2018). In 2017, 460 social media users were charged under Article 282 Part 1 
(Memorial, 2018a):
Actions aimed at the incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as abasement of 
dignity of a person or a group of persons on the basis of sex, race, nationality, 
language, origin, attitude to religion, as well as affiliation to any social group, 
if these acts have been committed in public or with the use of mass media. 
(Criminal Code of the Russian Federation)
Other users faced charges under Article 280 “public appeals for the performance of extremist 
activity” and Article 205 “act of terrorism” (Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).
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User arrests based on Article 148 of the Criminal Code “incitement of hatred and 
insult to the religious feelings of believers” take root in the ‘offence’ committed by a 
protest punk rock band, Pussy Riot. In 2012, three band members performed a “punk 
prayer” in which they “danced around and shouted their song, ‘Virgin Mary, Get 
Putin Out’” (Denber, 2012). In their act, Pussy Riot simultaneously encroached on two 
untouchables in Russia– the Russian Orthodox Church and the president. Criminal code 
Article 213–hooliganism– was applied and all three members were sentenced to two 
years in a penal colony.38 This incident was followed by amendments to Article 148 of 
the criminal code of the Russian Federation in 2013 “in the aim of protecting religious 
convictions and feelings” (The Kremlin, 2013).
In addition to Article 148, amendments were introduced to other criminal code 
articles, including the above-mentioned Article 282 and Article 205 that concerns 
terrorism and public security, defining the former as:
…the perpetration of an explosion, arson, or any other action endangering the 
lives of people, causing sizeable property damage, or entailing other socially 
dangerous consequences, if these actions have been committed for the purpose 
of violating public security, frightening the population, or exerting influence on 
decision-making by governmental bodies, and also the threat of committing 
said actions for the same ends. (Criminal Code of the Russian Federation)
When applied to the social media sphere, charges under Article 205 can be 
pressed for the “reposting of blogs or other online messages” (Roudik, 2018), creating 
uncertainty and confusion as ‘likes’ and shares on social media can be interpreted as an 
endorsement of terrorism.
A Moscow-based lawyer working on social media-related cases described these 
amendments as “reactionary”, stating that “any new event leads to the development 
of new articles and amendments to the criminal code” (Interview, Lawyer II, Moscow). 
The lawyer further explained that after the amendments that expanded its scope and 
made it applicable to online activity, Article 205 has been increasingly applied to social 
media cases. “First, 282, and now a trendy one is Article 205–terrorism. Terrorism implies 
long sentences. Terrorism is a trendy article” (Interview, Lawyer II, Moscow). While the 
scope of Criminal Code articles widens and punishment for offences gets harsher, the 
“officials” can “interpret a wide range of government opposition as ‘extreme’” (Smyth 
& Oates, 2015, p. 291). Even civil servants are interpreted as a “separate social group” 
(Memorial, 2018b), and criticisms of this group on social media can cost users their 
freedom. 
In March 2019, Putin signed the law on “fake news” and “disrespect” of the 
38 Released under state amnesty in 2013, three months before the end of the sentence term.
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government, making it a crime to “insult” the authorities (The Moscow Times, 2019b). A 
month later, the law was used against an internet user (Chudovsky District Court, 2019) 
over a social media post referring to Russia’s president in an obscene manner. Focus on 
the nature of offences in social media user arrests will further illuminate the themes that 
get users into trouble in Russia.
6.6. Targeted individuals and online speech
There is an intricate approach to reporting on litigation against social media users. On 
the one hand, media reports are an important tool in showcasing the type of activities 
that are not welcomed by the regime, thus disciplining users by letting them know about 
the consequences of certain online engagements. On the other hand, an abundance 
of reports may portray the regime as overly repressive. Not all cases of social media 
user arrests are reported on in the media or otherwise made public. Internet Protection 
Society (OZI) NGO maintains a database of cases concerning online speech across the 
country. OZI compiled a map of criminal and administrative charges, starting with 
2015.39 As of October 21, 2019, the database contained 990 cases coming predominantly 
from the archives of a Moscow-based NGO, SOVA. While OZI’s map desegregates cases 
by region of the Russian Federation, date, and platform,40 it does not provide a thematic 
categorisation. The author seeks to expand the understanding of the types of targeted 
speech and individuals through his own analysis of the categories of charges. This 
classification should be regarded as a flexible structure, subject to expansion upon 
newly emerging cases.  
Among the recurring themes in online speech that cost users their freedom, 
this study identifies xenophobia (including Nazism and anti-Semitism); calls for 
unsanctioned protests; faith and lack thereof; challenging state authority (ruling elite, 
police, judges); and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This section of the chapter will provide 
several snapshots from the pool of cases to illustrate the above classification.
6.6.1. Xenophobia
Most cases of litigation against social media users concern xenophobia. The details of 
posts and activities that lead to charges, arrests and fines are not always provided by 
the police or mass media. As per pressed charges, this category of offences includes 
anti-Semitism, fascism, nationalism, Nazism, racism, ultra-right views, etc. Some cases 
concerned xenophobia targeting people from Central Asia and the Caucasus; other 
cases implied targeting ethnic Russians.
39 See https://ozi-ru.org/proekty/internet-repressii/karta/ 
40 Most of the charges concern VKontakte social network; however, cases also include activity on a 
wide variety of other platforms. 
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Following a period of tolerance towards neo-Nazi and far-right formations, Russia’s 
domestic security apparatus cracked down on both in the last few years (Petkova, 2017). 
Amid the cultural and political significance of Soviet victory in World War II, the display 
of any Nazi attributes is considered to be an extremist act. As such, the situation with 
social media posts of Nazi symbols at times reaches absurd levels as users have faced 
the law over posts in which they condemn fascism (Torocheshnikova, 2018). Moreover, 
posts about Soviet victory in World War II displaying the surrender of Nazi soldiers in 
1945 have also attracted the attention of the state (Lenta.ru, 2018b). Due to the vague 
definition of extreme speech, practically anyone can be arrested for virtually anything 
in Russia. A photo from a museum, or historical textbook, a research-related survey 
(Meduza, 2018b), or a screenshot from a movie or TV programme can get a person 
arrested or fined, while the source of the content would suffer no consequences 
(Meduza, 2017).
6.6.2. Calls for Unsanctioned Protests
Several cases of litigation over online activity involved calls for unsanctioned protests. 
Here, the assemblage reacts to the expected targets such as the opposition leaders 
and activists (Znak.com, 2017), as well as random internet users. One of such examples 
concerns a student in St. Petersburg, Oksana Borisova, who shared a post about 
an unsanctioned protest to be taking place in another city, Mineralnye Vody, on her 
VKontakte page. The next morning police came to her university to arrest her. Up to six 
officers were flown in from another region to capture Borisova, who was found guilty 
and served one day of administrative arrest (Novaya Gazeta, 2015).
6.6.3. Faith and Lack Thereof
Another recurring theme for charges pressed against social media users is centred 
around faith and atheism. Convicts are usually charged on the basis of a combination of 
several criminal code articles. Article 148 “Incitement of hatred and insult to the religious 
feelings of believers”; Article 282 “Incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as abasement 
of human dignity;” and later, Article 138 “Violation of the secrecy of correspondence, 
telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other messages” were used to press 
criminal charges and convict a 22-year-old blogger Ruslan Sokolovsky to 3.5 years of 
suspended sentence41 for playing Pokémon Go inside of a church (RFE/RL’s Russian 
Service, 2017b). Evidence was produced by Sokolovsky himself as he posted his prank 
video on YouTube, catching Pokémon inside of the Russian Orthodox Church of All Saints 
in Yekaterinburg (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Commenting on the case, Sokolovsky’s 
lawyer stated that such a harsh response is intended to “frighten and intimidate bloggers 
and other internet users in Russia and to prevent them from speaking freely online” 
41 Reduced to 2.3 years of a suspended sentence upon appeal.
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(Human Rights Watch, 2017). Sokolovsky’s name currently appears among extremists 
and terrorists listed on the website of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the 
Russian Federation (n.d.).
In another case of incitement of hatred and insult to the religious feelings of believers, 
atheist Viktor Krasnov faced charges for denying God’s existence on VKontakte social 
network (Agora, 2018a). Charges against Krasnov were eventually dropped, but his 
lawyer believes that those who initiated the case “were used by law enforcement to 
‘complete a plan’ to produce a certain number of convictions” (The Moscow Times, 
2017b). This practice of “plan fulfilment” implies that law enforcement authorities are 
assigned a quota for a certain number of cases on different offences, and “they have 
to find lawbreakers, even if the latter do not exist” (Interview, NGO employee, Moscow, 
2018).
In the Siberian city of Barnaul, 23-year-old Maria Motuznaya faced charges for 
extremism and incitement of hatred and insult to the religious feelings of believers 
under Articles 282 and 148 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation (Agora, 
2018b). Combined charges could have cost Motuznaya up to 6 years of freedom for 
the memes she posted in a private album on her VKontakte page (The Moscow Times, 
2018b). Motuznaya appeared among extremists and terrorists listed on the website of 
the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (n.d.) and decided to leave Russia in 2018. The 
case against her was dropped in 2019. 
Other cases varied thematically and included posts allegedly targeting Christians, 
Muslims, non-Christians, non-Muslims, etc. Given that Jehovah’s Witnesses are deemed 
extremist in Russia since 2017 (The Moscow Times, 2019c), several charges targeted 
related content.
6.6.4. Challenging State Authority
Even before the law on “fake news” and “disrespect of authority”, posts about civil 
servants, including the president, could lead to arrests. In 2018, Vladimir Egorov of 
Tver was convicted to “a two-year suspended sentence and three years of probation” 
(Meduza, 2018c) for a post on VKontakte where he referred to President Putin as “the 
main rat in the Kremlin” (Maetnaya, 2017). Egorov currently appears among extremists 
and terrorists listed on the website of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (n.d.).
In March 2018, 10 people faced charges of extremism under Article 282 for 
establishing an “extremist” organisation called Novoe Velichie [The New Greatness] using 
social media (Memorial, 2018c). Two of the arrested are teenagers. The case received 
wide media coverage and resulted in numerous protests known as the Mothers’ March 
(Gershkovich, 2018; Meduza, 2018d). The case of Novoe Velichie is surrounded by 
controversy and is believed to be an entrapment organised by law enforcement– “...they 
[police] developed all official documentation themselves and they rented an office for 
this organisation and they themselves turned this organisation in!” (Interview, Lawyer 
II, Moscow). 
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6.6.5. Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Russia-Ukraine conflict and the annexation of Crimea were recurring themes in internet-
related charges and arrests. In 2015, VKontakte user Andrey Bubeyev faced charges 
under Article 282 for sharing a video which referred to Russia as a “fascist aggressor” 
(The Moscow Times, 2017c) in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. Convicted to 10 
months and while in custody, Bubeyev faced new charges under Article 280 Part 1 for a 
different post on VKontakte, stating that “Crimea is Ukraine” (The Moscow Times, 2017c), 
which was interpreted as a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity (Agora, 2016). Bubeyev 
currently appears among extremists and terrorists listed on the website of the Federal 
Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation (n.d.). Among several internet 
users who faced litigation over shared music is Roman Grishin of Kaluga, charged 
under Article 282 Part 1. On his VKontakte page Grishin shared a video clip to a song by 
Boris Sevastyanov “New hit from Kharkiv: This, baby, is Rushism”, which questions and 
criticises Russia’s presence in Ukraine (SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2017a). 
What can be concluded about targeted individuals and online speech is the fact 
that cases can be categorised as genuine, tactical, practical and random. Genuine 
cases include litigation for actual cases of hate speech, although the proportionality 
of punishment is highly questionable. Tactical cases imply targeting people who are 
already ‘on the radar’, such as activists, opposition members and state critics. Practical 
cases concern instances where police officers prosecute people to fill in offence quotas 
with the aim of advancing own careers. Random cases are a side effect of the system in 
which definitions are vague and the application of the law is selective and subjective. 
There is also a certain geographical context in the nature of police reactions to 
online activity. As an academic in St. Petersburg explained:
The application of anti-terrorism legislation is geographically subjective. What 
is possible in Moscow and St. Petersburg can cost users their freedom in, say, 
Tumen. It is not just about the laws, it is about the implementation practices. 
(Interview, Academic I, St. Petersburg, 2018)
A representative of a public opinion NGO in Moscow confirms this idea of differentiation 
between Russia’s two major cities and the rest of the country, and emphasises the lack 
of clarity in the interpretation and implementation of legislation:
People who get in trouble for their posts are selected based on their activism. 
Sometimes there are random arrests, of course. Many cases come from Russia’s 
regions and not from Moscow. Perhaps, people in Moscow are more cautious or 
more informed. In general, what is allowed and what is not allowed is not clear. It 
really is a gamble. (Interview, public opinion NGO, Moscow, 2018)
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In general, litigation concerned thematically disparate topics and could target users 
simultaneously for homophobia (SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 2017b) and 
gay propaganda (Mediazona, 2018) or hate towards women (SOVA, 2018) and radical 
feminism. Although partial decriminalisation of Article 282 at the dawn of 201842 lead to 
the suspension of several cases, the system is functioning in such a way that potentially 
any social media activity can lead to charges and sentences, if necessary.
6.7. Sub-assemblages: Authorised law enforcement and pro-state 
vigilantes
To proceed further in the pursuit of unpacking approaches to social media control, it is 
important to address forces and sub-groups in the overall assemblage. One such sub-
assemblage is the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian 
Federation for Combating Extremism, also known as Centre E. Established in 2008, 
Centre E constitutes an independent unit within the police force, and its mandate 
includes “development and implementation of state policy and legal regulation, as well 
as enforcement powers in the field of countering extremist activities and terrorism” (The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, n.d.). Centre E is the main law enforcement body responsible 
for monitoring and reacting to extremism expressed online. In an interview to Meduza–a 
Latvia based online newspaper and aggregator of manually selected news, texts and 
podcasts in Russian and English languages–the Centre’s former agent explained that 
while some of the units “fight the true evil of our time” (Meduza, 2019). In principle, 
people are charged with extremism through two approaches: the first involves high 
profile “public figures who get charged after the government machine decides to ‘take 
them out’”, while the second is a product of the so-called “stick system”–police quotas 
for the number of crimes reported in a given area (Meduza, 2019). These revelations are 
illustrative of both the power in the hands of the ruling elite and its sub-assemblages as 
well as the danger of the system where police are assigned a quota.  
In terms of collaboration between vigilant citizens and police, there is an intriguing 
link. As Daucé, Loveluck, Ostromooukhova, and Zaytseva explain it, there is a 
competition-driven tension in “the coexistence of several online citizen surveillance 
models”, including “expert investigators” (internet companies and security specialists) 
and “political cyber patrols” (state-loyal vigilantes) (Daucé et al., 2020, p. 67). At the same 
time, the evolving legislation is establishing a stage for “mutual vigilance between law-
enforcement agencies and online surveillance volunteers” (Daucé et al., 2020, p. 67).
Areas of the intersection of sub-assemblages are not necessarily perceived as highly 
42 The first offence would lead to a fine of 10 to 20 thousand rubles, or 100 hours of mandatory social 
service, or arrest for up to 15 days. For a repeated offence committed within a year, the law implies 
punishment of 2 to 5 years in prison (State Duma, 2018).  
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productive by either party. As one law enforcement officer put it, “at the end of the 
day, they [vigilantes] still turn to the state, but instead of helping the state they just 
get in the way” (Online interview, Law Enforcement, 2018). When asked about potential 
ties and resemblances between Soviet-era citizen involvement in matters of justice and 
contemporary vigilantes, the police officer expressed nostalgia for the Soviet times 
when police had greater control over citizen volunteer groups (Online interview, Law 
Enforcement, 2018). These insights led to questions concerning unity in the vision of 
different sub-assemblages. Is there a unifying vector or is the system a compendium 
of broad visions, interests and motivations that are handy for the regime as long as the 
regime itself is not targeted? As an academic in St. Petersburg put it:
You see, in order for the institutions to function, people who are part of these 
institutions should possess a respective motivation. This is related to the 
size of salary, discipline, organisational issues. When people are involved in 
crackdowns on demonstrations, they do not understand themselves what they 
are cracking down on, or why they capture these people. (Interview, Academic 
II, St. Petersburg 2018)
Thus, the assemblage appears to be functional within its dysfunctionality. Weak 
institutions, lack of professionalism, and absence of the rule of law lead to a scenario 
where no one is immune to retaliation, and this uncertainty is a significant motivator 
for self-censorship. At the same time, vagueness allowed for control over each sub-
assemblage, as the diversity of motives for participation leads to diversity among 
actors willing or forced to join the assemblage without necessarily understanding its 
overarching objectives.
Sub-assemblage participants can be categorised into those generating counter-
dissent content (pro-Kremlin bloggers, trolls) and those engaged in tracking and 
reporting on dissent content (kiberdruzhinas, anti-maidaners) (Quinn, 2015). This active 
citizenry can conveniently assist the ruling elite in muting repellent voices. Contrary to 
the traditional understanding of vigilantism, which implies autonomy of citizen actors 
(Johnston, 1996), in Russia, vigilant citizens can be recruited by the state (Gabdulhakov, 
2018), sometimes representing a quasi-citizen-led force with a façade agenda.
In addition to the amended legal framework, new initiatives were passed to encourage 
reporting on crime. The previously “rare and unregulated” (The Moscow Times, 2018a) 
practice of financially rewarding citizens for their contribution to crime-solving was 
turned into an official plan by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 6 June 2018 (parvo.gov.ru, 
2018). Furthermore, under new provisions of the Yarovaya law package, failure to report 
on a witnessed crime can in itself be regarded as an act of crime which further encourages 
snitching. Beyond this, the law package has called on the telecommunication operators 
to increase their storage capacities “by 15 percent annually for the next five years” and “to 
store correspondence, audio recordings of conversations, videos” and other types of user 
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communications from 30 days to six months, depending on their type (Vesti, 2018). These 
regulations, however, are viewed with scepticism:
The Yarovaya law package will not be fully implemented, it is too costly to store 
all data in Russia and they will just not do it. As usual, there is the law, but no one 
is implementing it. (Interview, Academic II, St. Petersburg 2018)
There are several groups whose objective is to seek, expose and report on information 
and users that are perceived as dangerous. Among these groups is a collective that calls 
itself Je Suis Maidan. Based on the limited description available on its website and social 
media accounts, the group’s objective appears to be the identification of “participants 
of opposition protests”, and linking their faces to respective social media profiles 
through “various face recognition systems” (Je Suis Maidan, n.d.).43 The website features 
people across Russia with links to their social media profiles. Visitors are encouraged to 
send in photos of “the heroes” to be listed on the website. This practice is not a novelty, 
according to a Moscow-based rights defender:
The nationalists used to do this around ten years ago. They would make a post 
with a person’s full address and invite people to retaliate. There were cases when 
retaliation took place. (Interview, Rights Defender III, Moscow 2018)
It is unclear what is done or is expected to be done to protest participants exposed 
on Je Suis Maidan. The website can serve as a convenient source of ‘evidence’ for law 
enforcement and potentially encourage harassment of the listed individuals. Equally, it 
may simply lead to no outcomes. The very presence of such a platform, however, can 
potentially deter protest, assuming that having seen their own faces or other protesters’ 
faces online, people would be discouraged from participating in such events. The 
impact and popularity of Je Suis Maidan appear to be marginal, given the mere 137 
members on its VKontakte social network page (Je Suis Maidan, n.d.a.).
Another group, SILOVIKI [Security officers], describes itself as a “community of 
security departments of the Russian Federation” and enjoys a following of 65,865 
subscribers on Telegram, 6,956 followers on Instagram, 2,990 followers on Twitter, and 
660 subscribers on YouTube (data for December 2019). It is unclear who stands behind 
the group. SILOVIKI specialises in the exposure of activists, protestors, and opposition 
leaders. In some of the posts, they provide an image, full name, date of birth, address, 
phone number, vehicle description and licence plate numbers, names of parents and 
other relatives of the targets and openly call on their followers to “say hello” to the 
exposed person via the provided phone number or to “decorate” the target’s car.
43 Website no longer exists when checked in May 2021. 
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The Safe Internet League was established in 2011 with the support of the Ministry of 
Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media; the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 
and State Duma Committee on Issues of Family, Women and Children. The League’s 
objective is to find and “eradicate dangerous content through community action by IT 
professionals, industry players, and regular internet users” (Safe Internet League, n.d.). 
Under the umbrella of the Safe Internet League there operates the Kiberdruzhina [The 
Cyberguard] which, per the group’s Russian language version of the website, is a “cross 
regional public youth movement” consisting of “over 20 thousand volunteers from across 
Russia and the CIS” (The Cyberguard, n.d.a.). The League’s English version of the website 
explains that Kiberdruzhina is inspired by the “Soviet-era druzhinnik neighbourhood 
watch units” who “helped the authorities maintain law and order” (The Cyberguard, 
n.d.b.). Such a reference to the past once again underlines the re-packaged nature of 
control measures in contemporary Russia. Unlike the Soviet times, fear of punishment 
for the failure of reporting and ideological convictions alone are not doing all the justice 
anymore. Financial stimulation is used as a tool. “In Tyva, they have announced this 
competition... to compete in reporting on suspicious online activity. The victor would 
receive 3,000 rubles” (Interview, Rights Defender I, Moscow). Such rewards can lead to 
false accusations and sabotage of deviant members of communities. Money is a unique 
variable, capable of overshadowing political, ideological, and moral motivations to 
snitch. “There will definitely be willing people, especially in the provinces, they will do 
this outside of any political interest, just to make money” (Interview, Rights Defender I, 
Moscow). Diversity of motives for becoming part of the assemblage further widen its 
scope of reach. While legally obliged reporting on witnessed crime, at the background 
of the vagueness of the definition of this very crime, can lead to ubiquitous snitching; 
financial rewards for reported crime in the system with a weak rule of law can turn 
snitching into a business. This comes hand-in-hand with police forces who are assigned 
a quota to be fulfilled.
At the same time, rights defenders specialising in working with vigilantes believe 
that Cyberguards are ineffective and that “the media blows their significance out of 
proportion” (Interview, Rights Defender I, Moscow), and further add that:
The Cyberguards are a completely dysfunctional entity. There is no functional 
activity. Russia’s security apparatus is equipped with automated internet 
monitoring programmes and uses them where necessary. The only purpose of 
these Cyberguards entities is to educate the youth, to get them involved and to 
lecture them on the danger of certain ideologies.
Constituting sub-assemblages, formations such as Cyberguards, SILOVIKI and 
others, resemble a force of opportunists who can gain certain benefits from serving 
up to the state. At the same time, by recruiting such forces, the state fulfills several 
objectives at once–the watchful gaze seems to be omnipresent; citizenry appears to 
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be politically active on social media; and while searching for dangerous content online, 
technologically savvy and state-loyal vigilantes educate themselves on what is ‘right’ 
and what is ‘wrong’. 
6.8. Citizen counter-forces
At times, methods utilised in the assemblage work against the regime, as is evident 
from the case of the Cossacks (New York Times, 2013) whose involvement in the 
dispersal of a public protest on 5 May 2018 created a wide resonance. In this case, face-
recognition systems were used by regime opponents to identify individuals who beat 
the protesters. A prominent example of a counter-force to the controlling assemblage is 
the civil analytics project Database, which publishes “free-to-use investigations based 
on open data” (bewareofthem, n.d.). The website maintains a list of provocateurs, 
propagandists, law enforcement officers, judges, snitches, and civil servants among 
other actors. It is not clear how this data can be used against pro-regime actors. The 
project itself describes the applicability of their investigations as follows: 
A significant part of our work is done in closed mode and stored in encrypted 
form according to all national and international personal data legislation. Access 
to these data is granted individually on request from official authorities as part 
of the investigation. (bewareofthem, n.d.)
State support and incentives created for specific forms of vigilantism lead to inequalities 
in operation modes. As a researcher in St. Petersburg explained:
The difference between “allowed” activists and “not-preferred” activists is that 
the former enjoy access to state resources such as the FSB (Federal Security 
Service). Quite often they [vigilant audiences] post some data which is impossible 
to acquire without the assistance of special services, such as police and MVD 
[The Ministry of Internal Affairs]. (Online interview, Academic III)
Other citizen-led initiatives include the already mentioned Roskomsvoboda and 
Internet Protection Society (OZI). Both organisations counter online censorship and 
excessive internet control. While OZI is closely linked with Putin’s main opposition 
leader Alexei Navalny, Roskomsvoboda has been invited to the advisory group of State 
Duma Committee on Information Policy, Information Technology and Communications 
(Expert Committee, n.d.). In countering repressive measures of the state, the largest 
problem for counter-forces is lack of unity. As St. Petersburg-based lawyer explained:  
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I don’t believe that users can be unified in one way or another. In Armenia, we 
recently saw how the people collectively stood up in opposition to the state. This 
will not be the case in Russia because opposition or social movements will not be 
able to unite. They oppose the state from very different standpoints. (Interview, 
Lawyer I, St. Petersburg)
Thus, not only citizen counter-forces are scarce and inferior to the state in their capacities; 
they are also not necessarily unified. While technological affordances allow citizens to 
monitor and expose the “previously exempt” actors, immunities, asymmetries, and 
other capacities must be considered in this uneven landscape. In Russia, with the greatly 
defined and enforced vertical of power, the ruling elite is at an advantage despite any 
theoretical “leveling of the hierarchy of surveillance” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 606).
6.9. Discussion
In the current understanding of surveillant mechanisms applied to the digital domain, 
the virtual other, or the “data-double” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000) is constantly 
monitored and can attract institutional gaze towards the conventional self. In some 
cases, this dynamic is reversed as conventional ‘offences’ get tied to the concerned 
individual’s digital trace, leading to arrests and fines. In other words, a person facing 
charges for online speech can already be the focus of security forces for their offline 
activities. Amid the conveniently vague legislation governing online speech in Russia, 
for law enforcement authorities, it is a matter of linking one element with the other—
offline activism with the digital trace. In such instances, contrary to the “data-double” 
theorisation, the physical person is selected first. As a Moscow-based rights defender 
explained:
It is quite obvious that a person is selected first, and then they select online 
content that could be attached to the case. It is just so easy to find something 
[in the content shared online] that violates the law. (Interview, Rights Defender 
I, Moscow 2018)
Therefore, the original author of a given social media post may not suffer any 
consequences, while those who shared or otherwise engaged with this content might 
face the law depending on the nature of their offline activities. The vagueness of 
definitions and police forces equipped with quotas establish dangerous realities where 
any user can face charges over any online activity.
Hand in hand with the legislative measures, the Kremlin employs and endorses 
activists who engage in vigilantism and snitching (Gabdulhakov, 2018). The line between 
authority and citizens blurs in this regard as vigilant citizens become an extension of the 
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state. Thus, amid the increasing control over the digital domain, the state is allowing 
regime-loyal citizens to be active online, creating an illusion of citizen-led participation 
in domestic affairs while reinforcing the fear of ubiquitous surveillance and the all-
seeing gaze of the state. This dynamic opens a window of opportunity for actors willing 
to serve the state, while the actual effectiveness of such formations is questionable.
With legislative frameworks that are open to interpretation and regulations that 
criminalise failure to report on a crime (accompanied with measures that encourage 
snitching by offering financial and other rewards), it could be expected that user arrests 
would be counted in tens of thousands. Is Russia’s surveillant assemblage weak, or is 
it simply selective? What is the role of state-recruited vigilante citizens in denouncing 
users? As a Moscow-based human rights defender explained, “what is taking place 
[in Russia] today with all these ‘concerned’ citizens is a joke. It is on such a primitive 
level, you wouldn’t believe it”. Their colleague adds, “our law enforcement system is 
too weak to carry out arrests on a mass scale, they only do targeted arrests” (Interview, 
Rights Defender II, Moscow 2018). Presumably, the logic behind this measure is the 
instigation of self-censorship. Having seen others arrested for a social media post, users 
are expected to think twice before sharing or even ‘liking’ similar content. As such, the 
repressive system is rather unpredictable. However, uncertainty and unpredictability 
of the assemblage can create fruitful grounds for self-censorship, making the system 
effective by virtue of its dysfunctionality.
The regime revealed itself as both devious and inconsequential. It is devious in the 
sense that it does not skimp on the entrapment of citizens or targeting teenagers and 
single mothers. At the same time, the regime is inconsequential in its selective response 
to online offences. As is evident from the cases, content that is deemed dangerous 
when ‘liked’ or shared by some users is not removed and continues to circulate online; 
rather, the regime removes select citizens who engage with this content.
Citizen counter-forces indeed represent a scenario where, as per Haggerty and 
Ericson, those previously exempt from surveillance also fall under the gaze. Citizens 
monitor and reveal cases of rights violations and instrumentalise similar “weapons” 
(Trottier, 2017) of exposure that are used against them. However, the state (represented 
by the ruling elite) is at an obvious advantage on account of its law enforcement 
apparatus, legislative framework and technological capabilities.
6.10. Conclusion
Despite the autocratic turn in its policies following the initial liberalisation in the 1990s 
and in contrast to the perceived omnipotence of its security apparatus, when put under 
the magnifying glass, Russia’s surveillant assemblage indicates that the multiplicity of its 
components and their dysfunctionalities require the state to rely on a set of superficial 
measures designed to stimulate self-censorship. Among such measures are random 
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and selective arrests of social media users, as well as recruitment of vigilant citizens 
intended to assist the ruling elite in battling undesired online content.
Having unpacked Russia’s surveillant assemblage, this chapter provided an overview 
of the types of online engagements that can cost social media users their freedom; it 
elaborated on the means of retaliation by focusing on legal frameworks applied to social 
media offences; and it unpacked the elements (sub-assemblages) that collectively, but 
not exhaustively, make up contemporary surveillance practices in Russia. The analysis 
revealed several intriguing nuances in the Kremlin’s approaches to internet control. First 
of all, the adapted legislative framework creates an environment in which, if needed, 
virtually any online activity can be tied to repressive legislation. The applicability of 
the law, in this case, is selective. This selectivity exemplifies a reverse approach to the 
“data-double”, as conventional behaviour of an individual can lead to scrutiny of their 
digital trace.
While the Kremlin has taken respective measures to mute, eradicate, discourage, 
and otherwise limit voices that challenge its authority, Russia’s surveillant assemblage 
has a central goal but no central motivations that could unite all of its sub-assemblages. 
Motivation is a subjective concept inside each sub-assemblage, be it law enforcement, 
regional authorities, or vigilante citizens. Motives may also vary among citizen counter-
forces opposing repressive state measures; however, issues of unity and collaboration 
also come into play in this domain.
Social media user convictions in Russia are a by-product of the system where the 
desire to control defies a systematic approach. While this defiance may be interpreted 
as a weakness of the central structure, the ambiguity and monomania of the structure 
make everyone potentially vulnerable. Due to technical and financial inability to replicate 
The Great Firewall of China, Russia’s ruling elite opted for trolling the web through the 
spread of fear via repressive legislation, selective arrests, and regime-loyal citizens 
acting out in a manner that echoes the country’s totalitarian past. As Daucé, Loveluck, 
Ostromooukhova, and Zaytseva put it, Russia can be viewed as “a test laboratory for 
plural forms of citizen participation in online security” (Daucé et al., 2020, p. 67).
In the global perspective, current measures adopted by the Kremlin serve as 
examples of ‘best practices’ to other autocratic regimes, seeking to establish control 
over online self-expression. As international, regional and domestic governance of the 
World Wide Web is entering discourse at the level of the United Nations (UN News, 
2019), an informed and sober outlook on the role and influence of political, legislative, 
social, and economic realities on internet governance is urgently needed.
Further research should focus on the role of international and domestic social media 
platforms, messengers, and content sharing outlets in Russia and beyond; enriching 
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This Chapter revisits the dissertation’s six sub-questions and formulates a response to 
the main query. In doing so, the Chapter elaborates on key findings in respect to the 
historical premises for digital vigilantism in Russia. It considers the role and impact of 
online visibility for participants and targets as well as the power of traditional media 
in digital vigilantisms. The Chapter highlights vulnerabilities and immunities in digital 
vigilantism and provides an overviews of the legal premises for the emergence and 
decay of vigilante formations. It responds to state-citizen and citizen-to-citizen relations 
in digital vigilantism. The Chapter revisits the empirical and theoretical contributions 
that each study that makes up the current dissertation has made, while also addressing 
international implications of these findings. Finally, it lists limitations of the studies 




“Instructions for living a life: Pay attention. Be astonished. Tell about it.” 
– Mary Oliver 
This dissertation set out to find answers to the following questions: 1) How is digital 
vigilantism in Russia informed by historically situated practices of outsourced, 
crowdsourced, and volunteered citizen-led justice, as well as denouncing, shaming, and 
moralising of citizens by fellow citizens? 2) How is visibility (including mediated shaming, 
moralising, harassment, and embodied acts of retaliation) weaponised by participants? 
3) What motivates citizen participation in and state support of digital vigilantism? 4) How 
is digital vigilantism framed and rendered meaningful by state-owned and independent 
Russian media? 5) How is digital vigilantism experienced by targets in relation to social 
inequalities, digital divides, social frustrations and biases? 6) What are the legal and digital 
media landscapes in which vigilante practices take place in Russia?
Through the articles that make up its chapters, the current dissertation sought an 
answer to the overarching puzzle of the role and influence that social media may have 
on the relationship between the sovereign (the state) and its constituency (citizens), 
as well as the modes of socialisation among the latter within state-imposed structures 
and in spite of them. Thus, the main research question was formed as follows: How are 
practices of digital vigilantism in Russia manifested through state-citizen and citizen-
to-citizen relations? Such state-citizen and citizen-on-citizen control dynamics are 
accompanied by complex webs of other inter-relations, negotiated through traditional 
and digital media.
7.1. Historical premises
The dissertation addressed historical premises, contexts and structures of control 
through delegated citizens in Russia. Having looked back at over 100 years of history, the 
dissertation identified waves of outsourcing justice matters into the hands of citizens. 
Some waves on the historical timeline can be described as radical and extraordinary 
in their intensity, specifically when it comes to such circumstances where citizens had 
power to execute other citizens over perceived offences.  
Another characteristic of the historical context is institutionalisation of citizen-on-
citizen surveillance and control. The culmination of such institutionalisation were the 
so-called comrades’ courts which helped the state handle some of the minor mischiefs 
and take pressure off the traditional legal courts of justice. Among punitive instruments 
utilised in comrades’ courts the central role was played by shame. Colleagues, 
neighbours and other ‘concerned’ community members engaged in public shaming of 
the delinquent target in question. As the review of historical accounts revealed, people 
preferred the legal court of justice over the court of comrades’, as public shaming and 
humiliation were perceived as harsher punishment than fines or detention. 
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Historical structures of citizen-on-citizen control are also characterised by the 
ubiquity of surveillance–a phenomenon that can be referred to as the culture of 
control. Because the state encouraged and solicited deviant watch, such cultures led 
to obsessive practices. Denunciation cases, for instance, were wide-spread in the Soviet 
Russia and the culture of donos [snitching] was ubiquitous. 
Having compared historical context to contemporary practices, this dissertation 
revealed some important similarities and differences. Among the reincarnated 
approaches, the dissertation identified the role of the state in support of select vigilantes 
and collaboration between these state-approved citizens and law enforcement 
authorities. At the same time, new modes of visibility allow watchful citizens to 
potentially turn against the ‘feeding hand’ and expose corrupt elites and abusive 
police. In this regard, the relationship between vigilantes and the state is not always 
smooth and, in the case of Russia, is characterised by waves of mutual endorsement 
and condemnation. 
Among the differences between Soviet-era citizen recruitment and contemporary 
digital vigilantism in Russia, this dissertation points to the shift of central actors such as 
participants and targets. While in the Soviet times, members of the comrades’ courts 
tended to be well-respected in the society, with achievements in military service or 
labour; in contemporary Russia, state-endorsed vigilantes are young people with no 
particular prior achievements, aside for the demonstrated loyalty to the political status 
quo. On the contrary, participation in vigilante acts can grant these young people social, 
political, financial and other capital and advantages.
Informants interviewed in the course of the research recognised some Soviet-era 
traces in current vigilante practices in Russia, although perceptions were diverse. Some 
saw a positive side to active citizenry in the otherwise state-dominated public sphere. 
Others were less optimistic and worried about totalitarian turns in Russia’s governance 
practices that increasingly penetrate the digital domain. 
7.2. Digital vigilantism and visibility
While visibility is instrumentalised to harm the targets, it can bring certain benefits 
to participants. Studies within this dissertation revealed that through participation, 
vigilantes can build a name for themselves and become influential informal leaders. 
Through the use of logos, stickers, shirts and other paraphernalia, participants develop 
a brand and can even approve franchise branches across and beyond the country. Large 
audience following can bring about several benefits (albeit, often temporary)—social 
recognition, political connections, financial benefits and legal immunities. 
Through participation and consequent recognition, participants can gain social 
status. Sometimes, leaders of vigilante formations are invited to speak on national 




is an act of professionalisation of amateurs through a self-made vigilante repertoire. 
Political aspects imply formal and informal powers. Formally, some participants were able 
to build a name for themselves and run for official positions in the Russian government. 
Informally, participants who enjoyed endorsement by the ruling elite also benefited 
from such recognition both in cases of interaction with law enforcement authorities 
and in terms of media portrayal of their activities. From the financial standpoint, 
participants can generate income via various sources. Among these are state grants in 
support of activities, YouTube monetisation, advertisement, paraphernalia sales, brand 
sales, in some cases, blackmailing of targets can also be a source of income. From the 
legal perspective, visibility and recognition rendered certain immunities to participants. 
As interviews have revealed, some vigilantes were able to blackmail police officers 
by threatening to expose them online. In this case, a wide following on social media 
grants unique powers to vigilantes, sometimes exceeding those of legal authorities. In 
combination, recognition and political endorsement have granted certain immunities 
and privileges to participants. However, these benefits have shown to be temporary, 
and in Russia, highly dependent on the vision of the ruling elites.
When certain invisible lines are crossed and participants become a threat to the elites, 
visibility can be used against vigilantes. For instance, this can happen when they start 
targeting the political establishment and their relatives or attacking national symbols 
that render legitimacy to individuals in power positions. Video and photo material 
disseminated online to harm the targets can suddenly turn into pieces of evidence 
used against participants. Traditional media too can come into play by glorifying or 
condemning participation. 
7.3. The role of traditional media in digital vigilantism
Traditional media has been shown to play several important roles in the manifestation 
of digital vigilantism. First of all, traditional media outlets in Russia have been acting 
as “norm setters” and, therefore, respective framing of vigilante activities potential 
has a strong influence on public perceptions. Traditional media can (intentionally or 
otherwise) assist vigilantes in building their brand and publicity by frequently reporting 
on their activities and by framing them as heroes fighting for the greater social good. 
While doing so, traditional media can bring further harm to the targets whose unsolicited 
online exposure is suddenly broadcasted on television and printed in newspapers. 
When measures to protect the identity and other personal data of targets are not taken, 
further harm through exposure can be brought upon them. 
This dissertation identified an important quality of media powers in giving (or not 
giving) voice to the actors involved. When a case takes place and only participants are 
given an opportunity to comment via interviews, then only one side of the event is 
presented. Thus, while enjoying a large following on social media (sometimes counted 
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in millions of subscribers), vigilantes can also reach audiences that are not present 
online via traditional media.   
At the same time, traditional media outlets can turn against select groups and 
individuals and use visibility in reverse to denounce and condemn their activities. These 
dynamics and such media powers are especially explicit in contexts of strict state control 
over media, as is the case in Russia. Regime-owned and regime-loyal broadcasters 
considered within the scope of this dissertation demonstrated that they possess 
influential framing powers. But beyond this, they demonstrated flexibility in terms of 
perspective change in their reports. Youth vigilante groups went from being framed as 
national heroes to being accused of hooliganism. Amid this perspective change, targets 
that used to be framed as guilty by default were not only given the benefit of the doubt 
but were suddenly re-framed as victims. In this regard, state-loyal media is a type of 
wind vane that reads the attitude of the ruling elites towards vigilante formations. At the 
same time, among the few remaining independent broadcasters in Russia, the selected 
outlet TV Rain maintained consistency in its reports that continuously questioned 
vigilante activities. 
7.4. Vulnerabilities and immunities in digital vigilantism
While in some cases public scrutiny, exposure and shaming can have a detrimental 
effect on a target’s reputation and well-being, in other instances targets enjoy relative 
immunity. This dissertation inquired into the nuances of immunities and vulnerabilities 
by considering several types of targets—migrants, female migrants, owners of 
luxurious cars, merchants, ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, political activists as well 
as representatives of the political establishment. Depending on their offline positions, 
capitals and capacities, targets tend to experience online exposure and denunciation 
differently. 
This dissertation demonstrated that those vulnerable offline, such as political 
activists, women, sexual, ethnic and other minorities, are also highly vulnerable online. 
Furthermore, this vulnerability can come in layers and from various directions at once. 
Given that numerous thematic vigilante groups operate across Russia, at any given time 
one can simultaneously fall target to several groups. In other words, a Muslim female 
migrant from Kyrgyzstan can fall target to groups targeting Muslims, women, migrants, 
Kyrgyz women and so on, in any combination. 
After the exposure, such vulnerable groups and individuals experience further 
scrutiny and denunciation by their communities. As was demonstrated, a female 
migrant might not be welcomed in her hometown/village after being publicly 
humiliated. Furthermore, her life might be endangered back home if ‘honour beating’ 
or ‘honour murder’ are demanded by the community. The same alienation applies to 




due to stigma and law banning “gay propaganda”.44 Turning to the police can lead to 
deportation for migrants and legal repercussions as well as beating and blackmailing for 
sexual minorities. Again, if a person is vulnerable in several domains simultaneously (for 
instance, a female migrant who is an ethnic and sexual minority), they are also deprived 
of legal justice on numerous levels. From lack of legal knowledge, to fear, to lack of faith 
in the positive outcome–this research revealed numerous barriers on the path to legal 
justice pursuit for the targets. Vulnerable targets are left with few, if any options for 
restoring their good name and bringing the offenders to legal responsibility. 
On the other hand, targets with various forms of agency and capital can experience 
minimal consequences from public exposure. The rich and powerful have several tools 
available to them, including media voice, their own large following and supporters 
on social media, financial capacities to hire top lawyers, as well as the so-called 
‘administrative resource’ in the form of informal patronage by powerful people. Finally, 
when it comes to the very powerful among the elites, pressure can even be put on 
global social media platforms and revealing content can simply be removed on the 
grounds of privacy violation concerns. 
7.5. Legal premises, emergence and decay of vigilante formations
Vigilante groups, formations and individuals that were considered within the scope of 
the current dissertation tend to be in constant flux of appearing and disappearing. The 
rise and fall of participants depend on several factors, among them is the type of activity 
that they engage in, their levels of popularity and their relationship with the state. 
While the emergence of digitally mediated vigilantism in Russia can be attributed 
to far-right hate groups, many of the ‘original’ formations and their leaders are no 
longer around. Starting from 2014, openly criminal hate groups have been cracked 
down upon in Russia, in spite of the initial tolerance of their activities and even cases of 
their collaboration with police. There are several theories that informants (researchers, 
lawyers and rights-defenders) expressed concerning reasons behind the breaking of the 
relationship between the state and far-right movements. One theory is that nationalists 
were counted on in East-Ukraine operations but instead joined the contestant’s side. 
Another explanation is centred around the sudden clash of operationalised values. 
While the state relied on repackaged World War II history as a symbol of Russia’s glory 
and as a source of legitimisation for the political elites, far-right vigilante formations 
were too attracted to Nazi ideology; they were vandalising memorials and otherwise 
trolling World War II (In Russia referred to as The Great Patriotic War). Others believe that 
such sport events as the Olympic games and the world football championship played a 
44 The Russian federal law “for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a 
Denial of Traditional Family Values” adopted on 11 June 2013. 
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role, since Russia’s authorities did not want the country to appear barbaric and wanted 
to prevent local nationalist attacks on foreigners and football fan clashes. Perhaps, 
discovering the true motives is an impossible task. What is certain is that criminal cases 
against xenophobia and hate speech led to the prevalence of arrests in the ranks of far-
right hate groups. It is important to note, however, that repressive legislation was also 
applied on state critics and random social media users.   
There are several ‘core groups’ among the originally state-supported formations that 
have been around for over a decade since 2010 and continue their operations. Some of 
these groups, namely StopXam, experienced a downfall in their relationship with the 
state. The movement, once financially supported by presidential grants, faced lawsuits 
in the Supreme Court instigated by the Ministry of Justice. In spite of the court’s decision 
to shut down StopXam (a decision that was overruled once, but eventually held), its 
members continue the raids in and beyond Russia but rarely appear in the mainstream 
media anymore. On those rare occasions that state-supported media report on the 
group, they tend to be presented as hooligans rather than heroes. 
There can be several reasons behind this deterioration of collaboration between 
StopXam vigilantes and the state. One reason can be that participants crossed the 
boundaries that the ruling elites deemed forbidden. Numerous state representatives 
and their relatives appeared in the StopXam’s episodes on YouTube. Such visibility 
can be damaging to the reputation of the elites. Furthermore, in one of the episodes, 
StopXam confronted Russia’s famous athlete and four-times Olympic champion. An 
attack on the athlete of this calibre can be equated to an attack on Russia’s national 
pride, as victories in sporting events are instrumentalised for regime support. 
In general, the vision of state-vigilante collaborations has shifted. During the 
interviews, law enforcement representatives expressed their nostalgia and hopes that 
one day, numerous vigilante groups that operate across Russia would turn into the 
Soviet-era druzhina [volunteer militia formations]. In their view, groups such as StopXam 
only get in the way and true help would come if these groups were taking orders from 
law enforcement authorities. Indeed, the new generation of regime-loyal vigilante 
formations such as the Cyberguards are under the direct control and coordination of 
the police. 
7.6. State-citizen and citizen-to-citizen relations in digital 
vigilantism
While the traditional top-down control and surveillance is challenged by bottom-up 
scrutiny, the power of the state, especially in autocratic contexts, is disproportionately 
greater than that of other actors. Such power advantages are manifested through the 
monopoly on violence, strategic legislation, and collaboration with platforms through 




Russia demonstrates that political elites are extending their watchful gaze through 
citizen agents. As this dissertation demonstrated, motives for collaboration with the 
state can be multiple: 1) financial support and other material benefits; 2) informal 
support and endorsement, which can bring about social power; 3) political career 
aspirations; 4) genuine belief in the system and ideological loyalty to the rulers, etc. 
Sometimes, out of poverty, citizens can engage in vigilante activities on the promise of 
small gifts and relatively marginal income. For instance, the dissertation addressed the 
phenomenon of the Cyberguards who monitor the digital domain for content that is 
perceived as dangerous. 
Ultimately, anyone can join the ranks of the Guards, and this amateur squad applies 
its subjective and unprofessional judgment to what content and users to report on. 
In exchange for the reported content, participants receive financial rewards. A game-
like competitive environment where those who make the most reports receive gifts 
such as wrist watches and mugs stimulates snitching enthusiasm. Such environments 
of state-citizen control through citizen-on-citizen surveillance largely resemble Russia’s 
totalitarian past, when comrades were keeping an eye on each other and any deviation 
from the communist standards (listening to Western music, wearing jeans, etc.) could 
result in the donos [a snitching report]. Sometimes these reports were made out of 
jealousy or revenge. Perhaps, some of the same reasons are still present amid the 
digitalised nature of socialisation and control. 
7.7. Empirical and theoretical contributions
This dissertation attempted to make a unique contribution to literature by applying 
inter-disciplinarity to the study of digital vigilantism. Being at the crossroads of 
political science, criminology, media studies, cyber security studies and sociology–
the phenomenon of citizen involvement in mutual surveillance and retaliation over 
perceived offences requires multi-contextual and comparative approaches. Empirical 
research focused on a diverse set of cases and actors, such as thematic vigilante groups 
specialising in retaliation against drivers, labour migrants, store merchants, ethnic 
minorities, sexual minorities and political activists. 
Empirical studies that make up this dissertation relied on multiple methodological 
approaches and included qualitative content analysis of traditional media reports; 
qualitative content analysis of digital products produced by vigilantes; on- and offline 
observations; semi-structured in-depth interviews; and desk research of legal cases. 
These methods were often used in combination, or as a “blend” (for an example of 
netnographic blended methods see Fenton & Procter, 2019). Studies utilising content 
analysis as a primary method, for instance, benefited from interview data that further 
enriched and strengthened the empirical grounds on which analyses were constructed. 
Focusing on content produced by participants allowed for a detailed illustration of 
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the discourse in vigilante practices when it comes to target framing and justification 
of citizen-led justice. This analysis too was accompanied by netnographic (Kozinets, 
2019) observations–continuous monitoring of various formations and groups in their 
online habitat. Such online observations allowed the researcher to present a multitude 
of nuances in group description sections, with the focus on various online platforms. 
At the same time, it was important to consider the role of traditional media in digitally 
mediated citizen-led justice and to make offline observations of participants in action. 
Such a combination of methods allowed for a comparison between the three domains 
–participation streamed online, broadcasted on television, and taking place in real-
time offline. Online self-presentation of vigilante groups can make them appear greater 
and more omnipresent than they may be in real life. News media, in its turn, play in 
important role in lending vigilante practices meaning, be it justification, endorsement 
or condemnation.  
Relying on the existing conceptual approaches to vigilantism and its digital 
manifestation, this dissertation contextualised the existing theories and contributed to 
their expansion by focusing on cases that had been missing in the literature. Namely, 
the dissertation demonstrated that the notion of autonomy in vigilantism is not 
categorical and can be challenged in some contexts. Furthermore, studies that make 
up the current dissertation revealed the phenomena of vulnerabilities and immunities 
to exposure and retaliation. By focusing on both traditional and digital media, this 
dissertation underlined the importance of the audience in online punitive acts. Without 
the audience, not only the intensity of retaliation is challenged but the very punitive 
act itself. 
When it comes to audience, one may wonder about the difference between being an 
‘innocent spectator’ and a participant by virtue of watching, ‘liking’, sharing, commenting 
on and otherwise engaging with YouTube videos shared by vigilantes. Audience 
members not only ensure that exposure is punitive, but they can also contribute to the 
severity of such punishment. In this regard, digital vigilantism as a punitive practice can 
be compared to Foucauldian “spectacle of punishment” where akin to the medieval 
times, the audience is present at the scene of public torture and execution. In the same 
way it was done centuries ago, some audience members may sympathise with the 
victim, but will they speak up in the victim’s defense? While spectating, the audience is 
taught a lesson that some behaviour can lead to punitive outcomes and that essentially 
anyone can be in the place of the tortured subject. Foucault argues that such public 
torture of the past focused on damaging the body, while punitive measures of the 20th 
century in the form of prisons and insane asylums damaged people’s souls. In digital 
vigilantism the two can merge. When a person is physically attacked–their body is in 
pain; when this attack is filmed and shared online for the global audience to see in 
perpetual manner, a person’s dignity and reputation are also destroyed.  
While some may argue that in certain cases punishment of targets is justified 




they would not face punishment by police, it is important to be reminded that in digital 
vigilantism due process is absent and presumption of guilt defies any presumption of 
innocence. Moreover, groups and individuals vulnerable offline tend to be even more 
vulnerable online. 
7.8. International implications
While studies that make up the current dissertation were focused predominantly on 
Russia, there are several international implications to consider. First of all, there is a 
certain spill-over effect of Russia’s institutionalised digital vigilantism, as branches 
and franchises of thematic groups such as StopXam and Hrushi Protiv emerge in other 
former Soviet states such as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, and far beyond, as was 
demonstrated by the case of Mal Estacionado in Peru. The franchising phenomenon 
demonstrates the international demand for digital vigilantism on the one hand, while it 
strengthens the position and further increases popularity of the original Moscow-based 
formations, turning them into a force that can potentially be perceived as omnipresent 
on the global scale. Furthermore, foreigners subjected to vigilante retaliation in Russia, 
such as labour migrants from Central Asia, may take on the practice and retaliate on 
other vulnerable individuals within their own ‘community’. In this regard, people 
attacked by nationalists in the host state may in fact be nationalists themselves in the 
home-state context. 
There are certain themes in digital vigilantism that appear to be globally present. 
Among these are paedophile-busting campaigns, anti-corruption investigations, and 
reactions to antisocial behaviour such as parking on sidewalks or littering. At the same 
time, the universality of such cases must be addressed with caution as contextual 
nuances matter significantly. In various contexts, paedophilia is often confused with 
homosexuality; anti-corruption campaigns may turn into an instrument in the hands 
of the ruling elites to get rid of political opponents; and acts perceived as offensive 
in one context may be taken as a norm in another. Thus, there are legal, political and 
sociocultural nuances at play. 
A study that was conducted within the project but was not included in the current 
dissertation addresses recurring themes in digital vigilantism in the Russian, Chinese 
and Anglo-American contexts (Huang et al., 2020). While Russia’s StopXam participants 
claim to be indiscriminate, they frequently target drivers of expensive cars with 
VIP licence plates. In Chinese cases of digital vigilantism and online public scrutiny, 
luxurious cars are also a frequent subject. Public reactions are often provoked on the 
grounds of class-struggle narratives. In both Russian and Chinese cases, scrutiny over 
road offences performed by people in luxurious cars leads to further denunciation. At 
the same time, in the considered cases coming from the Western world, where bad 
parking and other traffic violations are exposed, public scrutiny tends to disregard 
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socioeconomic and political structures affiliated with class awareness. As such, while 
digital vigilantism is a universal practice, nuances are subjective and do not necessarily 
translate across contexts. This observation indicates that legal and political structures 
as well as sociocultural perceptions can impact how cases of digital vigilantism emerge, 
how they are justified and how consequences are handled. 
7.9. Limitations and further research
While the current dissertation theoretically and empirically addressed the phenomenon 
of digital vigilantism from an interdisciplinary and multi-method perspective, there 
are certain limitations to the study. From the theoretical point of view, counter-state 
vigilante formations require further conceptualisation that would help create vivid 
categorial differentiations between political opposition activities and Rosenbaum and 
Sederberg’s “regime control” vigilantism. Would this categorisation depend on political 
context? Given the absence of other legal mechanisms to oversee the ruling elites and 
fundamental suppression of genuine opposition in a particular case, would watchful 
and digitally-savvy citizens exposing these elites be qualified as digital vigilantes as 
opposed to being just political activists? Or is this something that is practice-focused, 
where in spite of the political context, when opposition members weaponise visibility 
they can be qualified as digital vigilantes? Political science perspectives would be 
helpful in this pursuit. 
In spite of the recent wave of scholarly attention to the phenomenon of vigilantism 
and its digital manifestation, there remain important nuances that require further 
empirical investigation. From the empirical point of view, more attention could have 
been paid to social media comments as important artifacts in measuring audience 
perceptions of vigilante acts. Digital cultures, practices and affordances are in a constant 
state of evolution and, therefore, further studies would also need to respond to new 
sets of vigilante repertoires. Research could focus on comparing various contexts to 
investigate participants and their motivations as well as audience feedback to these 
practices. What circumstances create entrepreneurial opportunities in participation? 
Studies on this subject could be beneficial for respective policy decisions, legal 
provisions and platform regulation schemes, which could work towards discouraging 
opportunistic and income-seeking practices that harm others. 
Another important area that requires continued multi-contextual attention 
concerns targets and their experience with the impacts of retaliation. What are some 
best practices in helping targets cope with consequences of public exposure? In this 
domain researchers should seek collaboration with rights defenders, NGOs specialising 
in online crimes and, if possible, legislators. Per Foucault’s “power of discourse”, 
operationalisable definitions of (digital) vigilantism can not only be helpful in academic 




As platforms become increasingly powerful to the point that they can mute the 
president of the United States, their role in facilitating social justice must be addressed. 
In this regard, corporate powers in muting certain voices and giving agency to others 
require urgent scholarly attention. What precedents are created when people are 
muted? How will these powers play out in different political contexts and amid realities 
where domestic and regime-loyal platforms engage in silencing of critical voices? 
In this rapidly-changing domain, researches should keep an eye on the future. As 
algorithms continue to penetrate all sectors of human interaction, perhaps exposure 
and retaliation too will eventually be taken over by artificial intelligence. 
I urge researchers in different fields to address the phenomenon of digital vigilantism 
from interdisciplinary perspectives and utilising blended methods. This is a challenging, 
yet scientifically intriguing and socially significant phenomenon requiring a multititle of 
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Annexe I. Content analysis guide for Hrushi Protiv YouTube videos 
After the process of watching all episodes and performing open coding, the following 
questions helped construct axial codes and extract respective discursive observations. 
Episode title
Any reference to violence in the title?
Any reference to targets in the title?
What other language nuance are observed in the title?
Date of uploading 




Number of comment 
Who is targeted? Store? Open-market?
What are participants wearing? 
How many participants in episode?
How many targets?
Police present/absent?
Any ‘guest raiders’ such as celebrities?
What language is used by participants towards targets?
What language is used by targets towards participants? 
What language is used by participants/targets towards police?
What language is used by police towards participants/targets?
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Methodological guidelines for FDD by Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008, pp. 98-99
BOX 6.1 Some Methodological Guidelines for Conducting Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis
Selecting a corpus of statements 
A corpus of statements are samples of discourses that express a relationship between ‘rule’ 
and ‘statements’. Criteria for selecting statements might include:
samples of text that constitute a ‘discursive object’ relevant to one’s research
samples that form ‘conditions of possibility’ for the discursive object
contemporary and historical variability of statements:
- i.e. how is the same object talked about differently?
- i.e. how and why do statements change over time?
Identify and collect texts:
- i.e. policy documents, intellectual texts, newspapers, semi-structured 
interviews, autobiographical accounts, ethnographic observations and 
descriptions, etc. 
Problematizations
Problematizations are examples where discursive objects and practices are made 
‘problematic’ and therefore visible and knowable. They often form at the intersection of 
different discourses and expose knowledge/power relations. Problematizations serve an 
epistemological and methodological purpose: they allow the analyst to take up a critical 
position in relation to research and they allow the analyst to trace how discursive objects are 
constituted and governed. 
Technologies 
Technologies are practical forms of rationality for the government of self and others. 
There are two kinds of technologies appropriate for psychological inquiry: power and self. 
Technologies of power seek to govern human conduct at a distance while technologies of the 
self are techniques by which human beings seek to regulate and enhance their own conduct. 
Technologies are also ‘truth games’ realized on a large political scale of among local specific 
instances of interaction – e.g. the rhetorical function of language. 
Subject positions
Identifying subject positions allows the analyst to investigate the cultural repertoire of 
discourses available to speakers. Not only are they positions on which to ground one’s claims 
of truth or responsibility, but they allow individuals to manage, in quite subtle and complex 
ways, their moral location within social interaction. 
Subjectification
Subjectification refers to an ‘ethics’ of self-information. How do subjects seek to fashion and
transform themselves within a moral order and in terms of a more or less conscious ethical
goal – i.e. to attain wisdom, beauty, happiness and perfection? Through which practices and
by what authority do subjects seek to regulate themselves?
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Annexe II: StopXam in Traditional Media: Protocol for Data 
Collection, Coding, and Report Production
According to the selected method, initial questions are raised during the protocol 
stage, which consists of “a list of questions, items, categories, or variables that guide 
data collection from documents” and tend to be “fairly short, often having a dozen or 
fewer categories” (Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 72). I formulated several questions: 
How are StopXam vigilantes represented in the news? How are the targets represented 
in the news? How are police forces represented in the news? Who is given the voice in 
the reports?
In addition to these questions, the following initial categories began to take shape 
and informed the protocol:
1. Broadcaster
2. Date of the report
3. Headline
4. Frequency of reporting by number of news pieces per broadcaster
5. Location of the event
6. Framing of participants
 a.     Activists/volunteers/hooligans
 b.     Doing the right thing
 c.     Not doing the right thing
 d.     Motivation
7. Framing of targets
 a. General background markers such as: male/female/Slavic/non-Slavic/rich/
famous/poor etc.
 b.    Guilty
 c.     Innocent
 d.    Consequences of retaliation
8. Framing of state bodies: (dys)functional?
9. Nature of retaliation
10. Voice given to: participants, targets, police, state representatives, other actors?
11. Images and other multimedia (videos, links) accompanying the report: provided by 
participants?
12. Miscellaneous codes
13. Summary of the initial observations
Coding
Altheide and Schneider are cautious about coding and using specialised computer 
software when it comes to qualitative data analysis, as these programs “cannot deal 
with meaning, but deal with only common words” (2013, p. 72). The current research is 
mindful of these issues and relied on coding software—but not out of a desire to find 
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repetitive wording in reports. On the contrary, the software helps to go beyond and 
apply the three steps of coding: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. As 
Starks and Brown Trinidad put it: “The objective of a discourse analysis is to understand 
what people are doing with their language in a given situation. Thus, the coding 
phase for a discourse analysis entails identifying themes and roles as signified through 
language use” (2007, p. 1376). In this regard, the coding phase helped identify themes 
and nuances in the analysed reports, while a thorough contextual analysis is supported 
by a compendium of markers such as tone of the reports as well as featured voices and 
portrayed parties.
Data Analysis
Altheide and Schneider describe this phase as one that “consists of extensive reading, 
sorting, and searching through your materials; comparing within categories, coding, 
and adding keywords and concepts; and then writing minisummaries of categories” 
(2013, p. 72). Indeed, the data analysis phase involved a thorough analysis of every 
document, which allowed identification of certain recurring themes and approaches to 
framing and portrayal of actors involved: participants, targets, police, etc.
Report  
This step involved summarising each of the categories in a paragraph, using illustrative 
materials where appropriate, including descriptions and quotations. The author 
elaborates on general observations concerning StopXam’s portrayal within and across 
selected broadcasters and specific themes (supported by direct quotes from the reports). 
The report section features a year-by-year coverage of media analysis. The discussion 




Annexe III: List of interview participants 
Interviews 
2018 Actor Actor location Mode 
1 Academic researcher specialising in 
online activism in Russia
St. Petersburg Skype interview
2 Academic researcher specialising in 
online activism in Russia
St. Petersburg Skype interview
3 Academic researcher specialising 
in digital media use, blogging, and 
journalism in Russia 
Helsinki, Finland Skype interview
4 Academic researcher specialising in 
Russian media 
Helsinki, Finland Skype interview
5 Academic researcher specialising in 





6 Federal penitentiary service of Russia Moscow, Russia Skype interview
7 Federal penitentiary service of Russia Vladimir, Russia Skype interview 
8 Federal penitentiary service of Russia Ryazan, Russia Skype interview
9 Federal penitentiary service of Russia Ryazan, Russia Skype interview
10 Journalist covering ‘honour beating’ of 
female Kyrgyz migrants 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan In-person interview
11 Journalist covering ‘honour beating’ of 
female Kyrgyz migrants
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan In-person interview 
12 Journalist covering ‘honour beating’ of 
female Kyrgyz migrants
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan In-person interview 
13 Lawyer working on internet 
governance cases 
St. Petersburg, Russia In-person interview 
14 Lawyer working on social media user 
arrests cases 
Moscow, Russia In-person interview 
15 NGO Moscow, Russia In-person interview 
16 NGO Moscow, Russia In-person interview
17 NGO Moscow, Russia In-person interview 




in Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands
19 Participant St. Petersburg, Russia Skype interview
20 Participant St. Petersburg, Russia Skype interview
21 Participant St. Petersburg, Russia Skype interview
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22 Participant Moscow, Russia Skype interview
23 Participant Moscow, Russia In-person interview 
24 Rights defender specialising in 
vigilantism 
Moscow, Russia In-person interview 
25 Rights defender specialising in 
vigilantism
Moscow, Russia In-person interview 
26 Rights defender specialising in far-right 
nationalism 
Moscow, Russia In-person interview 
Interviews 
2019
Actors Location Mode 
27 Academic/Researcher St. Petersburg, Russia In-person interview
28 Academic/Researcher Moscow, Russia In-person interview
29 Internet-freedom NGO Moscow, Russia Skype interview
30 Social media user arrests monitoring 
NGO
Moscow, Russia Skype interview
31 NGO Moscow, Russia In-person interview
32 Participant ‘Mal Estacionado’ (StopXam 
endorsed)
Lima, Peru Skype interview
33 Participant ‘Mal Estacionado’ (StopXam 
endorsed)
Lima, Peru Skype interview
34 Participant Moscow, Russia In-person interview
35 Rights defender specialising in 
vigilantism. Follow-up interview
Moscow, Russia Skype interview
36 Target in exile Latvia, Riga Skype interview
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Greet, thank, gather consent 
Focus on participant profile
How old are you?
What is your occupation? 
How long have you been a member of (insert group name)?
Why did you join the group? (or establish the group, if speaking with the founders)? 
Focus on group
How would you describe the focus of your group? Does it have a particular cause or 
goal?
How many active members are in the group?
How can one become a member of your group?
Focus on online audience
Tell me about your digital support (dotcomrades, online endorsers)? 
How big is your audience? 
How would you describe your audience? (age, interests, location, etc.)
Focus on relation with state 
How would you describe your relationship with the state (policymakers, police, etc.)?
Can you describe any developments over time in terms of how the state/police has 
treated you, or how you have worked with them?
Under which circumstances does police seek cooperation with you/you seek cooperation 
with police? 
Do you see any resemblance of the Soviet-era citizen-led justice in your activities, like 
comrades’ courts? 
What sources of inspiration have informed your group?
Focus on the use of social media and mobile devices
How do you use social media platforms for your cause? 
How do you use mobile devices for your cause (this would depend on the type of group/
activities)? Some may have professional camera crews, others may be more clandestine, 
or depend on citizens submitting footage/evidence through their own devices)?
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What if it was no longer possible to use the internet and social media, how would you 
go about your activities? 
Based on this scenario, how would you describe the function that social media and 
mobile devices serve in your activities/movement?
How are the videos that you upload on social media generated and processed?
Focus on other groups and counter narratives 
What do you think about other groups involved in similar activities?
How would you describe your collaboration/partnership/relationship with this/these 
group(s)? Are there any ‘fakes’ (insert group name) that take advantage of your brand 
and if so how do you address sanctioned/unauthorized franchising?
What is your reaction to counter-narratives and criticism to your activities online/in the 
media/public discourse? 
Are you satisfied with the way mass media represents your organisation?
Closure 
How long do you plan on participating in this cause? 
Where do you see yourself in the future (5 years, 10 years)? 
Questions for Targets:
Intro
Greet, thank, gather consent 
Focus on target profile 
How old are you?
What is your occupation?
Experience  
Would you please describe what happened to you?
How would you describe the video/photo/exposing material you were featured in?
When did the incident [confrontation or denunciation by group?] occur?
What were your immediate actions after the incident?
What were your immediate feelings after the incident? 
Did you turn to anyone for assistance (relatives, friends, police, layers, NGOs, other 
groups, counter-movements, etc.)?
Did anybody come to assist you without you asking?
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Perception of digital vigilantism 
What is your perception of citizen-led justice in Russia? 
Do you see any resemblance of the Soviet-era citizen-led justice in their activities, like 
the comrades’ courts?
Why do you think people engage in digital vigilantism?  
How did the media cover your cases/similar cases?
How reflective was it of what really happened?
Were you able to share your position on the event somehow (in mass media/on social 
networks)? 
If yes, can you describe how this took place, and what your message was?
What was the reaction of state and its representatives to your case?
If you ended up in the same situation again approached by (insert group name) how 
would you act?
Questions for Police/NGOs/Journalists/Academics:
What is you professional or personal stance on citizen-led justice in Russia? 
How do you perceive groups such as StopXam, Hrushi Protiv, etc.?
How did these citizen-led justice groups emerge in Russia? (any historical links to USSR?) 
Have you ever dealt with participants/targets of digital vigilantism in your work? 
If yes, could you share your experiences?
When did digital versions of these groups begin to be a factor in your professional 
duties?
Do you think digital vigilantism is a helpful tool for police or do these practices “get in 
the way” of your work? 
Are there specific circumstances (ex: type of crime) that make vigilantism more 
acceptable in your view?
Are all groups participating in digital vigilantism similar (in terms of composition, aims, 
public perception), or are there variations?
Why do you think people engage in digital vigilantism?
In terms of social harms, in the case of digital vigilantism is there danger of wrong 
accusation/proportionality/legality of retaliation? 
What about discrimination (against various categories of individuals and groups)?
What recommendations would you have for your organisation (or the government 
more generally, or other agencies perhaps in other countries) who may be dealing with 
citizens monitoring, denouncing and pursuing other citizens online?
What is your vision on the future of digital vigilantism in Russia? 







Digital vigilantism in Russia
Citizen-led justice in the context of social change and social harm
This dissertation attempted to find answers to the following questions: 1) How is 
digital vigilantism in Russia informed by historically situated practices of outsourced, 
crowdsourced, and volunteered citizen-led justice, as well as denouncing, shaming, 
and moralising of citizens by fellow citizens? 2) How is visibility (including mediated 
shaming, moralising, harassment, and embodied acts of retaliation) weaponised by 
participants? 3) What motivates citizen participation in- and state support of digital 
vigilantism? 4) How is digital vigilantism framed and rendered meaningful by state-
owned and independent Russian media? 5) How is digital vigilantism experienced by 
targets in relation to social inequalities, digital divides, social frustrations and biases? 6) 
What are the legal and digital media landscapes in which vigilante practices take place 
in Russia?
Through the articles that make up its chapters, the current dissertation sought an 
answer to the overarching puzzle of the role and influence that social media may have 
on the relationship between the sovereign (the state) and its constituency (citizens) as 
well as the modes of socialisation among the latter within state-imposed structures 
and in spite of them. Thus, the main research question was formed as follows: How are 
practices of digital vigilantism in Russia manifested through state-citizen and citizen-
to-citizen relations? Such state-citizen and citizen-on-citizen control dynamics are 
accompanied by complex webs of other inter-relations, negotiated through traditional 
and digital media.
Chapter overview
Citizen-led Justice Then and Now
This research project began with the investigation of sociocultural factors and historical 
practices related to outsourcing legal matters to citizens in Russia and their impacts on 
the current manifestation of digitally mediated citizen-led justice. It should be noted 
that the state has compelled citizens to exercise justice over other citizens since the 
early formation of the Soviet empire (Sieglebaum, 1992). Therefore, Chapter II “Citizen-
led justice then and now: From comrades’ courts to dotcomrade vigilantism” addresses 
Soviet-era delegation of certain legal matters into the hands of citizens. The following 
questions are addressed in the chapter: What are the similarities and differences 
between conventional communist and digitally mediated post-communist vigilantism 
in Russia? What role does the state play in manifestations of mediated citizen-led justice 
in post-communist Russia?
The involvement of citizenry in vigilante and judicial duties was institutionalised by 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s with a 
formal introduction of comrades’ courts (Gorlizki, 1998, p.403). The courts aimed to “...
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explore matters of everyday morality and address instances of improper behavior by 
those who depart from the norms of socialist community life” (materials from the XXI 
Communist Party Congress cited in Gorlizki, 1998, p. 424). The courts addressed minor 
mischief, poor performance at work, hooliganism, alcoholism, asocial behaviour and 
the like; they were granted the power to assign and execute punishment or transfer 
the case to other state organs, should the severity of a given offence be outside of the 
scope of amateur judges, i.e., fellow comrades (Supreme Council of RSFSR, 1961). 
Public shaming was practiced in the form of the so-called “black boards of shame” 
where photographs of deviant community members were displayed for the public eye. 
In fact, these boards of shame had an antipode in the form of “red boards of honor” 
displaying hardworking communists (Bondarev, 2012). Such methods of public display 
and shaming resemble modern practices of exposure, where social media platforms 
serve as spaces for “flagging” other citizens when they litter, deliver poor service, or 
otherwise commit perceive misconduct (Loveluck, 2019). These systems in the context of 
Russia’s social organisation provide a historical socio-cultural foundation for organised 
vigilante groups to take collective action against a perceived offence and to exercise 
moralisation and public shaming. 
In the current dissertation, the role of the state is addressed as a traditional power 
and violence monopolist and, in the case of Russia, as a media superpower (Orttung & 
Walker, 2013; Lipman, 2017; Freedomhouse, 2017). Contrary to the perceived autonomy 
of vigilantes (Johnston, 1996), in Russia, successful vigilante movements are approved 
and supported by the state. The chapter, thus, investigates nuances and complexities 
of this relationship, inquiring into the characteristics and practices that can grant state 
approval or, on the contrary, spark counter-measures. Some aspects of the Soviet-era 
collective justice, such as shaming and moralisation, indeed appear to have reincarnated 
in the digital domain. Other nuances, however, have either evolved or are unique due 
to the novelty of social media affordances. For instance, in the Soviet era well-seasoned 
members of the society were granted participatory powers in moralising other citizens; 
in contemporary Russia, however, these actors have been replaced with digitally-savvy 
youth who can gain social recognition by participation. 
Vigilantes, their Media Products and Motives for Participation
Having addressed historical premises, the dissertation zooms in on contemporary 
state-supported groups. The new era of organised and institutionalised vigilantism in 
Russia begins in 2005 with the formation of a pro-Kremlin youth group ‘Nashi’ [Ours] 
which “played an important role in political socialization of young people” (Krivonos 
& Fedorova, 2014). After its dissolvement in 2012, Nashi left behind such federal-level 
movements (with franchise branches across the country) such as ‘StopXam’ [Stop a 
Douchebag] combating bad parking and traffic violations, and ‘Hrushi Protiv’ [Piggy 
Against] specialising in detection of expired produce in grocery stores and markets. Both 
groups were founded in 2010 by former commissars and members of Nashi movement. 
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These groups have benefited from state grants under the Presidential Program for NGO 
Support (Rubin & Rustamova, 2014; Rustamova, 2015). 
Both StopXam and Hrushi Protiv operate in similar modes, a group of participants 
approaches its target and confronts offensive behaviour while filming the process. 
Confrontation often leads to the use of obscene language and violence, sometimes 
escalating into group fights. Videos are edited, uploaded on YouTube, and shared across 
various social platforms. Chapter 3 “YouTube as a stage for vigilantism and politicised 
citizen-led justice in Russia” features Foucauldian discourse analysis (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008) addressing power positions between participants, targets and law 
enforcement. Videos were analysed with regards to both speech and images, with the 
focus on participants’ self-portrayal, framing of targets (often ethnic minorities and 
labour migrants), and portrayal of police forces (who are sometimes invited to the scene 
both by participants and by targets) and other formal and informal actors (state officials 
and popular artists).  This chapter, thus, raises the following question: Amid the ongoing 
crackdown on online self-expression in Russia, what types of citizen-initiated forms 
of online activism are tolerated and even endorsed by the government and why? In 
addition, three support questions are raised: What are the motivations for participation 
in digital vigilantism? What are the impacts of digital vigilantism on targets? What is the 
role of platform affordances and regulation in digital vigilantism? 
Focusing on vigilante media products, the chapter contributes to literature by 
unveiling various power hierarchies and webs of interests in state-citizen and citizen-
to-citizen justice provision. It offers a detailed account of how vigilante formations such 
as Hrushi Protiv acquire financial, political, and other benefits from their activities. By 
being loyal to the ruling elites and by not crossing the boundaries that could potentially 
harm these elites, such formations as Hrushi Protiv are allowed to operate in the 
otherwise controlled digital and public domains. The government gains benefits from 
such citizen-critical publics. First of all, the blame is taken off the political elites and 
policies. Citizen-critical publics elevate on-the-ground unscrupulousness, as opposed 
to challenging the system itself. At the same time, amid control intensification, the 
government may aim to appear less repressive than it is by demonstrating a façade of 
civil society activism in the country. 
The analysis revealed a bias towards merchants of non-Slavic descent, as the group 
deems people from the Caucasus and labour migrants from the former-Soviet Central 
Asian republics responsible for expired produce on the shelves of Russia’s stores. Via 
monetisation options, platforms allow participants to generate an income, acquire 
a large following, advertise, and create discourse through their own social media 
channels. As such, platforms enable an environment in which digital vigilantism is 
manifest. This environment, however, is subject to domestic regulation in the specific 
internet governance context.  
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Heroes or Hooligans? 
After looking at the digital media products, the dissertation proceeds to consider the 
role of traditional media in framing participants, targets, law enforcement and other 
actors. Media discourses surrounding the phenomenon of digital vigilantism more 
broadly are addressed in Chapter 4 “Heroes or hooligans? The role of traditional media 
in rendering digital vigilantism meaningful”. This chapter aims to expand theoretical 
frames of definitional dimensions of vigilantism by addressing the role of audience and 
traditional media in the digitally mediated manifestation of this phenomenon. It aims 
to do so by addressing the following questions: How are StopXam participants, their 
targets, and police forces portrayed in Russia’s traditional media? What is the role of 
traditional media in rendering digital vigilantism meaningful? Motives for participation 
by groups and individuals as well as harms experienced by targets are evaluated at the 
background of social biases and frustrations that penetrate the digital domain and, 
consequently, re-enter offline discourses. 
This chapter focused on StopXam and considers the portrayal of the group, 
its targets and police forces in Russia’s pro-state and independent media outlets, 
investigating the role of traditional media in the manifestation of digital vigilantism. 
The chapter draws its sample from Russia’s top broadcasters: Channel One, NTV, Ren 
TV and Rossiia-24. State controlled media in Russia is a norm-setter that represents the 
position of the ruling regime on both domestic and international issues. Qualitative 
content analysis of reports on StopXam is used to shed light on the media perception 
of the role and meaning of digital vigilantism in the society. By looking at the eight-year 
period between 2010 and 2018, the chapter illustrates the evolution in the coverage 
of StopXam and links narrative fluctuations to greater socio-political processes in the 
country. In addition to these state-loyal broadcasters, the study features TV Rain—an 
alternative voice that had to move all of its broadcasting online due to state pressure 
and inability to deliver content via cable. 
All selected channels maintain websites with archived news blocks in the form of 
videos and transcribed text. News reports were sought by typing variations of the 
group’s name spelling in the Cyrillic alphabet: СтопХам, Стоп Хам, Стопхам. Select 
results that featured unrelated topics were removed. A total of 307 news pieces were 
analysed in the frame of this research: 4 from Channel One; 48 from NTV; 149 from Rent 
TV; 98 from Russia-24; and 8 from TV Rain (for details on methodological approaches 
see Annexe II). Content analysis demonstrates the important role of traditional media 
in framing social justice and in giving voice to respective actors. Whether StopXam 
members are heroes or hooligans is a contested view, and media analysis reveals that 
perceptions have changed over time.
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Layers of Target Vulnerabilities 
Hate-based movements in Russia target ethnic minorities, labour migrants and alleged 
paedophiles. Targets are identified through social networks and eventually fall victim 
to embodied confrontation and humiliation filmed on camera and shared online. Some 
groups exclusively target Muslim women and expose them to collective shaming and 
moralising. In the country’s conservative regions such as Chechnya, this exposure 
can lead to physical abuse and even ‘honour execution’. Chapter 5 “Layers of target 
vulnerabilities in digital vigilantism” addresses the case of the so-called patriot groups 
composed of male Kyrgyz migrants who punish Kyrgyz women through ‘honour 
beating’ for interaction with representatives of other ethnic groups while in Russia. 
By addressing the selected case, this chapter aims to further inform the scientific 
discussion, debate, and exchange on the role, benefits, and harms that digital media can 
bring into the lives of vulnerable groups such as labour migrants. The chapter responds 
to the following question: How are the established social, political, and economic 
inequalities, as well as racial, ethnic, and other biases impacting social justice manifested 
in the digital domain? Capable of reinforcing the “existing social relationships” (van Dijk, 
2012, p. 243), where they “culminate in a coordinated mass persecution of a targeted 
citizen” (Trottier, 2017, p. 61), these biases can re-enter the offline sphere and further 
influence the discourse.
The male ‘patriots’ undress women, beat them, shave their eyebrows off, sexually 
assault them. The entire process is filmed and shared online. While filming, they force 
women to reveal their identity and home address and to say that they are sorry for 
interacting with non-Kyrgyz men in order to “send a message” to others (Beishenbek 
Kyzy & Bigg, 2012). The case of Kyrgyz ‘patriots’ illustrates hierarchies of vulnerability 
among targets as labour migrants are targeted by far-right anti-immigrant groups in 
Russia, while female migrants also fall victim to abuse by fellow male compatriots.
(Con)Trolling the Web: Internet Governance in Russia
After addressing the historical premises, contemporary cases, the roles of digital and 
traditional media and target experiences, it is important to also consider the legal and 
digital milieus in which these practices take place. The aim of Chapter 6 “(Con)Trolling 
the web: Internet governance in Russia” is to assess the state of media control in Russia by 
investigating the logic of social media user arrests. The chapter responds to the following 
questions: What is the logic behind social media user arrests in Russia? What specific 
online activities can lead to litigation? It concludes that ambiguity and monomania of 
social-media control structures in Russia make everyone potentially vulnerable. In such 
circumstances, social media users simply do not and cannot know whether or not they 
will face the law for their online engagements–a condition capable of stimulating self-
censorship. 
The research begins with the analysis of legal frameworks, as several criminal code 
articles have been amended and applied to online speech, leading to accusations in 
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extremism and terrorism not only for expressed opinions, but even for mere ‘likes’. 
Furthermore, 990 cases of litigation against social media users were investigated to 
illustrate who is being targeted and over what type of online self-expression. 
The chapter identifies state-loyal vigilante forces recruited to snitch on fellow 
citizens and monitor the web for undesired content. It also presents citizen counter-
forces to repressive state mechanisms and their operation tactics. Four types of charges 
against social media users can be identified based on the study: 1) Authentic – real cases 
instigated over real hate-speech. 2) Tactical – made-up cases targeting state critics. 3) 
Practical – targeting people with limited financial and social capital for police to fill case 
quotas. 4) Random – accidental persons facing the law due to vague definitions and 
broad interpretations. All four categories can be described as invasive as in some cases 
citizens face the law for content shared in private photo albums on VKontakte (Russia’s 
Facebook analogue). This level of invasiveness is an indication of a collaboration 
between law enforcement and the platform.
There are certain themes in social media posts that can nearly guarantee a 
vulnerability to litigation. Among these are posts challenging the ruling elites, calls for 
protests, posts concerning the Orthodox Church, World War II, xenophobic posts, and 
posts related to Russia-Ukraine conflict. The spectrum of topics is broadened with every 
new case of accusation and with new legislation governing online speech. Sometimes 
there are contradicting combinations as both misogynist and feminist, religious and 
atheist posts can lead to litigation. Most of the analysed cases concerned posts shared 
or ‘liked’ on VKontakte social network. Although nearly all other mainstream social 
media platforms are represented, VKontakte is the leader when it comes to legal cases 
concerning online content. 
The applicability of the law is selective in Russia. This selectivity exemplifies a 
scenario where critics of the state can be punished for their off- and online activities. 
When a person is challenging the ruling elites offline, their online trace will also fall 
under scrutiny. Due to technical and financial inability to replicate a Chinese-style 
“Firewall”, Russia’s ruling elite opted for trolling the web through the spread of fear 
via repressive legislation, selective arrests, and regime-loyal citizens acting out in the 
manner that echoes the country’s totalitarian past. Citizens can report on other citizens 
for personal reasons. Furthermore, equipped with quotas, police officers can use vague 
legal frameworks to arrest random users and fill their case-solving statistics. Citizen 
counter-forces to the state are present, but are weaker than the united forces of elites, law 
enforcement, recruited citizens and state-loyal/state-compliant social media platforms. 
Counter-forces are in a weaker position due to limited capacity, disproportionality of 




Having compared the historical context to contemporary practices, this dissertation 
revealed some important similarities and differences. Among the reincarnated 
approaches, the dissertation identified the role of the state in support of select 
vigilantes and collaboration between these state-approved watchful citizens and law 
enforcement authorities. At the same time, new modes of visibility allow watchful 
citizens to potentially turn against the ‘feeding hand’ and expose the ruling elites and the 
police. In this regard, the relationship between vigilantes and the state is characterised 
by waves of endorsement and condemnation. Among the differences between Soviet-
era citizen recruitment for justice provision and contemporary digital vigilantism in 
Russia, this dissertation points to the shift of central actors, such as participants and 
targets. While in the Soviet times, state-recruited vigilant citizens tended to be well-
respected members of the society with achievements in military service or labour; in 
contemporary Russia, state-endorsed vigilantes are young people with no particular 
prior achievements aside for the demonstrated loyalty to the political status quo. On 
the contrary, participation in vigilant acts can grant these young people social, political, 
financial and other capital and advantages.
While visibility is instrumentalised to harm targets, it can bring about certain benefits 
to participants. Studies within this dissertation revealed that vigilantes can build a name 
for themselves online and become influential informal leaders. Through the use of logos, 
stickers, shirts and other paraphernalia, participants develop a corporation-resembling 
entity with powers of (dis)approval of franchise branches across and beyond Russia. 
Recognition and following by large audiences can bring about several benefits at once–
social, political, financial and legal. 
In terms of their social status, participants can gain recognition through participation. 
Sometimes leaders of vigilante formations are invited to speak as experts on a particular 
issue on the national television in Russia. In this regard, what can be observed is an 
act of professionalisation of amateurs through a self-made vigilante repertoire. Political 
aspects imply formal and informal powers. Formally, some participants were able to 
build a name for themselves and run for official positions in the Russian government. 
Informally, participants who enjoyed endorsement by the ruling elite also benefited 
from such recognition both in cases of interaction with law enforcement authorities 
and in terms of media portrayal of their activities. From the financial standpoint, 
participants can generate income via various sources. Among these are state grants in 
support of activities, YouTube monetisation, advertisement, paraphernalia sales, brand 
sales. In some cases, blackmailing of targets can also be a source of income. From the 
legal perspective, visibility and recognition rendered certain immunities to participants. 
As interviews have revealed, some vigilantes were able to blackmail police officers by 
threatening to expose them online. In this case, wide following on social media grants 
unique powers to vigilantes, sometimes exceeding those of legal authorities. However, 
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these benefits have shown to be temporal and highly dependent on the vision of the 
ruling elites.
In this regard, when certain invisible lines are crossed and participants become a 
threat to the elites, for instance, when they start targeting the political establishment 
and their relatives, or attacking national symbols that render legitimacy to individuals 
in power positions, visibility can be used against vigilantes. Video and photo material 
disseminated online to harm the targets can suddenly turn into pieces of evidence used 
against participants. Traditional media too can come into play and can both glorify and 
condemn participation. 
Traditional media has shown to play several important roles in the manifestation 
of digital vigilantism. First of all, traditional media framing of vigilante activities can 
influence public perceptions by frequently reporting on activities and by framing 
participants as positive characters fighting for the greater social good. Traditional media 
can also assist vigilantes in building their brand and expanding publicity. While doing 
so, traditional media can also bring further harms to the targets whose unsolicited and 
harmful exposure online is suddenly broadcasted on TV programmes and featured in 
newspapers.  
By focusing on both traditional and digital media, this dissertation underlined the 
importance of the audience in online punitive acts. Without the audience, the intensity 
of retaliation is challenged. By virtue of watching, liking, sharing, commenting on and 
otherwise engaging with YouTube videos shared by vigilantes, audience members 
contribute to the severity of unsolicited exposure experienced by targets. In this regard, 
digital vigilantism as a punitive practice can be compared to Foucauldian “spectacle of 
punishment” (Foucault, 1995). Akin to the medieval times, the audience is present at 
the scene of public torture and execution, albeit a virtual one. In the same way as was 
centuries ago, the audience is taught a lesson that essentially anyone can be in the place 
of the tortured subject. Foucault argues that such public torture of the past focused on 
damaging the body, while punitive measures of the 20th century in the form of prisons 
and insane asylums damaged people’s souls. In digital vigilantism the two can merge. 
When a person is physically attacked–their body is in pain; when this attack is filmed 
and shared online for the global audience to see in perpetual manner–a person’s dignity 
and reputation are also destroyed.  
While some may argue that in certain cases punishment of targets is justified because 
they committed serious crimes or breached moral and ethical norms, it is important 
to consider the layers of target vulnerabilities and to be reminded that in digital 






Digital vigilantism in Rusland
Burger-gestuurde gerechtigheid in de context van maatschappelijke 
veranderingen en maatschappelijke beschadiging
Dit proefschrift heeft geprobeerd antwoorden te vinden op de volgende vragen: 1) 
Hoe laten digitale burgerachten in Rusland zich kenmerken door historisch gesitueerde 
praktijken omtrent uitbesteedde, door het publiek gefinancierde, en vrijwillige burger-
gestuurde gerechtigheid, en omtrent het afkeuren, te schande maken en moraliseren 
van burgers door medeburgers? 2) Hoe is zichtbaarheid (wat onder andere gemedieerd 
te schande maken, moraliseren, intimideren en fysieke vergeldingsacties behelst) 
tot een wapen gemaakt door deelnemers? 3) Wat motiveert burgerparticipatie 
in- en staatsondersteuning van digitale burgerwachten? 4) Hoe worden digitale 
burgerwachten geframed en betekenis gegeven door zowel Russische staatsmedia 
als onafhankelijke Russische media? 5) Hoe wordt digitaal vigilantism ervaren door 
doelwitten in relatie tot sociale ongelijkheden, digitale scheidslijnen, sociale frustraties 
en vooroordelen? 6) Wat zijn de juridische en digitale medialandschappen waarin 
vigilantism plaatsvindt in Rusland?
Aan de hand van de artikelen die de hoofdstukken vormen van dit proefschrift, 
werd een antwoord gezocht op de overkoepelende puzzel van zowel de rol en invloed 
die sociale media kunnen hebben op de relatie tussen de soeverein (de staat) en 
haar burgers alsmede de modi van socialisatie van laatstgenoemde binnen de door 
de staat opgelegde structuren (of ondanks deze structuren). Dus de belangrijkste 
onderzoeksvraag werd als volgt vormgegeven: Hoe manifesteren praktijken van digitaal 
burgerwachten in Rusland zich in de relaties van staat tot burger en van burger tot 
burger?  Dergelijke staat-tot-burger en burger-tot-burger controledynamieken worden 
vergezeld door complexe verbanden van andere inter-relaties, waarin traditionele en 
digitale media een bemiddelende rol spelen. 
Hoofdstukoverzicht
Burger-gestuurde rechtvaardigheid toen en nu
Dit onderzoeksproject begon met een onderzoek naar de socioculturele factoren 
en historische praktijken die verband houden met het uitbesteden van juridische 
aangelegenheden aan burgers in Rusland en de impact van deze factoren en praktijken 
op de huidige manifestatie van digitaal gemedieerde burger-gestuurde gerechtigheid. 
Opgemerkt dient te worden dat de staat sinds de vroege vorming van het Sovjetimperium 
(Sieglebaum, 1992) burgers heeft gedwongen om gerechtigheid uit te oefenen over 
andere burgers (Sieglebaum, 1992). Om deze reden richt Hoofdstuk II “Burger-gestuurde 
rechtvaardigheid toen en nu: van kameradenrechtbank naar ‘dotcomrade’ vigilantism” 
richt zich op hoe in het Sovjettijdperk bepaalde juridische aangelegenheden werden 
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gedelegeerd naar burgers. De volgende vragen worden behandeld in het hoofdstuk: 
Wat zijn de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen het conventioneel communistisch 
en het digitaal gemedieerd postcommunistisch vigilantism in Rusland? Welke rol 
speelt de staat in manifestaties van gemedieerde burger-geleide rechtvaardigheid in 
postcommunistisch Rusland? 
De betrokkenheid van de bevolking in vigilantism en justitiële taken werd 
geïnstitutionaliseerd door de secretaris-secretaris van de Communistische Partij Nikita 
Khrushschev in de jaren ’50 met een formele introductie van de kameradenrechtbank 
(Gorlizki, 1998, p.403). De rechtbanken wilden “... de zaken van alledaagse moraliteit 
verkennen en gewag maken van voorbeelden van oneigenlijk gedrag door degenen die 
afwijken van de normen van het leven van de socialistische gemeenschap” (materialen 
van het 21st Communistisch Partijcongres geciteerd in Gorlizki, 1998, p. 424). Deze 
rechtbanken behandelden kleine misdaad, slechte prestaties op het werk, hooliganisme, 
alcoholisme, asociaal gedrag en dergelijke; ze kregen de bevoegdheid om straf toe te 
wijzen en uit te voeren of de zaak over te dragen aan andere staatsorganen mocht de 
ernst van een gegeven misdrijf buiten de reikwijdte van amateurrechters zijn, oftewel 
andere kameraden (hoogste raad van RSFSR, 1961). 
Het publiek te schande maken vond plaats in de vorm van de zogenaamde “zwarte 
raden van schaamte” waar foto’s van afwijkende gemeenschapsleden werden getoond 
voor het oog van het publiek. In feite hadden deze raden van schaamte een tegenpool 
in de vorm van “rode borden van eer” die hardwerkende communisten (Bondarev, 2012) 
vertoonden. Dergelijke methoden van openbare vertoningen en het publiek te schande 
maken lijken op moderne praktijken omtrent ‘exposing’, waarbij sociale media-platforms 
dienen als ruimtes voor het “markeren” van andere burgers wanneer ze afval op straat 
gooien, een slechte dienst leveren, of bij het anderszins waarnemen van een vorm 
van wangedrag (Loveluck, 2019). In de context van de sociale organisatie van Rusland 
bieden deze systemen een historische sociaal-culturele basis voor georganiseerde 
vigilante-groepen om collectief actie te ondernemen tegen een waargenomen misdrijf 
en te moraliseren en anderen publiek te schande te maken. 
In dit proefschrift wordt de rol van de staat behandeld als een traditionele kracht- 
en geweldmonopolist en, in het geval van Rusland, als media-superkracht (Orttung & 
Walker, 2013; Lipman, 2017; Freedomhouse, 2017). In tegenstelling tot de veronderstelde 
autonomie van vigilantes (Johnston, 1996), worden in Rusland succesvolle vigilante-
bewegingen goedgekeurd en ondersteund door de staat. Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt 
dus de nuances en complexiteiten van deze relatie, en de kenmerken en praktijken die 
goedkeuring van de staat kunnen wegdragen of, integendeel, tot tegenmaatregelen 
kunnen leiden. Sommige aspecten van de collectieve rechtspraak uit de Sovjetperiode, 
zoals te schande maken en moraliseren, lijken inderdaad opnieuw te zijn gereïncarneerd 
in het digitale domein. Andere nuances zijn echter ofwel geëvolueerd of uniek 
vanwege de nieuwheid van sociale media. Bijvoorbeeld, in de Sovjetperiode kregen 
geautoriseerde burgers participatieve bevoegdheden bij het moraliseren van andere 
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burgers; in hedendaags Rusland zijn deze acteurs echter vervangen door digitaal 
bekwame jongeren die door deelname sociale erkenning kunnen krijgen.
Vigilantes, hun mediaproducten en motieven voor deelname 
Na deze historische uitganspunten te hebben behandeld, zoomt het proefschrift 
in op hedendaagse en door de staat gesteunde groepen. Het nieuwe tijdperk van 
georganiseerde en geïnstitutionaliseerde burgerwachten in Rusland begint in 
2005 met de vorming van een pro-Kremlin-jongerengroep ‘Nashi’ [Onze] die “een 
belangrijke rol speelde in de politieke socialisatie van jongeren” (Krivonos & Fedorova, 
2014). Na te zijn ontbonden in 2012 liet Nashi soortgelijke bewegingen op federaal 
niveau achter (met franchisevestigingen in het hele land), zoals ‘StopXam’ [Stop een 
Douchebag] die slecht parkeren en verkeersovertredingen bestrijdt, en ‘Hrushi Protiv’ 
[Piggy Tegen] gespecialiseerd in het detecteren van verlopen houdbaarheidsdata van 
producten in supermarkten en markten. Beide groepen werden in 2010 opgericht door 
voormalige commissarissen en leden van de Nashi-beweging. Deze groepen hebben 
geprofiteerd van staatssubsidies in het kader van het presidentiële programma voor 
NGO-ondersteuning (Rubin & Rustamova, 2014; Rustamova, 2015). StopXam als Hrushi 
Protiv werken in vergelijkbare modi: een groep deelnemers nadert al filmend het 
doelwit en confronteert deze met aanstootgevend gedrag. Confrontatie leidt vaak tot 
het gebruik van obscene taal en geweld, soms escalerend in groepsgevechten. Video’s 
worden bewerkt, geüpload op YouTube en gedeeld op verschillende sociale platforms. 
Hoofdstuk 3 “YouTube als een podium voor vigilantism en gepolitiseerde, door burgers 
geleide gerechtigheid in Rusland” bevat Foucauldiaanse discoursanalyse (Arribas-
Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008) en behandeld de machtsverhoudingen tussen deelnemers, 
doelwitten en wetshandhaving. Video’s werden geanalyseerd met betrekking tot zowel 
spraak als beeld, met de nadruk op hoe de deelnemers zichzelf portretteren, het framen 
van doelwitten (vaak etnische minderheden en arbeidsmigranten) en het portretteren 
van de politiediensten (die er soms worden bijgehaald door zowel deelnemers als 
doelwitten) en andere formele en informele actoren (staatsfunctionarissen en populaire 
artiesten). Dit hoofdstuk roept dus de volgende vraag op: Welke vormen van door 
burgers geïnitieerd online activisme worden, te midden van het voortdurende harde 
optreden tegen online zelfexpressie in Rusland, getolereerd en zelfs onderschreven 
door de overheid en waarom? Daarnaast worden drie ondersteunende vragen gesteld: 
Wat zijn de drijfveren voor deelname aan digitale burgerwachten? Wat zijn de effecten 
van digitale waakzaamheid op doelwitten? Wat is de rol van platformmogelijkheden en 
regelgeving in digitaal vigilantism? 
Met de nadruk op mediaproducten van burgerwachten, draagt  het hoofdstuk 
bij aan de academische literatuur door verschillende machtshiërarchieën en 
belangennetwerken in de rechtsvoorziening tussen staat en burger en burger-
tot-burger aan het licht te brengen. Het biedt een gedetailleerd overzicht van hoe 
burgerwachten zoals Hrushi Protiv financiële, politieke en andere voordelen halen uit 
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hun activiteiten. Door loyaal te zijn aan de heersende elites en door de grenzen niet te 
overschrijden die deze elites zouden kunnen schaden, mogen groepen als Hrushi Protiv 
opereren in de normaal gesproken gecontroleerde digitale en publieke domeinen. De 
overheid heeft baat bij dergelijke burger-kritische groepen. Allereerst wordt de schuld 
niet bij politieke elites en het beleid gelegd. Burger-kritische groepen geven prioriteit 
aan gewetenloosheid op het niveau van het alledaagse, in tegenstelling tot het systeem 
zelf uit te dagen. Tegelijkertijd kan de regering, te midden van een intensivering van 
de controle, ernaar streven minder repressief te lijken dan ze is door een façade van 
activisme van het maatschappelijk middenveld in het land te demonstreren. 
De analyse onthulde dat de groep bevooroordeeld is jegens koopmannen van niet-
Slavische afkomst, aangezien mensen uit de Kaukasus en arbeidsmigranten uit Centraal-
Aziatische republieken van de voormalige Sovjet-Unie verantwoordelijk worden geacht 
voor verlopen producten in de schappen van Russische winkels. Platforms stellen 
gebruikers in staat om een inkomen te generen, een grote aanhang te verwerven, te 
adverteren en een discours te creëren via hun eigen sociale mediakanalen. Als zodanig 
maken platforms een omgeving mogelijk waarin digitaal vigilantism zich manifesteert. 
Deze omgeving is echter onderworpen aan binnenlandse regelgeving in de specifieke 
context van internetgovernance. 
Helden of hooligans? 
Na het behandelen van digitale mediaproducten, gaat het proefschrift verder met 
het beschouwen van de rol van traditionele media bij het framen van deelnemers, 
doelwitten, wetshandhavers en andere actoren. Mediadiscoursen rondom het fenomeen 
van digitale burgerwachten in bredere zin worden behandeld in hoofdstuk 4 “Helden of 
hooligans? De rol van traditionele media bij het betekenis geven aan digitale burgerwachten”. 
Dit hoofdstuk heeft tot doel de theoretische kaders van definitiedimensies van 
vigilantism uit te breiden door in te gaan op de rol van het publiek en traditionele media 
in de digitaal gemedieerde manifestatie van dit fenomeen. Het wil dit doen door de 
volgende vragen te beantwoorden: Hoe worden StopXam-deelnemers, hun doelwitten 
en politiediensten in de traditionele Russische media geportretteerd? Wat is de rol 
van traditionele media bij het betekenis geven aan digitale burgerwachten? Motieven 
voor deelname door groepen en individuen, evenals de schade die door doelwitten 
wordt ervaren, worden geëvalueerd tegen de achtergrond van sociale vooroordelen en 
frustraties die het digitale domein binnendringen en, bijgevolg, opnieuw in het offline 
discours terechtkomen. 
Dit hoofdstuk concentreerde zich op StopXam en gaat in op hoe de groep, haar 
doelwitten, en politiediensten in Russische staatsgezinde en onafhankelijke media in 
beeld worden gebracht, waarbij de rol van traditionele media in de manifestatie van 
digitale burgerwachten wordt onderzocht. 
Het hoofdstuk haalt haar voorbeelden uit de grootste zenders van Rusland: Channel 
One, NTV, Ren TV en Rossiia-24. De door de staat gecontroleerde media in Rusland zijn 
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een normbepaler die de positie van het heersende regime op zowel binnenlandse 
als internationale kwesties vertegenwoordigt. Een kwalitatieve inhoudsanalyse van 
rapporten over StopXam wordt toegepast om licht te werpen op de mediaperceptie 
van de rol en betekenis van digitale burgerwachten in de samenleving. Door te kijken 
naar een periode van acht jaar tussen 2010 en 2018, illustreert het hoofdstuk de evolutie 
in de berichtgeving over StopXam en koppelt het verhaalfluctuaties aan grotere sociaal-
politieke processen in het land. Naast deze staatstrouwe omroepen, behandelt het 
onderzoek ook TV Rain - een alternatieve stem die al zijn uitzendingen online moest 
verplaatsen vanwege staatsdruk en het onvermogen om inhoud via de kabel te leveren. 
Alle geselecteerde kanalen onderhouden websites met gearchiveerde 
nieuwsproducten in de vorm van video’s en getranscribeerde tekst. Nieuwsberichten 
werden verzameld door op variaties van de naamspelling van de groep in het Cyrillische 
alfabet te zoeken: СтопХам, Стоп Хам, Стопхам. Resultaten met niet-gerelateerde 
onderwerpen die zijn verwijderd. In het kader van dit onderzoek zijn in totaal 307 
nieuwsberichten geanalyseerd: 4 van Channel One; 48 van NTV; 149 van Ren TV; 98 
uit Rossiia-24; en 8 van TV Rain (voor details over methodologische benaderingen, zie 
bijlage II). De inhoudsanalyse toont de belangrijke rol aan van traditionele media bij het 
vormgeven van sociale rechtvaardigheid en het geven van een stem aan de respectieve 
actoren. Of StopXam-leden helden of hooligans zijn, is een omstreden mening, en uit 
media-analyse blijkt dat de perceptie in de loop van de tijd is veranderd. 
De gelaagde kwetsbaarheden van doelwitten
Door haat gemotiveerde bewegingen in Rusland richten zich op etnische minderheden, 
arbeidsmigranten en vermeende pedofielen. Doelwitten worden geïdentificeerd via 
sociale netwerken en worden uiteindelijk het slachtoffer van fysieke confrontatie en 
vernedering, gefilmd op camera en vervolgens online gedeeld. Sommige groepen 
richten zich uitsluitend op moslimvrouwen en stellen hen bloot aan collectieve schaamte 
en moralisering. In de conservatieve regio’s van het land, zoals Tsjetsjenië, kan deze 
blootstelling leiden tot fysieke mishandeling en zelfs ‘eervolle executie’. Hoofdstuk 5 
“De gelaagde kwetsbaarheden van doelwitten van digitale burgerwachten” behandelt 
zogenaamde patriotgroepen bestaande uit mannelijke Kirgizische migranten die 
Kirgizische vrouwen straffen door middel van ‘eerslagen’ voor interactie met leden van 
andere etnische groepen terwijl ze in Rusland waren.
In het behandelen van deze casus wil dit hoofdstuk de wetenschappelijke discussie, 
debatten en uitwisseling over de rol, voordelen en schade die digitale media kunnen 
brengen in het leven van kwetsbare groepen zoals arbeidsmigranten stimuleren. 
Het hoofdstuk beantwoordt de volgende vraag: Hoe manifesteren gevestigde 
sociale, politieke en economische ongelijkheden, evenals raciale, etnische en andere 
vooroordelen die van invloed zijn op sociale rechtvaardigheid, zich in het digitale 
domein? In staat om de “bestaande sociale relaties” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 243) te versterken, 
waar ze “uitmonden in een gecoördineerde massale vervolging van een beoogde 
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burger” (Trottier, 2017, p. 61), kunnen deze vooroordelen opnieuw binnenkomen in het 
offline domein en het discours verder beïnvloeden. De mannelijke ‘patriotten’ kleden 
vrouwen uit, slaan ze, scheren hun wenkbrauwen af, en randen ze aan. Het hele proces 
wordt gefilmd en online gedeeld. Tijdens het filmen dwingen ze vrouwen om hun 
identiteit en huisadres te onthullen en te zeggen dat ze spijt hebben van de interactie 
met niet-Kirgizische mannen om een  “boodschap te sturen” naar anderen (Beishenbek 
Kyzy & Bigg, 2012). Het geval van Kirgizische ‘patriotten’ illustreert hiërarchieën van 
kwetsbaarheid tussen doelwitten, aangezien arbeidsmigranten het doelwit zijn van 
extreemrechtse anti-immigrantengroepen in Rusland, terwijl vrouwelijke migranten 
ook het slachtoffer worden van misbruik door mannelijke landgenoten. 
(Con)Trollen op het web:Internetbestuur in Rusland 
Na de historische premissen, hedendaagse gevallen, de rol van digitale en traditionele 
media en de ervaringen van doelwitten te hebben behandeld, is het belangrijk om 
ook rekening te houden met de juridische en digitale omgevingen waarin deze 
praktijken plaatsvinden. Het doel van hoofdstuk 6 “(Con)Trolling the web: Internetbestuur 
in Rusland” is om de staat van mediacontrole in Rusland vast te kunnen stellen door 
de logica van arrestaties van gebruikers van sociale media te onderzoeken. Het 
hoofdstuk beantwoordt de volgende vragen: Wat is de logica achter de arrestaties van 
gebruikers van sociale media in Rusland? Welke specifieke online activiteiten kunnen 
leiden tot rechtszaken? Het concludeert dat ambiguïteit en monomanie van sociale-
mediacontrolestructuren in Rusland iedereen potentieel kwetsbaar maken. In dergelijke 
omstandigheden kunnen gebruikers van sociale media eenvoudigweg niet weten of ze 
al dan niet voor de wet zullen worden geconfronteerd met hun online activiteiten – een 
voorwaarde die zelfcensuur kan stimuleren. 
Het onderzoek begint met de analyse van juridische kaders, aangezien verschillende 
artikelen uit het wetboek van strafrecht zijn gewijzigd en toegepast op uitingen op het 
internet. Dit heeft geleid tot beschuldigingen van extremisme en terrorisme, niet alleen 
voor geuite meningen, maar zelfs voor het louter ‘liken’ van berichten. Verder werden 
990 rechtszaken tegen gebruikers van sociale media onderzocht om te illustreren wie 
de doelwitten zijn en welke soorten online zelfexpressie worden vervolgd. 
Het hoofdstuk identificeert burgerwachten die loyaal aan de staat zijn en 
gerekruteerd om medeburgers te verraden en het web te controleren op ongewenste 
inhoud. Het behandelt ook tegenkrachten van burgers, gericht tegen repressieve 
staatsmechanismen en hun operatietactieken. Op basis van het onderzoek kunnen vier 
soorten aanklachten tegen gebruikers van sociale media worden geïdentificeerd: 1) 
Authentiek – echte zaken die zijn ingegeven door daadwerkelijk haatzaaien. 2) Tactisch 
– verzonnen zaken gericht op staatscritici. 3) Praktisch – gericht op mensen met een 
beperkt financieel en sociaal kapitaal zodat de politie de zaakquota kan vullen. 4) 
Willekeurig – toevallige personen die voor de wet komen vanwege vage definities en 
brede interpretaties. Alle vier de categorieën kunnen als invasief worden omschreven, 
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aangezien burgers in sommige gevallen met de wet worden geconfronteerd voor inhoud 
die wordt gedeeld in privéfotoalbums op VKontakte (de Russische tegenhanger van 
Facebook). Hoe verreikend dit is indiceert een samenwerking tussen wetshandhaving 
en het platform. 
Er zijn bepaalde thema’s in berichten op sociale media die een ontvankelijkheid voor 
rechtszaken bijna kunnen garanderen. Hieronder vallen berichten die de heersende 
elites uitdagen, oproepen tot protesten, berichten over de orthodoxe kerk, de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog, xenofoob berichten en berichten over het conflict tussen Rusland en 
Oekraïne. Het spectrum van onderwerpen wordt verbreed met elke nieuwe beschuldiging 
en wetgeving omtrent online uitingen. Soms zijn er tegenstrijdige combinaties, 
aangezien zowel vrouwenhatende als feministische, religieuze en atheïstische berichten 
tot rechtszaken kunnen leiden. De meeste geanalyseerde gevallen hadden betrekking 
op berichten die werden gedeeld of ‘geliked’ op het sociale netwerk VKontakte. Hoewel 
bijna alle andere reguliere sociale-mediaplatforms vertegenwoordigd zijn, is VKontakte 
de leider als het gaat om rechtszaken met betrekking tot online inhoud. 
De toepasselijkheid van de wet is selectief in Rusland. Deze selectiviteit is een 
voorbeeld van een scenario waarin staatscritici kunnen worden gestraft voor hun off- en 
online-activiteiten. Wanneer een persoon de heersende elites offline uitdaagt, zal hun 
online spoor ook onder de loep worden genomen. Vanwege het technische en financiële 
onvermogen om een  “Firewall” in Chinese stijl te repliceren, koos de heersende elite van 
Rusland ervoor om het web te trollen door de verspreiding van angst via repressieve 
wetgeving, selectieve arrestaties en regime-loyale burgers die zich gedroegen op een 
manier die overeenkomt met het totalitair verleden. Burgers kunnen om persoonlijke 
redenen over andere burgers rapporteren. Bovendien kunnen politieagenten, uitgerust 
met quota, vage wettelijke kaders gebruiken om willekeurige gebruikers te arresteren 
en hun statistieken voor het oplossen van zaken te verbeteren. Tegenkrachten van 
de staat tegen de staat zijn aanwezig, maar zijn zwakker dan de verenigde krachten 
van elites, wetshandhavers, gerekruteerde burgers en staatsgetrouwe/staatconforme 
sociale media platforms. Tegenkrachten verkeren in een zwakkere positie door beperkte 
capaciteit, onevenredigheid van middelen en gebrek aan eenheid. 
Conclusie
Na vergelijking van de historische context met hedendaagse praktijken, bracht dit 
proefschrift enkele belangrijke overeenkomsten en verschillen aan het licht. Onder de 
gereïncarneerde benaderingen identificeerde het proefschrift de rol van de staat ter 
ondersteuning van geselecteerde burgerwachten en samenwerking tussen deze door 
de staat goedgekeurde waakzame burgers en wetshandhavingsinstanties. Tegelijkertijd 
stellen nieuwe vormen van zichtbaarheid waakzame burgers in staat zich mogelijk 
tegen de ‘voedende hand’ te keren en de heersende elites en de politie uit te lichten. In 
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dit opzicht wordt de relatie tussen burgerwachten en de staat gekenmerkt door golven 
van goedkeuring en veroordeling. Onder de verschillen tussen het rekruteren van 
burgers uit het Sovjettijdperk voor justitiële voorzieningen en hedendaagse digitale 
burgerwachten in Rusland wijst dit proefschrift op verschuivingen van centrale actoren, 
zoals deelnemers en doelwitten. Terwijl in de Sovjettijd door de staat aangeworven 
waakzame burgers de neiging hadden om gerespecteerde leden van de samenleving 
te zijn met prestaties in militaire dienst of arbeid zijn in het hedendaagse Rusland de 
door de staat gesteunde burgerwachten jonge mensen zonder bijzondere eerdere 
prestaties, afgezien van de getoonde loyaliteit aan de politieke status-quo. Integendeel, 
deelname aan waakzame handelingen kan deze jongeren sociaal, politiek, financieel 
kapitaal en andere voordelen opleveren. 
Hoewel zichtbaarheid wordt gebruikt om doelen schade te berokkenen, kan het 
bepaalde voordelen opleveren voor deelnemers. Studies binnen dit proefschrift 
hebben aangetoond dat burgerwachten online naam kunnen maken en invloedrijke 
informele leiders kunnen worden. Door het gebruik van logo’s, stickers, shirts en 
andere parafernalia ontwikkelen deelnemers een op een bedrijf lijkende entiteit met 
bevoegdheden tot het toestaan of afkeuren van franchisevestigingen in en buiten 
Rusland. Erkenning en navolging door een groot publiek kan verschillende voordelen 
tegelijk opleveren: sociaal, politiek, financieel en juridisch. 
In termen van hun sociale status kunnen deelnemers door participatie erkenning 
krijgen. Soms worden leiders van burgerwachtformaties uitgenodigd op de nationale 
televisie in Rusland om als experts over een bepaald onderwerp te spreken. Wat in dit 
verband kan worden waargenomen is professionalisering van amateurs door middel 
van een zelfgemaakt burgerwachtrepertoire. Politieke aspecten impliceren formele 
en informele bevoegdheden. Formeel waren sommige deelnemers in staat om een 
naam voor zichzelf op te bouwen en zich kandidaat te stellen voor officiële functies in 
de Russische regering. Informeel profiteerden deelnemers die steun genoten van de 
heersende elite ook van een dergelijke erkenning, zowel in gevallen van interactie met 
wetshandhavingsautoriteiten als in termen van mediaweergave van hun activiteiten. 
Vanuit financieel oogpunt kunnen deelnemers via verschillende bronnen inkomsten 
genereren. Hiertoe behoren overheidssubsidies ter ondersteuning van hun activiteiten, 
het genereren van inkomsten via YouTube, advertenties, de verkoop van parafernalia 
en merkverkoop. In sommige gevallen kan het chanteren van doelwitten ook een bron 
van inkomsten zijn. Vanuit juridisch oogpunt verleenden zichtbaarheid en erkenning 
bepaalde immuniteiten aan deelnemers. Zoals uit interviews is gebleken, waren 
sommige burgerwachten in staat om politieagenten te chanteren door te dreigen hen 
online te ontmaskeren. In dit geval geeft een brede aanhang op sociale media unieke 
bevoegdheden aan burgerwachten, soms zelfs meer dan die van juridische autoriteiten. 




In dit opzicht kan zichtbaarheid tegen burgerwachten worden gebruikt wanneer 
bepaalde onzichtbare lijnen worden overschreden en ze een bedreiging worden voor de 
elites, bijvoorbeeld wanneer ze zich gaan richten op het politieke establishment en hun 
familieleden, of nationale symbolen aanvallen die legitimiteit verlenen aan individuen 
in machtsposities. Video- en fotomateriaal dat online wordt verspreid om de doelen te 
schaden, kan plotseling worden omgezet in bewijsstukken die tegen deelnemers van 
burgerwachten worden gebruikt. Ook traditionele media kunnen een rol gaan spelen 
en kunnen deelname zowel verheerlijken als veroordelen. 
Traditionele media blijken een aantal belangrijke rollen te spelen bij de manifestatie 
van digitale burgerwachten. Ten eerste zou de traditionele media-framing van 
burgerwachtactiviteiten door frequent verslag uit te brengen over activiteiten, en 
door deelnemers te framen als positieve figuren die strijden voor het grotere sociale 
welzijn een grote invloed kunnen hebben op de publieke perceptie. Traditionele media 
kunnen burgerwachten ook helpen bij het opbouwen van hun merk en het vergroten 
van de publiciteit. Terwijl ze dit doen, kunnen traditionele media ook verdere schade 
toebrengen aan de doelwitten wiens ongevraagde en schadelijke blootstelling online 
plotseling wordt uitgezonden op tv-programma’s en in krantenartikelen wordt vermeld. 
Door te focussen op zowel traditionele als digitale media, onderstreepte dit 
proefschrift het belang van het publiek bij online strafmaatregelen. Zonder het 
publiek wordt de intensiteit van vergelding in twijfel getrokken. Door YouTube-video’s 
die door burgerwachten worden gedeeld te bekijken, leuk te vinden, te delen, te 
becommentariëren en anderszins te gebruiken, dragen kijkers bij aan de ernst van 
ongevraagde blootstelling die doelwitten ervaren. In dit opzicht kan digitale vigilantism 
als strafpraktijk worden vergeleken met het Foucauldiaanse idee van ‘spektakel van de 
straf’ (Foucault, 1995). Net als in de middeleeuwen is het publiek aanwezig op het toneel 
van openbare marteling en executie, zij het virtueel. Op dezelfde manier als eeuwen 
geleden, wordt het publiek een les geleerd dat in wezen iedereen in de plaats kan staan 
van het gemartelde onderwerp. Foucault stelt dat dergelijke openbare martelingen uit 
het verleden gericht waren op het beschadigen van het lichaam, terwijl strafmaatregelen 
van de 20e eeuw in de vorm van gevangenissen en krankzinnigengestichten de ziel van 
mensen beschadigden. In digitale burgerwacht kunnen de twee samenvloeien. Wanneer 
een persoon fysiek wordt aangevallen, heeft hun lichaam pijn; wanneer deze aanval 
wordt gefilmd en online wordt gedeeld zodat het wereldwijde publiek voortdurend 
kan zien, worden ook de waardigheid en reputatie van een persoon vernietigd. 
Hoewel sommigen beweren dat bestraffing van doelwitten in bepaalde gevallen 
gerechtvaardigd is omdat ze ernstige misdaden hebben begaan of morele en ethische 
normen hebben geschonden, is het belangrijk om de lagen van kwetsbaarheden van 
doelwitten in overweging te nemen en eraan te herinneren dat een eerlijk proces 







Publications made within the PhD Project:
Academic articles that make up chapters of this dissertation
1. Gabdulhakov, R. (in press). Are the pigs more equal than others? Media control and 
citizen-critical publics in Russia. Media and Communication, 9(4), X-X, https://doi.
org/10.17645/mac.v9i4.4233 
2. Gabdulhakov, R. (2020). (Con)Trolling the Web: Social Media User Arrests, State-
Supported Vigilantism and Citizen Counter-Forces in Russia. Global Crime. https://
doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2020.1719836
3. Gabdulhakov, R. (2020). Heroes or Hooligans? Media Portrayal of StopXam [Stop a 
Douchebag] Vigilantes in Russia. Laboratorium: Russian Review of Social Research 
11(3).16-45. https://doi.org/10.25285/2078-1938-2019-11-3-16-45
4. Gabdulhakov, R. (2019). In the Bullseye of Vigilantes: Mediated Vulnerabilities of 
Kyrgyz Labour Migrants in Russia. Media and Communication 7(2):230-241 https://doi.
org/10.17645/mac.v7i2.1927 
5. Gabdulhakov, R. (2018). Citizen-Led Justice in Post-Communist Russia: From 
Comrades’ Courts to Dotcomrade Vigilantism. Surveillance & Society, 16(3), 314-331. 
https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v16i3.6952
Academic articles published within the project but not included in this 
dissertation
1. Trottier, D., Huang, Q., Gabdulhakov, R. (2021). Covidiots as global acceleration of local 
surveillance practices. Surveillance & Society 19(1). 109-113. https://doi.org/10.24908/
ss.v19i1.14546 
2. Gabdulhakov, R., Trottier, D. (2020). Between “filter bubbles” and community 
leaders: An exploratory study of Facebook groups for Russophones/Russians in the 
Netherlands. Journal of Global Diaspora & Media 1(1). 89-105. https://doi.org/10.1386/
gdm_00006_1
3. Huang, Q., Gabdulhakov, R., Trottier, D. (2020). Online scrutiny of people with nice 
cars: A comparative analysis of Chinese, Russian, and Anglo-American outrage. 
Global Media and China, 1(14). https://doi.org/10.1177/2059436420901818   
4. Akbari, A., & Gabdulhakov, R. (2019). Platform Surveillance and Resistance in Iran 
and Russia: The Case of Telegram. Surveillance & Society, 17(1/2), 223-231. https://doi.
org/10.24908/ss.v17i1/2.12928
Book Chapters 
1. Trottier, D., Huang, Q., Gabdulhakov, R. (2020). Mediated Visibility as Making Vitriol 
Meaningful. In “Online Vitriol – On the History, Affect and Effects of Violence and 




1. Trottier, D., Gabdulhakov, R., Huang Q. (2020). Vigilant Audiences. Open Book 
Publishers https://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/1151
Publications meant for a broad audience
1. Gabdulhakov, R. Lockdown (dis)connect. EU-Central Asia Monitoring. (7 July 2021). 
https://eucentralasia.eu/lockdown-disconnect/ 
2. Gabdulhakov, R. Why likes and shares can cost you freedom in Russia. (23 November 
2020). https://bitescience.com/articles/why-likes-and-shares-can-cost-you-
freedom-in-russia/ 
3. Gabdulhakov, R. The Avengers vs the Orcs: Social media nuances in Kyrgyzstan’s 
(almost) third revolution. Oxus Society. (2020).
4. Gabdulhakov, R. Narrowing the digital divide in education: COVID-19 lessons for 
Uzbekistan. EU-Central Asia Monitoring. (31 August 2020). https://eucentralasia.
eu/2020/08/narrowing-the-digital-divide-in-uzbekistans-education-system-covid-
19-lessons/
5. Gabdulhakov, R. Digital vigilan…what? Why and how I study online citizen-led justice. 
(Blog). IBCoMagazine. (7 June 2020). https://ibcomagazine.com/2020/digital-
vigilantism/ 
6. Gabdulhakov, R. The FRRESH Take on Summer Schools. (Blog). ERMeCC PhD Club. (11 
September 2019). https://www.eur.nl/en/eshcc/news/frresh-take-summer-schools 
7. Gabdulhakov, R. A weapon in our hands or to our heads? (Blog). ERMeCC PhD Club. 
(Available: 5 July 2019). https://www.eur.nl/en/eshcc/news/weapon-our-hands-or-
our-heads 
8. Gabdulhakov, R. Two PhD Candidates team up to publish a paper. (Blog). ERMeCC PhD 
Club. (8 April 2019). https://www.eur.nl/en/eshcc/news/two-phd-candidates-team-
publish-paper 
9. Gabdulhakov, R.  Collaboration with external partners: Why? How? What are the 
consequences? (Blog). ERMeCC PhD Club. (Available: 27 March 2019). https://
www.eur.nl/en/eshcc/news/collaboration-external-partners-why-how-what-are-
consequences 
10. Gabdulhakov, R. Citizen-led justice? (Blog). Surveillance & Society.  (22 October 2018). 
https://medium.com/surveillance-and-society/citizen-led-justice-dea2e5b7136d 
11. Gabdulhakov, R. Diversity and inclusivity beyond the ivory tower: let’s “make it 






Teaching award “Media and Communication 2020”, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication. 
Media appearances
Current Time TV. (2020 September 9). “Unizhennyye chuzhimi, oplevannyye svoimi”. Kak v 
Rossii migranty iz Kyrgyzstana okhotyatsya na zemlyachek [“Humiliated by strangers, spat 
upon by their own.” How migrants from Kyrgyzstan hunt compatriots in Russia.] https://
www.currenttime.tv/a/kyrgyzstan-women-rights-migrants/30827794.html  
Courses taught during the PhD trajectory
2020-2021
1. MA Media Studies. MA thesis supervision. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands (supervisor for one student; second reader for 10 students)
2. BA 3. Communication and Media. Thesis supervision. Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
the Netherlands (supervisor for 10 students; second reader for 10 students)
3. BA 2. IBCoM. Research Seminar: New Media, Culture and Entertainment. Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the Netherlands (one group)
4. BA 1. IBCoM. Intercultural Communication. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands (one group)
5. BA 1. IBCoM. Media Systems in Comparative Perspective. Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (one group)
6. BA 2. IBCoM. International and Global Communication. Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (two groups) 
2019-2020
1. BA 2. IBCoM. International and Global Communication. Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (two groups) 
2. BA 1. IBCoM. Academic Skills. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands (one 
group)
3. Erasmus Voorbereidend Jaar. New Media for Integration Course: Social Benefits and 
Social Harms of Digital Media. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
4. Erasmus Voorbereidend Jaar. Social and Cultural Competences in the Digital Age. 




1. BA 2. IBCoM. International and Global Communication. Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (two groups) 
2. BA 1. IBCoM. Academic Skills. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands (one group)
3. BA 1. IBCoM. Media Systems in Comparative Perspective. Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (two groups)
4. Erasmus Voorbereidend Jaar. New Media for Integration Course: Social Benefits and 
Social Harms of Digital Media. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
2017-2018
1. BA 2. IBCoM. International and Global Communication. Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (two groups) 
2. BA 1. IBCoM. Academic Skills. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands (one 
group)
3. BA 1. IBCoM. Media Systems in Comparative Perspective. Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands (two groups)
Guest lectures
1. Russia’s digital media. Summer School: Russia in Covid Times. 15 July 2021. Ghent 
University. https://www.ugent.be/nl/agenda/summer-school-online-summer-
school-russia-in-covid 
2. Russia’ traditional media. Summer School: Russia in Covid Times. 14 July 2021. Ghent 
University. https://www.ugent.be/nl/agenda/summer-school-online-summer-
school-russia-in-covid
3. For the greater good? Surveillance in times of pandemic. Webster University, the Hague. 
24 March 2021.
4. Media Systems “Beyond” the Western World: The Case of Russia and Central Asia. Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, Guest Lecture IBCoM CM1008, Media Systems in Comparative 
Perspective. Online. 22 March 2021.
5. Media Systems “Beyond” the Western World: The Case of Russia and Central Asia. Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, Guest Lecture IBCoM CM1008, Media Systems in Comparative 
Perspective. 29 March 2019.
6. The role of digital media in storytelling. Erasmus University Rotterdam, Guest Lecture 
IBCoM CM2001 International and Global Communication. 30 September 2019. 
7. The role of digital media in storytelling. Erasmus University Rotterdam, Guest Lecture 
IBCoM CM2001 International and Global Communication. 25 September 2018. 
8. Media Systems Beyond the Western World. Erasmus University Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands, Guest Lecture IBCoM CM1008, Media Systems in Comparative 
Perspective. 23 March 2018. 
230
Portfolio
Select online activities amid the COVID-19 pandemic
1. CERCEC, the Centre for Russian, Caucasian and Central European Studies. Paris, 
France (online). “Disciplining social media users in Russia: no crime but punishment”. 
9 April 2021.  
2. Roundtable “Navalny and beyond: Assessing the protest in Russia”. Gent University, 
18 March 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DhqfqdSDpg 
3. Public Lecture “Putin’s media strategies and challenges in the digital age”. Organised 
by Eastern European Student Association of Erasmus University. https://www.eur.
nl/en/eshcc/news/lecture-putins-media-strategies-and-challenges-digital-age-be-
viewed-online 
4. Online course on “Digital Methods for Social Science”. Produced with “Cabar.Asia” 
Media School. Language: Russian. https://school.cabar.asia/ru/course/metody-
socialnyh-issledovanij-onlajn/ 
5. “Beyond the Headlines” Lunch Talk Series. Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Co-Producer and host. Language: English.  https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=iA783HtX7ow&feature=youtu.be 
6. Online course on “How to publish your work in academic journals”. Produced with 
“Cabar.Asia” Media School. Language: Russian. https://school.cabar.asia/ru/course/
tonkosti-publikacii-v-nauchnom-zhurnale/ 
7. Europe-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM). Online workshop on “Media Security”. 20 
October 2020. 
8. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Cabar.Asia School of Young Analysts. 
Presentation title: “Producing effective policy papers”. Online Workshop. 24 
September 2020.
9. OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Interactive Workshop on Digital Tools and Challenges 
Amid the Global Pandemic. Online Workshop. 24 July 2020.
10. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Cabar.Asia Media School. Presentation title: 




1. St. Petersburg State University, Russia. Comparative Media Studies in Today’s World 
9th International Conference [Online] 20-21 April 2021.
2. Netherlands Flanders Communication Association (NeFCA), Etmaal 2021 [Online]. 
Popular Communication cluster. Presenter. 5 February 2021 https://nefca.eu/
etmaal-2021/etmaal-2021-popular-communication/ 
3. RightsCon Online Panel moderator. “Digital Fights for Digital Rights? Investigating 
231
Portfolio
Privacy in the Global South”. [Online] 27-31 July 2020. https://www.rightscon.org/ 
4. Internet Governance Forum. 25-29 November 2019. Berlin, Germany. https://www.
intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2019
5. SEnECA Conference on EU-Central Asia Relations. “Central Asia and the EU: 
knowledge transfer, communication tools and awareness-raising”. 14-15 November 
2019. Brussels, Belgium. https://www.seneca-eu.net/news/register-for-seneca-
conference/
6. ECREA Conference Digital Fortress Europe. “Russophone Social Media Groups in the 
Netherlands: At Home Among the Strangers?” 30-31 October 2019. Brussels, Belgium.
7. The 17th Chinese Internet Research Conference: Digital Cultures: Chinese Internet 
and Beyond. Presenter. 28 June 2019. Singapore.
8. St. Petersburg State University, Russia. Comparative Media Studies in Today’s World 
7th International Conference. 16-18 April 2019. http://cmstw2019.org/
9. Surveillance Studies Network (SSN). Presentation title: “Unsanctioned Hooligans or 
Endorsed Peoples’ Activists? Discourses on Digital Vigilantes in the Russian Media”. 
Aarhus, Denmark, 7-9 June 2018 http://conferences.au.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/
SSN2018-program-online-3_small.pdf
10. Cambridge University. British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies 
(BASEES) Conference. Cambridge, United Kingdom. 13-15 April 2018 http://www.
basees2018.org/
11. Georgetown University’s Seventh Annual International Conference on Cyber 
Engagement. Invited Expert. News, Alternative Facts, and Propaganda: The Role 
of Cyber in Influence Operations. 24 April 2017. Washington DC, USA. https://
georgetown.app.box.com/s/ltwmsza9jf6bkfk48b73hz7qvh2stihf
Co-organised conferences 
1. Surveillance Studies Network, 9th biennial conference. Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
(postponed to 2022, due to COVID-19 pandemic). 
2. International Symposium. “Vigilant Audiences: Scrutiny, Denunciation, and Shaming 





1. The University of Tokyo. Vigilant Practices in the Digitally-Mediated Public: A 
Global Perspective. Academic Workshop. Presenter. 2 July 2019. Tokyo, Japan. 
https://ru.plovism.com/post/webinar-for-osce-academy-alumni-digital-tools-and-
challenges-amid-the-pandemic
2. Aleksanteri Institute. Media control as a source of political power in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Academic Workshop. Presenter. 2-3 September 2019. Helsinki, 
Finland.
3. Centre for European Security Studies/EU-Central Asian Monitoring. Media in 
Security Workshop. Lecturer. Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 16 October 2019. https://
eucentralasia.eu/
4. Centre for European Security Studies/EU-Central Asian Monitoring. Media in 
Security Workshop. Lecturer. Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 12 October 2018. https://
eucentralasia.eu/
12. Center for European Security Studies/EU-Central Asian Monitoring. Media in Security 
Workshop. Lecturer.  Groningen, the Netherlands. 4 June 2018. https://eucentralasia.
eu/
13. Lorenz Center. Data Sharing for Law Enforcement Workshop. Participant. Leiden, the 
Netherlands.  28-31 May 2018. 
14. European External Action. EU Special Representative for Central Asia Workshop. 
Participant. Almaty, Kazakhstan. 25-26 April 2018. European External Action.
15. CERI Sciences Po, Paris, France. Digital Vigilantism in Russia: Methods. Workshop on 
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of digital vigilantism. 22 February 2018. 
Academic exchanges
1. St.Petersburg State University, the Russian Federation. Erasmus+ Teaching Exchange. 
Guest Lecturer in the MA and BA programmes. March 2020
2. Sciences Po, Paris, France. Erasmus+ Exchange. Guest Lecturer in the MA programme. 
April 2019
3. Moscow Higher School of Economics, the Russian Federation. Visiting Research 
Fellow. April-May 2018
4. OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. Guest Lecturer in the MA programme. 




1. Second Lisbon Winter School on Media and Uncertainty. 7-11 January 2020. Lisbon, 
Portugal. https://www.lisbonwinterschool.com/
2. The Finnish Russian network in Russian and Eurasian studies in the field of social 
sciences and humanities (FRRESH). Summer School. Participant. 26-30 August 2019. 
Orilampi, Finland. 
3. Research School for Media Studies (RMeS). Winter School and Graduate Symposium. 
23-24 January 2018. 
Memberships held and academic services performed during the 
PhD trajectory
1. Europe-Central Asia Monitoring (EUCAM) Advisory Board Member
2. Research School for Media Studies (RMeS) PhD Council Member and Co-Chair
3. British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES) Member
4. Surveillance Studies Network (SSN) Member
5. Surveillance in The Global South Network Member
6. PhD Club Blog Editor at the ESHCC’s ERMeCC
7. Representative of Erasmus University in NeFCA PhD dissertation awards jury
Peer reviewing experience
International Journal of Press/Politics – 1 article 
Surveillance & Society (Canada) – 4 articles 
First Monday (United States) –  1 article 
Mediální studia/Media Studies (Czechia) – 1 article 
234
Portfolio
Courses followed during the PhD trajectory 
Course title Institution EC Date
Ethnography and its varieties EGSH 2,50 06-05-2017
Introduction to participatory action research EGSH 0 May 2017
Cross-cultural awareness and communication EGSH 0 August 2017 
Making an academic poster that stands out EGSH 0 September 2017
Work-life balance EGSH 1 13-09-2017
Brush up your research design EGSH 2,50 13-10-2017
Delphi technique EGSH 1,50 04-12-2017
RMeS Winter School RMeS 2 23-01-2018
Atlas.ti EGSH 1 01-02-2018
Basic didactics Risbo 1 02-02-2018
Qualitative data analysis EGSH 2,50 04-10-2018
Great thinkers of the 20th century EGSH 2,50 12-02-2018
Teaching in International Classroom TOP in collaboration with 
Community for Learning 
and Innovation (CLI)
0 November 2018
The dean’s master class: “December Rituals” EGSH 0 09-12-2018
Professionalism and integrity in research EGSH 1 24-01-2019
How to construct open-ended questions Risbo 0 February 2019
Summer School. The Finnish Russian network in 
Russian and Eurasian studies in the field of social 
sciences and humanities (FRRESH).
University of Helsinki. 5 26-08-2019
Lisbon Winter School for the Study of 
Communication 
UCP Lisbon 5 07-01-2020
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